Month: July 2021

Draft Essay: Impartiality and Judicial Review

The aim of this paper is to address a worry with Ronald Den Otter’s case for judicial review. Den Otter’s argument rests on the notion of “public reason.” The term is used here to mean a justification for principles and rules which cannot be rejected by reasonable people on reasonable grounds. Granting Den Otter’s argument up to the point that judges are indeed best suited to come up with a set of sufficiently public reasons, there is a worry with how judges must decide between multiple public reasons and end with the “best” public reason. Some principle is necessary to guide this decision-making process. I think this principle, as evident in public reasons, is the principle of impartiality (and neutrality). This essay begins with an explication of impartiality and finds a notion of neutrality at its core. With this in place, I explore impartiality and neutrality within Den Otter’s picture, eventually leading up to the worry about judicial review. I argue that judges cannot be sufficiently (and consistently) impartial in deciding the best public reason from a set of sufficiently public reasons; as such, if we want to move closer to impartiality, we must move the voting from the judges to the citizens.  

To set the stage for our discussion, let me begin by providing a sketch of what I mean by “neutrality” and “impartiality.” First, some caveats. It is crucial to distinguish these two terms; often, these terms are conflated and the distinction is blurred. For instance, judges are synonymously labelled as “impartial” and as “neutral.” This makes things unclear, especially when we want to understand how to conceptualize the function of these terms. In short, I think neutrality is a necessary condition of impartiality, meaning one of the features of impartiality is that it carries the notion of neutrality.

Let me start by first sketching a basic picture of the structure of impartiality. Impartiality is a concept typically found in discussions of morality, and these discussions help illuminate some of the dimensions of impartiality. One dimension of impartiality is impersonal, meaning dispassionate or indifferent. In this case, the good judge is impartial insofar as they are not swayed by emotions or weigh in personal considerations – for example, an angry judge should not deliver a harsher sentence to a defendant, nor should the judge deliver a more lenient sentence because the judge and defendant both enjoy jazz music. Another dimension of impartiality is equality, which suggests a level playing field for all. When I say “all,” I want to remain neutral to the fact that it can encompass an impartial assessment of moral rules, conceptions of good, and other abstract conception, and not just moral agents. Here is a moral example of impartial equality: William Godwin (Godwin, 1793) imagines a scenario where one must choose to either save a chambermaid or Fenelon (the archbishop of Cambrai) from a fire. If the rule was to promote the best consequence, the clear outcome would be saving Fenelon, since he benefits thousands with his works. Even if the chambermaid was one’s own wife or mother, they would still be on a level playing field insofar as the rule to promote the best consequence, and Fenelon would still choose the archbishop over one’s own wife or mother in promoting the best consequence. This is far from an exhaustive account of impartiality, but we have enough of a sketch to move on.

Let me end this discussion on impartiality with a more formal definition, provided by Bernard Gert, we can later make reference to: “A is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and only if A’s actions in respect R are not influence at all by which member(s) of G are benefited or harmed by these actions.” (Gert, 1995) There a couple things to note here. This formulation is not strictly a moral formulation. This formulation makes reference to an agent’s point of view (the agent being “A”) and how this agent executes (or, the “actions”) impartial treatment. Furthermore, it is always with reference to another agent (or, “group G”) and how they are treated (or, “in respect R”). Neutrality seems to be thematic in this conception of impartiality.

Before exploring the relationship between neutrality and impartiality, let me briefly outline what is meant by “neutral.” The relevant type of neutrality for our discussion concerns actions; that is, similar to our formulation of impartiality, neutrality regulates how one acts. For instance, Joseph Raz (Raz, 1998) gives the example of being neutral between conceptions of good. He writes, “Such a principle [neutrality] will require the state to react in a way yet to be specified, i.e. neutrally, to disagreements about conceptions of the good […]” (p. 31) Here, the state’s actions are regulated by neutrality, and its correspondingly neutral actions are such that they are unspecific with respect to (in this case) conceptions of the good. Perhaps we can modify Gert’s impartiality formulation for neutrality: A is neutral in respect R with regard to view V if and only if A’s actions in respect R are yet to be specified to view V.

So how does neutrality map onto impartiality? Taking, for instance, the first dimension mentioned above, impartiality as being impersonal might incorporate neutrality in that we remain neutral to our views as subjective individuals. Thomas Nagel (with the help of Derek Parfit) can help us out here with the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral. (Nagel, 1986) The basic idea is that a reason for action is agent-relative if it makes some reference essential reference to a person, and it is agent-neutral if it does not. If I were a judge, I would act on agent-relative reasons if delivered a harsher sentence because the defendant made me angry (since my anger is a reason for me but nobody else). Similarly, moving to the second dimension mentioned above, my reasons to save my wife over Fenelon are reasons for me and nobody else (after all, my wife is not anybody else’s wife, hopefully). In effect, my acting agent-neutrally is to act in a way in which agent-relative reasons are yet to be specified. Now to address the question of the relation between neutrality and impartiality: neutrality is a necessary condition to impartiality, but neutrality on its own denotes a more narrow idea of non-specificity.

                  Before investigating in any depth the relevant uses of impartiality and neutrality in Den Otter’s picture, it is appropriate for clarity’s sake to merely identify them first. To do this, let me first give an overhead view of Den Otter’s enterprise, then magnify on the parts relevant to impartiality and neutrality. Den Otter’s uses the Rawlsian idea of public reason to justify judicial review. Den Otter’s view arises in the context of value pluralism within a liberal democracy. A plurality of values is problematic when the fundamental values of the citizens are in conflict with the values held by the state. The state, in accordance with its values, issues coercive authority, and this coercive authority must be justified to the citizens. This justification comes in the form of public justification; namely, a justification which cannot be reasonably rejected. Public justification must be grounded in public reasons, which are characteristically anti-perfectionist. Den Otter notes: “Rawlsian public reason is premised on the fundamental distinction between what is true and what is reasonable.” (p. 165) The aim here is not truth, rather it is finding a justification which would be acceptable to all reasonable dissenters. Much is devoted to the nature of public reasons and the appropriate steps to arriving at sufficiently public reasons.

Diving a little further in, Den Otter’s more controversial thesis is that judges are the best at coming up with public reasons. Working within a framework of constitutional liberalism, judges take from the abstract theory of public reasons and translate it into concrete notions of freedom and equality; with this, they may adjudicate controversial cases in a way which is publically justified. Den Otter’s premise in favouring judges over anybody else is a practical one. He writes that leaving it to citizens entails an “unrealistic assumptions about their civic capacities,” (p. 20) and also notes that “courts cannot save Americans from themselves, but they can help them to understand the importance of protecting the freedom and equality of everyone when certain constitutional questions arise.” (p. 19) It is difficult to see if there is a principled reason for judges being better at coming up with public reasons. Den Otter adds: “that judges are more likely to be able to identify sufficiently public reasons than citizens and their elected representatives are in the most important constitutional cases.” (p. 20) By and large, Den Otter seems to rest his argument on contingent claims.

With this general picture in place, let us return to our aim of identifying the relevance of neutrality and impartiality in Den Otter’s picture. To start, the Rawlsian liberal framework is supposedly neutral, and impartial in its genesis. This sets the stage for the crux of our discussion: how judges must be impartial. (Here, we must grant Den Otter’s claim that the judges are the best at identifying public reasons.) First, judges must be impartial when coming up with public reasons. Second, I think judges must also be impartial after coming up with multiple sufficiently public reasons and deciding which one public reason to commit to. I argue that judges fail in this second respect.

Let us begin by investigating the first claim to neutrality and impartiality which underlies the Rawlsian liberal framework. Starting again with a rough sketch, Raz (1990) identifies four themes in the view put forth by Rawls. First, “limited applicability” refers to the fact that the Rawlsian view is not a comprehensive theory of justice; rather, its application is limited to a modern constitutional democracy, where there is a pluralistic society with a generally shared common culture. (p. 7) Second, “shallow foundations,” what Raz has issues with, refers to the fact that justifications must be founded on the “common currency of our public culture.” (p. 8) Third, the “autonomous” feature adds the idea that Rawls does not start with general moral truths – in fact, it is indifferent to what is truth – rather, its starting point is within common culture. Fourth and finally, “epistemic abstinence” highlights the idea that the doctrine of justice does not claim to be true; that is, some truths are off limits (regardless of their truth value) because they are not sufficiently “public.” This, according to Raz (p. 10), is motivated in the name of stability and social unity; moreover, they are commitments tied to the Rawlsian liberal framework. These four themes are useful to keep in mind, and we will make reference to them in our discussions of impartiality.

Now, what is the relationship between a liberal framework and impartiality? Nagel (1987) goes into the paradoxical nature of liberalism and its notion of impartiality. He notes that whatever our conception of politically endorsed morality is, it must be impartial; what people disagree on is what this impartial morality is supposed to be, and this calls for a “higher-order impartiality.” (p. 217) In Nagel’s words, higher-order impartiality is necessary for liberalism because, “in politics, where we are all competing to get the coercive power of state behind the institutions we favour – institutions under which all of us will have to live – it is not only our personal interests, attachments, and commitments that bring us into conflict, but out different moral conceptions.” (p. 215-216) The higher-order impartiality is important for questions of political legitimacy and justifying coercive force. Talk of this sort of “higher-order” impartiality has been very abstract thus far, so perhaps an illustration will help clarify what is being discussed. I think this sort of impartiality is apparent when applied to moral rules. Let us begin by distinguishing what would be “lower-order” impartiality. Take for instance the rule, “Do not break promises.” We can be impartial insofar as executing this rule by not making any exceptions to this rule; so, for instance, we would be equally diligent in keeping a promise to a stranger as we would our spouses. Now, “higher-order” impartiality would refer to us being impartial when we come up with moral rules. A moral rule like, “Christians may break promises,” would not be impartial because it shows favour to Christians. There is a difficulty, however, with this “higher-order” impartiality, and it relates to the grounds for one’s belief something is impartial.

There is a problem with competing conceptions of impartiality. For example, take again the rule, “Do not break promises.” This might seem sufficiently impartial, but somebody might retort, “There are clearly cases where breaking promises is permitted or even required morally.” These exceptions seem to violate impartiality. Even if you believe that the rule against breaking promises is sufficiently impartial, clearly the opponent is not unreasonable for rejecting it. What do you appeal to when facing this opponent? The answer to this question sheds light on how impartiality is tied into the conception of liberalism. Liberalism provides “a maximally impartial standard of right which has priority over more specialized conceptions in determining what may be imposed on us by our fellow humans, and vice versa.” (p. 239) In the end, the liberal framework is an impartial framework which trumps all other purported impartial frameworks.

Nagel warns that liberalism must not be conceived as committed to the moral ideals of autonomy and individuality, or else it would become “just another sectarian doctrine.” (p. 223) The aim is a framework from which we can assess all other doctrines. Thus, liberalism must be defended as a theory of impartiality, or a theory that is inextricable with an interpretation of impartiality. The conception of impartiality assesses not only benevolence and how coercion are to be exercised, but higher-order concerns of how we identify benefits or coercion. Liberal impartiality strays from Gert’s formulation of impartiality in that it is directed towards beliefs rather than actions. In Nagel’s words, liberal impartiality tries to make “the epistemological standpoint of morality impersonal as well.” (p. 230)

Let us now investigate how the judge must be impartial when coming up with public reasons. Returning to the more general, formal definition: “A is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and only if A’s actions in respect R are not influence at all by which member(s) of G are benefited or harmed by these actions.” “Actions,” for the judge, would be coercive actions – the goal, then, is justified coercive actions vis-a-vis public reasons. Using the categories provided by Raz, judges must be impartial in accordance with two themes: “shallow foundations” and “epistemic abstinence.” Shallow foundations refer to the impartiality insofar as neutrality towards theories of good (anti-perfectionist).  To be neutral to theories of good means that any public reason must not favor a specific value system – for instance, a non-neutral theory of the good might be that God (and a life devote to God) is the best kind of life, or perhaps that a life devoted to pursuing the pleasures of chocolate is the best kind of life. This is problematic because any coercion based on some particular theory of the good unjustly violates the autonomy of those not committed to that particular theory of the good (e.g. perhaps the coercive theistic laws infringe on the chocolate-eaters’ way of life). Similarly, when we talk of judges showing “epistemic abstinence,” it means that that judges must put aside their own views on truth, particularly in regards to a doctrine of justice. Raz writes that “certain truths should not be taken into account because, though true, they are of an epistemic unsuited for public life.” (p. 4) Again, even if it were true beyond a doubt that worshipping God our ultimate purpose in life, judges would need to put these sorts of truths aside when coming up with public reasons. This second theme, “epistemic abstinence,” reflects liberal impartiality – that is, it demands that conceptions of truth need to be impartial. Judges must be impartial in this sense in coming up with sufficiently public reasons, but they must also be liberally impartial in the second step of weighing between different public reasons.

As we move to my main argument, let me first clarify the problem. Den Otter writes that a second challenge for the judges after coming up with sufficiently public reasons is weighing “the remaining public reasons appropriately in reaching the conclusion that is most publicly justified.” (p. 186) Den Otter seems to be more concerned with the method involved of coming up with sufficiently public reasons and arguing that judges are the best filters for ending up with a set of public reasons. But the further issue is that once we have public reasons, judges must decide which from the set is best; moreover, at this point, the sort of reasoning involved in coming up with public reasons runs out and the judges must use their own discretion. Sincere, good faith attempts by the judges still seem problematic. The judges have various biases, like political commitments, which seem to subtly distort their judgement so that the “best” public reason we end up with is skewed. For example, imagine there were sufficiently public reasons to support abortion on one side, and there were sufficiently public reasons against abortion on the other side. Public reason cannot help judges decide between the two. If we imagine further that the judges in charge of the decision were conservative, we may end up with a publically justified law against abortion every time. This seems unfair to someone who supports abortion. Nevertheless, I think there is a way of making this fairer.

The judges, when deciding between competing public reasons, must be pushed to liberal impartial. There is something that sounds initially circular about this proposal. Since judges must be impartial in coming up with public reasons, and the set of public reasons they end up with have some notion of neutrality embedded in them, it seems odd to expect that a further impartiality would give novel answers to the question of which public reason is best. But this misses the point: judges engage in a different kind of reasoning when weighing public reasons. Let us track the uses of impartiality in these modes of reasoning. In merely identifying public reasons, the judges use the sort of general, action-oriented impartiality formulated by Gert. In weighing multiple sufficiently public reasons, the judges engage in an epistemic, liberal impartiality. Since the public reasons are already impartial in the prior senses, we need a different sort of impartiality to adjudicate between public reasons.

Judges are not well-suited for satisfying the demands of liberal impartiality. When weighing public reasons, judges must resort to their comprehensive doctrines, in some sense, because their adjudication requires some commitment to the truth of certain claims. To illustrate, imagine there are sufficiently public reasons both pro-affirmative action and anti-affirmative action, and judges must adjudicate on which public reason is best. The judge might weigh the pro-affirmative action side more heavily because of his understanding of equality and equity. Another judge might give weight because of her understanding of sociological theories. The weight attributed to public reasons is going to reflect some conception of truth on the part of the judge. Any adjudication is going to be epistemically partial.

Perhaps this is the best we can do. This sort of partiality seems like a cognitive deficiency that nobody can get around. The solution might be to let the judges, with their good faith attempts at the truth, vote amongst themselves. But this does not lead to solution that is epistemically impartial. There may be some cognitive bias particular to judges, just as there are cognitive biases particular to scientists (for instance, a naturalistic or mechanistic view of the world).  If our aim is liberal impartiality, which entails epistemic impartiality, it seems the best solution is to let the people decide.

Letting the citizens vote is the closest to liberal impartiality because whatever partiality remains is not problematic. By having a mass vote, there are different attempts at the truth informed by different views of the world. Let us explore this some more with an illustration. Imagine we had a public vote for two opposing public reasons pertaining to abortion. People would vote based on their understanding of religious truths, their understanding of the nature of personhood, their understanding of murder, and so forth. This approach of turning it over to the people is epistemically more impartial because it includes a wider variety of attempts at truth and it does not favor just a select few (like the judges). On a smaller scale, it would be like adding a continental philosopher to a faculty of analytic philosophers – in this case, the faculty is less partial to analytic attempts at the truth. The underlying principle here is that more variety in attempts at truth makes the cumulative whole more epistemically impartial.

There may still be worries about impartiality with citizens voting. What if the population was saturated with, say, Christians? Do they not have unified approaches to truth? Is this the same epistemic partiality we had with the judges? I think this point overstates the homogeneity beliefs in sectarian groups. Christians have all sorts of different understandings of truths relevant to abortion; as evident in Christian populations, not every Christian is against abortion, and even all those against abortion are not against it for the same reason. By and large, the way people come to conclusions is a complex process of weighing various commitments to various beliefs they hold to be true. In any case, the only problematic kind of partiality which remains is on a national level. Another way of tracking epistemic impartiality is tracking the institution: for instance, judges are impartial qua judiciary and scientists are impartial qua academia, and we can make further fine-grained distinctions from there. But shifting the vote to the citizens guarantees that all institutions and attempts at the truth are represented. However, it seems there is a qualifying condition in all these cases; namely, they are all within a particular nation. There is a subtle partiality in favor of members of the nation. It is evident immediately that this sort of partiality is not dangerous or unjustified to the citizens. Showing partiality towards citizens when voting on coercive laws is unproblematic.

What is important for public justification is impartiality. There is an issue which remains unaddressed which may have implications on the central thesis of this essay. The issue is of a substantive principle which judges may draw upon in deciding among public reasons. I have merely provided a formal principle. I have shown that the structure of Den Otter’s argument rests on a fundamental notion of liberal impartiality. The same sort of impartiality must be applied when deliberating between a set of sufficiently public reasons. Judges cannot satisfy this criterion. The citizens, however, may move closer to this impartial ideal but still cannot achieve it; nevertheless, the partiality which remains is justified because it originates from the citizens themselves.

Sources

Den Otter, R. (2009). Judicial review in an age of moral pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gert, Bernard, 1995. “Moral Impartiality,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XX: 102–127.

Godwin, William, 1793. Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, ed. Raymond Preston. New York: Alfred A Knopf.

Keller, Simon. Partiality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Nagel, Thomas. Moral conflict and political legitimacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs (16). 1987.

Nagel, T., 1986, The View From Nowhere, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, John (1996). Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.

Raz, J. (1998) “Disagreement in Politics,” American Journal of Jurisprudence: Vol. 43: Iss. 1, Article 2.

Raz, J. (1990). ‘Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 19: 3-46.

Draft Essay: Brentano and Metaethics

Franz Brentano has unique answers to questions posed in moral philosophy. T. M. Scanlon has revived Brentano’s particular approach within the context of contemporary metaethics. This essay will compare Brentano’s account with Scanlon’s “buck-passing” account, and note the advantages of Brentano’s view. The buck-passing account seems to stumble when faced with the “wrong kinds of reason” problem; however, Brentano overcomes this hurdle with his notion of “correctness.” This notion must be explored further, especially with some of the tools provided by contemporary moral philosophy. I suggest that Brentano’s notion of correctness raises questions which cannot be adequately dealt with by a discrete look into Brentano’s philosophy; rather, contemporary solutions – mostly from the philosophy of emotion and moral psychology – can supplement Brentano’s picture.

To paint the background Scanlon’s view, we can make an initial distinction in the normative sphere between evaluative concepts and deontic concepts. Deontic concepts include things like reason, right, wrong, duty, obligation, and so forth. Evaluative concepts include things like value, good, bad, better, worse, and the like. Metaethics, and Scanlon’s enterprise, comments on the nature of these concepts and how we are to understand their relation. For instance, we might say that “good” (or “value”)[1] is a simple, basic (unanalyzable) property; as such, one might use “good” to define all the other concepts – say, actions are “better” if they have more good, or we have a “reason” to act if it gets us closer to good.

Scanlon’s buck-passing account takes a particular stance on the relation between these categories (viz. deontic and evaluative) of normative concepts. Buck-passing is committed to the idea that evaluative concepts can be analyzed using deontic concepts; more specifically, “good” is to have other properties which provide “reasons” (to respond). (p. 97) On this view, when we say something is “intrinsically good,” we are not saying that there is some concept “good” which makes the thing intrinsically good. Rather, when we say something is “intrinsically good,” we look at the reasons to respond: namely, natural properties, like attractiveness or happiness. Let me clarify, a response, here, does not have to mean action; it can also mean to take up an attitude to favor something (a “pro-attitude”), or even to take an attitude against it. Hedonism is a type of buck-passing; that is, good things have the natural property of pleasure which ground all practical reasons. Again, “good” does not add a further reason to favor something; rather, it merely tracks reasons to respond and collect things that are valuable on other grounds. (Scanlon, 1998)

A question arises: on this account, what exactly is meant by “good?” In short, it is a higher-order property which is determined by the lower-order natural properties. For instance, when we say the chocolate bar is “good,” we do not mean that our liking the chocolate bar is because there is some property of “goodness” within in the chocolate bar. When we say that the chocolate bar is “good,” we mean that it has a natural property of pleasurableness (begotten from the sweetness, richness, or creaminess of the chocolate bar). What makes us like (or take up a pro-attitude towards) the chocolate bar is its pleasurableness. “Good,” then, means having a reason to take up a pro-attitude – in the chocolate bar example, the “goodness” is the pleasurableness. In other words, the reasons are generated from the good-making property, not “good” per se. In effect, the normative “buck” is passed from the “good” to the natural, good-making properties.

Moving on, we must sketch Brentano’s position. We must first situate his moral psychology in his general theory of mind, and then discern his specific metaethical views from his moral psychology. His general theory of mind focuses on objects of inner perception – that is, a sort of first-person phenomenological point of view. Brentano identifies three kinds of mental phenomena: presentations, judgments, and love/hate. The last category, the phenomena of love and hate, is what is relevant for our purpose, but love/hate is somewhat dependent on the other categories. Presentation is the act of being directed towards an object – for instance, seeing, remembering, imagining. A judgment is based on the presentation: we can accept or deny it. So, once an object is presented to us, and we accept it, we have some feelings towards it, which end up being positive (“love”) or negative (“hate”). This final category of love/hate is where we can find his metaethical views.

Brentano makes a distinction between “what we value” and “what is objectively valuable” through the notion of “correctness,” or having the right kinds of feelings. This is to say that emotions can be correct or incorrect. For instance, saying pleasurableness is “good” means that it is correct to value it positively, or love pleasurableness and pursue it as an end. Now, let me be careful here to distinguish the separate roles of judgement and love/hate. We can value a thing, assign love/hate, without judging that the thing valuable; note, this is discrete to love/hate. Indeed, it is necessary to have an initial merely emotional (love/hate) attitude to engage in evaluative judgement – without this initial emotional attitude, there would be nothing to evaluate. It seems confusing to think that emotions can provide us with moral truths, but much rests on the notion of correction.

To clarify, “correctness” in emotion must not be confused with “correctness” in judgment. Note early that both forms of correctness have a distinctive phenomenology – we know when we are experiencing “correctness.” Let us briefly revisit judgment to understand correctness in this context. Judgments are correct when they are made from self-evidence, which is derived through inner perception. Since judgments assess presentations, self-evidence judgments – and consequently, the experience of correctness – manifests when comparing self-evident judgments with the contrary. We can derive the notion of impossibility by reflecting on judgments made when we are presented with things like round squares or married bachelors. We can similarly derive notions of correctness by universalizing self-evident judgments. For example, when presented with a chocolate bar, this presentation can be affirmed or rejected; since we already have some notion of self-evident judgments, we can then compare this particular judgment with our notion of self-evident judgments. Correct judgements are ones that match up with self-evident judgments.[2]

The “correctness” in emotions is different from the “correctness” in judgement, but they are analogous features in their structure. In the way judgments can be self-evident to be correct, emotions can derive correctness in a similar way. For instance, we may love the pleasurableness from chocolate and compare to the contrary – mainly, hating the pleasurableness of chocolate. Loving something can be universalized much the same way self-evident judgments are (i.e. through inner perception), so we can correctly love the pleasurableness from the chocolate (and incorrectly hate it). This is a rough picture of Brentano’s metaethics.

Let us now make the connections between Scanlon and Brentano more explicit. They are motivated by the same questions: What are moral truths? How do we know them? How do they affect us? They have a similar starting point in that they merely want to show that “we have good grounds for taking certain conclusions that actions are right or are wrong to be correct […]” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 2) They also have an aim of clarifying what is intrinsically good or valuable; indeed, they take ethics to deal with “those ends which are worthy of being pursued for their own sake.” (Brentano, 1952, p. 7) The main point of similarity between Scanlon and Brentano is the “good” – or, for Brentano, “love” – is conceptually subsequent. “Reasons” or “correctness” always come first, and then good is fixed to these terms.

A difference is what they see as the preconditions for moral knowledge. For Scanlon, there are reasons, for Brentano, there are emotions. For Brentano, moral judgements are judgements about the correctness of emotions. For Scanlon, moral judgements are the natural properties which give us reasons to act. For Brentano, to favor something is just to have the phenomenological experience of “preferring.” (Brentano, 1889, p. 26) The normative is explained in terms of this preference, or “better than.” To compare Brentano and Scanlon, we would need to see how comprehensive their views are, and this is done by assessing how well their accounts deal with problem cases.

One sort of problem for these types of accounts is the “wrong kinds of reason” (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is that there seem to be cases where we have reasons to favor an attitude which seems intuitively not good (or not valuable). The usual example is Roger Crisp’s (2005)[3] demon example: imagine an evil demon threatens to punish you unless you desire a cup of mud. Here, we have a reason to desire the cup of mud, but we are hesitant to say that there is anything good (or valuable) about the cup of mud; however, if we are committed to buck-passing accounts, we may be committed to saying that the cup of mud is good. In other words, the issue is that we have reasons to favor an object that has nothing to do with the object itself; rather, it has to do with reasons for favoring the favoring attitude.

Even if it were not an evil demon, but your caring wife who wants you to love a vase she bought. The reason to love the vase is make your wife feel good about her purchase, and we have reasons to love the vase even if it is aesthetically very ugly. G. E. Moore has a similar concern. (Moore, 1902) Moore has trouble saying that “inanimate beautiful objects” are intrinsically good; rather, our appreciation of them makes them good. To use a modern economic analogy, it is like a Veblen good. Veblen goods are things which have a demand strictly because of its high price and not because of the value of the thing itself (e.g. luxury cars, designer handbags, expensive wines). We seem to want Veblen goods for the wrong kinds of reasons.  Attempts have been made to address the WKR problem, but subsequent counterexamples and modifications to the WKR scenarios have also been put forth.

Derek Parfit (2001) provides a useful distinction that may relieve the tension: objective-give considerations and state-given considerations. If we map these distinctions onto the example of the demon threatening us to desire a cup of mud, we might say that the state-given consideration is the incentive to avoid punishment whereas the object-given consideration is attached to the mud itself. We might further say that we have “reason to favor” the state-given consideration of avoiding punishment (thereby saying it is valuable or good); conversely, we say that the object-given consideration of the mud itself is not a “reason to favor.”

But there are problem cases which are immune to Parfit’s attempt at a resolution. Berys Gaut (2007) thinks of the hilarious joke that is also cruel. Here, we might think we have state-given considerations to not laugh at the joke, and thereby no reasons to favor this state-given consideration. However, the object-given consideration is stipulated as hilarious, and we might have reasons to favor the joke itself. This is problematic on the buck-passing account because we seem to have a reason to favor the joke, since it is hilarious, but we have some Frankfurt-like second order desire not to desire to favor it (since it is a cruel joke, and we do not want to be cruel by laughing at the joke). It is unclear whether the joke is valuable or good. In the end, it seems the “wrong kinds of reasons” problem still stands for buck-passing accounts.

On Brentano’s picture, the “wrong kinds of reasons” problem does not appear to be explicitly problematic. Brentano gives an explicitly criteria of demarcating the right kinds of reasons from the wrong kinds of reasons through the notion of “correctness.” In effect, the right kinds of reasons are self-evident because we can experience the “correctness” of emotions. In the cruel joke example, we can affirm the correct love of the “hilariousness” and reject the correct love of “cruelness.” Sven Danielsson (2007) notes a “Brentano-style approach” to addressing the classic demon example. He notes a distinction between holding-reasons (reasons for having an attitude) and content-reasons (reasons for the correctness of the attitude. He further makes a distinction between beliefs and conative attitudes. We can cite holding-reasons for a belief (we ought to have the belief) and we can holding-reasons for a conative attitude (we ought to have the attitude); similarly, we can cite content-reasons for a belief (we ought to believe that it is true) and content-reasons for a conative attitude (we ought to have the attitude that it is true). In the demon example, we can identify the mud as a holding-reason to have the conative attitude to favor the mud, but not the parallel content-reason. Here, the content-reasons for a conative attitude are what correctness is supposed to be.

But this raises further worries. Despite doing better against the WKR problem than buck-passing accounts, the reason for Brentano’s account doing better against the WKR problem (viz. correctness) raises further questions. What does it mean for an emotion to be correct? What is the nature of the phenomenology of correctness? How does emotion and correctness relate to the object? Perhaps these are reasons to think Brentano’s views are suspect. I think, however, the many questions raised by Brentano’s notion of correctness are being tackled by contemporary moral psychologists and philosophers of emotion. The rest of this paper will elucidate on some avenues of research and connect them to Brentano’s enterprise.

Christine Tappolet (2016) gives one account of what we might want to mean when we say emotions are “correct.” In sketching her view, she gives a helpful survey of competing views of emotion: namely, conative theories, cognitive theories, and perceptual theories. Conative theories have the advantage of propositional content in desire, but they lack “correctness conditions.” (p. 10) Cognitive theories say emotions are cognitive states, but this seems counterintuitive. Perceptual theories say that emotions are “perceptual experiences of evaluative properties” (p. 10), and she finds this most convincing. She adds that perceptual theories have analogues in perceptual experience: the experience (say) of blue has the same phenomenal analogue in experiences (say) of fear. (p. 19) To add, perceptual theories have an explanation of the casual link between events in the world and emotion; moreover, they have correctness conditions and seem to capture some intuitions about emotions. More specifically, she calls her view, “sentimental realism,” and argues that “evaluative concepts have to be explained in terms of fitting or appropriate emotions, and are thus response-dependent. But the properties they pick out are fully objective as well….” (p. 79) Here we see a sort of hybrid view of buck-passing and Brentano. Like the buck-passing account, evaluative concepts are collapsed into deontic ones, but, like Brentano, the deontic concepts are “correct”[4] emotions; moreover, like buck-passing, the basic properties are natural (or “objective) properties. It must be noted that Tappolet’s views do not map perfectly, but we can see strands of similarities with buck-passing and Brentano.

Others in the philosophy of emotion aim to answer questions of how emotions may be evaluative in the right sense. This can inform our discussion of Brentano’s notion of “correctness.” Justin D’Arm and Daniel Jacobson (2000) investigate the relation between emotions and judgments (qua beliefs of evaluation). They find emotions are inextricably linked to judgments; even when we resist emotions, thereby resisting the evaluative presentation, they still have an affective presence on us. Resisting disgust, for example, is like “being aware of perceiving an optical illusion” (p. 67) – that is, even if we are aware that we are feeling disgust, we cannot mitigate its effect on our judgment (just as we cannot mitigate the effect of optical illusions). Furthermore, they note that emotions can be criticized the way judgments can. Idioms like, “don’t cry over spilt milk” and “the grass is always greener on the other side,” point at the size or degree of certain emotions; in other words, some emotions like sadness or envy can be inappropriate or unfitting if they are overblown (or they are “overreactions”). This picture gives support to Brentano’s general psychology in that emotions and judgments are closely linked, and that emotions have an innately evaluative quality.

Ronald de Sousa (2016) picks up on this point, and expands on the epistemic role of emotions. For Brentano, this is precisely the phenomenon of “correctness.” He notes some intrinsically epistemic feelings, like knowing, doubting, certainty, and familiarity, but he also notes some other feelings which act like epistemic feelings, like fear, greed, trust, and doubt. (p. 3) The later feelings which act like epistemic feelings affect things like convictions or inferences – for instance, fear diverts attention and motivates self-deception, but it is also an “instinctive measure of risk.” (p. 4) This all goes to suggest that perhaps Brentano’s “correctness” may be expanded to include emotions, or, at the very least, it is not the exclusive standard for assessing emotions. Still, Brentano’s “correctness” may yet be the best standard. The phenomenology of this “correctness” might be compared to the certainty mentioned by Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum,” (p. 9) or the feeling of rightness experienced by religious experiences.  

Moral psychologists have also contributed to the questions raised by Brentano’s notion of “correctness.” Jesse Prinz (2006) suggests a “methodological promiscuity” to “intermingle empirical and philosophical results.” (p. 30) There are many empirical studies to suggest the fact that emotions influence moral judgment. The emotion of disgust was examined when subjects were given a series of vignettes[5] and asked to rate the wrongness. One set of subjects read the vignettes at a clean desk and the other set of subjects read the vignettes at a dirty desk, as to elicit the emotional response of disgust. The studies found that the subjects at the dirty desk rated the vignettes as more wrong than the subjects at the clean desk. The takeaway here is that emotions go hand-in-hand with moral judgments. Many other experiments come to similar conclusions which inform our philosophy (or psychology).

Some moral psychologists start with the psychology and use that as the starting point for philosophy. Let us explore how some using this approach have come up with philosophical conclusions useful for expanding Brentano’s picture. Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell (2012) have rested their moral psychology on the “dual process” (p. 319) model. Here, two systems work at the aim of moral evaluative: first, “system 1” is a quick, automatic, emotion-driven system; second, “system 2” is a slow, controlled, reason-driven system. These authors resist the claim that the emotionally based system 1 is unreliable, and they show this through a cumulative case of empirical studies, especially studies measuring responses of subjects exposed to moral dilemmas. Their aim is to find an empirically based model of the moral mind, and subsequently answer philosophical questions from there.

If empirical research can indeed inform our general metaethics or moral philosophy, it will have implications on how we answer the questions from Brentano. The field of experimental philosophy aims at using empirical data to inform philosophical questions, and this is particularly useful for Brentano. Those working in this field have an approach similar to Brentano, except they have varied methodologies for studying (phenomenal) conscious states. The dual process model, for instance, corroborates Brentano’s account of phenomenological psychology. We can map on the initial love/hate to system 1, and find the “correctness” within system 2. Perhaps there can be some amalgamation of the inner, phenomenal philosophy of Brentano, and the outer, objective science.

Philosophy of emotion provides some useful conceptual tools to tackle some of the questions raised by Brentano’s notion of correctness, and experimental philosophy’s development in methodology may provide further support to buttress Brentano’s picture. Competing theories, like Scanlon’s buck-passing account, seems to require major patchwork to overcome issues like the “wrong kinds of reason” problem. Brentano was hauntingly ahead of his time: he had a more comprehensive account and pointed to questions which are hot topics for moral philosophers now.


[1] I use them interchangeably; similarly, “goodness” and “valuableness.” I will sometimes add one or the other to clarify or channel the right intuitions.

[2] Although all self-evident judgements are correct, not all correct judgements are evident.

[3] Crisp (2005) notes some other issues with buck-passing. He notes an issue with treating lower-order as natural properties misrepresenting the phenomenology of evaluative experience. He also notes that this may lead to troubles with discriminating between different kinds of values (e.g. grace and sublimity cannot be capture in terms of a set of natural properties).

[4] It is unclear if “correct” is used by Tappolet the same sense as Brentano. I think it is, as she quotes Chisholm (p. 87) and states that “appropriate” emotion might understood as one that ought to be felt in the normative sense.

[5] For example: cooking and eating the family dog, flushing the country’s flag down the toilet, having sex with a chicken, having sex with one’s siblings, and so forth.

Draft Essay: Justifying Invasive Public Health Initiatives

Some public health initiatives are such that they are initiated by one state but have significant consequences on another state. One clear example of this is genetically modified mosquitoes – in this case, it is difficult to contain mosquitoes within state boundaries, and they often crossover and affect the neighboring states. This intuitively seems just as wrong as my neighbor spilling garbage onto my lawn or having pesky tree branches invade my property. Rather than investigating specific instances of such public health initiatives, this essay will explore the ethical framework that can be applied generally to any such public health initiatives which have a propensity to affect those outside state borders. More precisely, this essay is driven by the following questions: When is it wrong to implement initiatives that are known to affect neighboring states? Why is it wrong? How can it be justified? And if the neighboring states do not agree to such initiatives, are there good reasons to proceed regardless? I frame the latter questions of overriding consent as one of paternalism, and I consider three avenues of justification: a contractarian justification, a rationality-based justification, and a free-rider justification. In addition, I raise issues with these forms of justifications, particularly focusing on their moral legitimacy. By and large, my aims are modest insofar as outlining a procedure for invasive public health initiatives. At most, my argument amounts to the need for states to consider the right type of justification before acting paternalistically towards another state; and, at the very least, it charges most public health initiatives (that have an impact on other states) as illegitimate and lacking the necessary moral grounding.

WHEN CROSSING BOUNDARIES GOES WRONG

Let us begin by discerning which cases of invasive initiatives (those that cross boundaries) are intuitively wrong. I will tease out these intuitions using familiar illustrations involving neighbors. First, consider the distinction between trivial and non-trivial cases. Imagine you have seasonal allergies and any exposure to pollen leaves you with a stuffy nose, watery eyes, and an annoying itch in the back of your throat. Now imagine your next door neighbor has a beautiful flower garden planted in front of her house that leaves pollen in the air to be blown into your yard and trigger your allergies whenever you step out of your house. Here, it would be silly to think that your neighbor did something morally wrong – it is much too trivial. Even when we think in terms of manners or social convention, it is hard to say that the neighbor has violated any norm or is being overtly inconsiderate. Now imagine this non-trivial scenario: your neighbor has a tree that has branches invading onto your property, and these branches happen to be covering your favorite tanning spot and leaving sticky sap all over your favorite chair. This might seem just as trivial, but here you might have legitimate grounds to dispute your neighbor – namely, the rights to your property. It seems your neighbor is violating your right to your property; in effect, your neighbor is doing something wrong. It seems one feature of the wrongness of invasive initiatives is that it is not trivial but is grounded in some norm (morality, law, etiquette, etc.).

Second, consider the distinction between boundary crossing initiatives that are harmful and boundary crossing initiatives that are beneficial. (This distinction is a bit more obvious, but it is worth clarifying in order to set up our next distinction.) There is a difference between coming onto your property to start a fire and coming onto your property to put out a fire. Interestingly, some might say that coming onto your property to put out the fire is also wrong in some ways because it is a case of trespassing and it also violates your property rights; conversely, others might say that a neighbor who sees the fire and does not assist in putting it out is doing something wrong. This leads to our next distinction.

Third, consider the distinction between intentional harm and merely foreseen harm. This is the classic doctrine of double effect, and it plays an important role in discerning which cases of boundary-crossing initiatives are wrong. Imagine that you see your neighbor’s house on fire and you know she is not home, and the only way to put the fire out is to climb in through her window. Incidentally, climbing into the window would also mean running through her garden and trampling her precious flowers (which would devastate her). In this scenario, you intend to put out the fire and you merely foresee the harm to her flowers. To get clear on this distinction, we can apply the counterfactual test: if the merely foreseen consequence were absent, could you still have the intended consequence? In our scenario, the answer is “Yes.”[1] If somehow the flowers were not trampled on our way to put out the fire, we would still be able to put the fire out. Some may then push the argument that you did nothing wrong in crossing over to your neighbor’s house to put out the fire, even if her flowers ended up being trampled. This reasoning can be used in the cases of boundary crossing public health initiatives.

Now let us get clear on how the parallel between the neighbor illustrations and the (boundary crossing) public health initiatives can be drawn. Note the moral reasoning: I intend a good (i.e. putting out a fire or improving public health) and I merely foresee the harm (i.e. flowers or risks associates with the public health initiative). Does this vindicate me from blame or wrongness? Not quite. There is an added violation of imposing a particular valuation onto the other party (i.e. the next door neighbor or the neighboring state). This valuation in the next door neighbor illustration is that putting out the fire was more important than the flowers; on the same note, in the boundary crossing public health initiative scenario, one state determines that the value of a particular public health initiative outweighs its risks, and it imposes this risk-benefit analysis onto the neighboring state. This imposition of value becomes a problem of paternalistic action.

Before moving forward, let me add one clarifying note. When thinking of (boundary crossing) public initiatives, I am assuming a symmetry here in the risk-benefit for one state and the transient risk-benefit for its neighboring state; that is, the risks and the benefits are prima facie the same. This bars any scenario or initiative where the risk-benefit changes when it enters another state – for instance, initiatives that are very beneficial and minimally risky for one state, but once crosses over to a neighboring state it becomes minimally beneficial and very. I think we can reasonably say that these cases are wrong, or at least we can put these sorts of cases to the side and focus on the cases where the risk-benefit stay constant between states.

WHAT IS PATERNALISM

How exactly is one state acting paternalistically with their boundary crossing public health initiative? Well, underlying the public health initiative is a particular risk-benefit analysis, and the risk-benefit analysis is inevitably value-laden. Simply put, the idea is that when we think of “benefit” we have an underlying assumption of what “good” is (e.g. health, wealth, happiness…); conversely, when we think of risk, we have an underlying assumption of what “bad” things to avoid (e.g. death, poverty, pain…). With that in mind, one state might conduct their risk-benefit analysis with one idea of good and bad, and another state might conduct their risk-benefit analysis with an entirely different idea of good and bad. To push one’s risk-benefit analysis onto another is where one is pressed with the charge of paternalism.

Let us now get clear on what we mean by “paternalism.” Jonathan Quong provides a useful survey of the literature on how to define paternalism before suggesting his own account. 

The first, he calls, the “liberty-limiting definition.” (Quong, 2011, p. 74) It suggests that paternalism is the interference of a person’s freedom with the justification making some reference to the paternalized person’s well-being, good, happiness, and so on. Quong suggests the issue with this definition of paternalism with a number of illustrations that seem to undermine this definition. For instance, a father incentivizing his daughter to practice the piano with money for a movie ticket – in this case, Quong writes, “It seems clear the father is acting paternalistically, although he is not restricting her freedom.” (Quong, 2011, p. 76) Similarly, having my girlfriend, who is dubious that I would finish the conference paper instead of watching the football game, offer to take me to my favorite resturaunt if I completed my paper; or, a mother lying about her son’s dead iguana to spare his feelings; or, not loaning you money because I suspect you will use it to fuel your drug habit. (Quong, 2011, p. 76) All of these cases seem to be cases of paternalism, yet they are not captured by the liberty-limiting definition. 

The second, the “preference-based definition,” says paternalism is any actions which aims at improving somebody’s “welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values” against their “minimally rational wishes.” (Quong, 2011, p. 77) This differs from the liberty-limiting definition because the liberty-limiting definition focuses on “a particular method of overriding someone’s beliefs about his or her interests,” but the preference-based definition is defined by the general feature of overriding another’s views rather than focusing on a particular method. Quong points to the issue with the preference-based definition being that “the definition cannot refer merely to the already expressed opinions of the paternalized agent.” (Quong, 2011, p. 77) In the example of the father incentivizing his daughter’s piano playing, we might say that the father is not acting against the “expressed opinions” of the daughter since she had not made a decision yet. This definition cannot capture counterfactual preference, or what the daughter would have preferred if it were not for the father’s paternalistic actions. 

The third, the “choice-improving definition,” defines paternalism as an action that “attempts to influence the choice of the affected parties in a way that will make them better off.” (Quong, 2011, p. 78) The example used here is a lunch counter that can have health foods earlier in the queue and unhealthy foods later in the queue, and vice versa. The layout of the food will inevitably influence people’s choice of healthy or unhealthy lunches. Quong’s issue with this definition is that it is too broad. Quong suggests that even telling your friend about their favorite movie marathon, knowing that they have other work to do, and trying to increase their range of choices would count as paternalistic on this definition. (Quong, 2011, p. 79)

The fourth, the “moralized definition,” attributed to Bernard Gert and Charles Culver, takes paternalism to be a violation of a moral rule, “such as coercion, deception, or harm, and we do in order to benefit the person we are coercing, deceiving, or harming.” (Quong, 2011, p. 79-80) Quong’s issue with this definition is that it fails to capture intuitive cases of paternalism. The father incentivizing his daughter’s piano practice is clearly paternalistic, but it does not break any moral rules.

The fifth, the “autonomy-intrusion definition,” a model offered by Seana Valentine Shiffrin, states that paternalistic action (1) interferes with a person’s “legitimate sphere of agency,” (2) substitutes judgement, (3) acts in a person’s interest which they have legitimate control over, and (4) acts on the grounds that the person’s judgement is inferior. (Quong, 2011, p. 80) Quong notes that the term “legitimate” is too ambiguous to ground the definition, and however that term is construed ends with either a definition of paternalism that is too inclusive or not inclusive enough. (Quong, 2011, p. 80-81)

Quong then offers his own definition of paternalism, which he calls the “judgmental definition,” and it is formulized as such: “[1] Agent A attempts to improve the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of agent B with regard to a particular decision or situation that B faces […] [2] A’s act is motivated by a negative judgement about B’s ability (assuming B has the relevant information) to make the right decision or manage the particular situation in a way that will effectively advance B’s welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values.”[2] (Quong, 2011, p. 81) The paternalizer’s negative judgement about the paternalizee’s abilities refers to the “necessary levels of rationality, or willpower, or emotional welfare.” (Quong, 2011, p. 83) This formulation seems to have the right scope to capture all of our intuitive cases of paternalism without any of the drawbacks.

It is important that we end up with Quong’s definition of paternalism and not any of the alternatives because it is particularly relevant when thinking of paternalism between states. Typically, paternalism is thought of as relational between persons, or between a state and persons; however, in the context of one state’s initiatives crossing into another state’s borders, the relation is between two states. Remember that the relevant “negative judgment” in this case is the value judgments underlying the risk-benefit analysis of a particular public health initiative. It is important to note that the wrongness of paternalism is not from encroaching onto another state’s territory without permission, but it is from the assertion of a particular set of values that underlie the cost-benefit analysis of the boundary crossing initiative. It is like somebody playing heavy metal music on the subway thinking that all the other passengers will enjoy this genre of music; that is, just as not everybody would enjoy listening to heavy metal music, not every state would agree to the goodness (or the goodness outweighing the badness) of a particular public health initiative. This sort of paternalistic action seems prima facie wrong; or, at the very least, it requires some added justification if it is to be permissible.

JUSTIFICATION

Michael Blake notes the difficulties of paternalism between one state and another state arises because “the political and legal institutions we share at the national level create a need for distinct forms of justification.” (Blake, 2001, p. 258) We cannot appeal to justifications that apply in one state and apply them to another; in fact, the differing values and commitments are the very root of the problem. It is a contingent fact and sometimes pure happenstance that one state adheres to the same particular principles as their neighboring state, and only in these cases could the states come to some sort of shared justificatory standard. Even liberal principles come in a variety of flavors, and the particular species of liberalism apply “only within the context of the territorial state.” (Blake, 2001, p. 257) He continues, “In the international arena, by contrast, no institution comparable to the state exists.“ (Blake, 2001, p. 265) So, we return to the question: “What sorts of considerations could justify what would otherwise be an impermissible violation of [state] autonomy?” (Blake, 2001, p. 273) 

Blake’s suggestion takes the loose form of a contractarian theory. One strategy might be to find a cosmopolitan outlook and find some impartial principle that would apply universally across state borders. An approach to executing this strategy (which he refers to as the “noninstitutional theory) is by “abstracting away from the institutions we currently have, and asking what sorts of institutions we would endorse if we were starting from scratch.” (Blake, 2001, p. 261) Here, he echoes John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon in establishing principles everybody can find reasonable accept or principles that one cannot “reasonably reject.” (Blake, 2001, p. 274) This modeling of rational consent, Blake argues, “will allow us to understand what sorts of coercion might be justifiable.” (Blake, 2001, p. 274) This is one plausible way of justifying coercive action.

We might, however, approach justifications in ways that override consent, which seems to give the wrongness of coercion more bite. There is a difference between implementing some paternalistic action without having explicit consent, and implemental some paternalistic action despite an explicit refusal. Acting without explicit consent seems to give more room for justifications: perhaps I merely violated a duty to inform, or it is possible to appeal to some tacit consent, or maybe my actions were a good faith attempt to capture your wishes and I could plead ignorance. However, when I have explicit refusal from you, I have to have pretty strong justifications to go against your wishes, since in the process I would be violating your dignity, respect, or autonomy. So what possible justification would be, all things considered, good enough to go against your explicit refusal?

I could claim that, if you had all the knowledge I did and rationally calculated your decisions, you would end up with the same conclusion as me. To map this onto the invasive initiative case, one state would claim that a particular public health initiative is objectively the best choice given the risk-benefit analysis, and further claim that to refuse this analysis is to be irrational. Since it would be irrational to refuse the public health initiative, if a neighboring state refused, they would be refusing on irrational grounds; moreover, we would not need to respect their request because if they were rational they would not refuse. In other words, given the neighboring state’s bounded rationality, perhaps they just did not calculate the risks and benefits of the particular public health initiative correctly. This paternalism then becomes analogous to you taking the initiative to take my keys away when I am clearly drunk and insisting on driving home. If I were sober (and thinking more clearly), I would not refuse your initiative and I would relinquish my keys; moreover, when I am sober the next day, I would likely thank you for your paternalistic actions and not listening to my drunk self. In the state initiative case, however, I think it is harder to prove that another state is acting irrationally or being unreasonable. Moreover, even if it is clear to everybody that one state is acting irrationally in resisting the initiatives of another state, it may be good practice to permit cases of false positives and be overly sensitive when resorting to paternalistic action. The idea here is that we ought to be overly charitable and assume even if a certain refusal seems irrational, we imagine that there is something that went wrong in our interpretation of their refusal rather than insisting that they are irrational in their refusal. Still, the aim here is to protect the autonomy of the state, and one may argue that a particular public health initiative is so good that it overrides such concerns. So, we move onto the second avenue of justification.

Next, I could claim that certain initiatives are universally good and require the participation of everybody, and I can subsequently justify paternalistic action because it prevents free-riding. Imagine, for instance, an initiative for the environment to reduce our carbon footprint, and this requires everybody to walk rather than drive cars. Let us further up the ante by imagining that everybody has a vested interested in following this initiative because (say) in ten years everybody will be extremely uncomfortable because of the changes in the environment. If everybody was walking and only I drove a car (because it saves me a lot of time and trouble), then my driving a car will have little impact on the environment but I get to reap the advantages of everybody walking and myself driving a car. I am free-riding on their initiative: everybody walking suffers the cost of inconvenience, while I reap their benefits without any of the inconvenience. Now, it does not seem irrational for me to think this way (perhaps it seems amoral or inconsiderate), and if everybody thought like this, the initiative would fail and everybody suffers. In order to prevent such a scenario, we may use coercive force against people like me; in effect, we have a justification of paternalistic action. Again, this seems plausible, but it requires a very specific scenario, and not all public health initiatives are structured this way.

LEGITIMACY AND OTHER ISSUES

Jonathan Quong points to another issue with paternalism, namely, gaining legitimacy. “Legitimacy,” Quong pushes, “is a complex moral right,” and it “refers to the moral power of one agent to impose duties on another agent, and also to a right of the former agent to use some degree of coercion to enforce those duties.” (Quong, 2011, p. 109) Quong illustrates the difference between being merely justified in coercive actions and having legitimate authority using a story involving a touring company. (Quong, 2011, p. 109) The idea is that even if choosing a certain touring company is the best option for you to make the most out of your trip – and all things considered you have every reason to go with the touring company – if you refused to go with the touring company, it would be silly to think that the touring company can coerce you into being its customer. Even if the touring company can point to a justification for coercing – say, you will have a better trip overall if you chose to tour with them – they do not have legitimate authority over you. This can be thought of as a case of the expert-boss fallacy. (Quong, 2011, p. 118-119) The fallacy is that just because you are an expert and can provide reasons to act in certain ways, it does not make you my boss and give you the authority to dictate my actions through coercive means. Quong formulates this problem with concrete questions: “Just because you have most reason to go on the trip to Peru, why does this entail the touring company should possess the legitimate authority to require and enforce this action? Why should this authority not belong to the president of Peru, indeed, why should it not belong to anyone else we might care to name?” (Quong, 2011, p. 109)

Quong puts his finger on a genuine worry when thinking about the moral consequences of paternalistic actions, and I can only point to a possible solution. Perhaps I can ground my justifications and gain legitimacy in acting paternalistically against you by appealing to some duty you have to yourself. Take the justification that I am acting paternalistic because you are not rational: here, I can gain legitimacy by appealing to the norm you already follow that you ought to be rational. Here, what I am doing by being paternalistic is helping you follow your own commitments and assisting you in following your own duty to be rational. Returning to the drunk-self illustration, if I gave you an advanced directive to take away my keys when I get drunk, you are acting as an instrumental for my own directives when you take away my keys because I am drunk; in this case, your legitimacy as an authority is grounded in the counterfactual claim that you would want me to take your keys away if you were sober (and I am certain of this because of your advanced directives). It is difficult, however, to map this onto the state’s initiative case without appealing to some perfectionist grounds that a certain public health initiative is valuable to everybody, and that (qua a counterfactual claim) you would want the value of this public health initiative if you were thinking rationally. How one might gain legitimacy in paternalistic actions between states is still a muddy question.

Let me tease out one more problematic area insofar as the ethical issues surrounding border crossing public health initiatives. When thinking strictly of consequences, it seems the harm inflicted on the neighboring state takes the form of an exposure to a risk. Suppose the risk is not from the initiative itself, but more detached and downstream – is this risk still the obligation of the origin state? The intuition seems fuzzy. Imagine a case of some infectious disease originating in one state, and one of the citizens brings it over to a neighboring state and causes a massive outbreak in the neighboring state. It does not seem right that the state where the infectious disease originated has done something wrong, or that the neighboring state has some claim on the originating state. The analogy is not perfect, but I think this is suggestive of a problem of closeness. The public health initiative must have a direct negative impact on a neighboring state for it to be considered obviously wrong, and it is not easy to establish such a close connection between a certain initiative and the harm.

In closing, there are several convincing ways of arriving at justifications for paternalistic actions towards another state via public health initiatives that affect other states. The wrongness of the paternalism derives from imposing one state’s risk-benefit analysis on another state, which has an underlying imposition of a state’s values. It is difficult to arrive at the right kinds of reasons to legitimize the use of coercive force over another and to properly ground one’s authority over another state’s good or well-being. In the end, I think the most convincing line of argument appeals to perfectionist principles – namely, principles appealing to a certain set of objectively good or valuable things for all humans. This, however, requires a complex ethical commitment and some appeal to a metaphysical theory about the nature of humans, which seems too controversial to employ. Still, even if certain initiatives are not morally legitimate, perhaps they are all things considered the best option.

Sources

Blake, Michael (2001). Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy. Philosophy and Public Affairs: 30 (3). P. 257-296.

Quong, Jonathan (2011).  Liberalism Without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


[1] This distinction might be made clearer with a case that fails the counterfactual test. The classic example is the fat man scenario: imagine you are on a bridge with a fat man, and that bridge is in-between a trolley that is going to kill a dozen people upon impact. If you push the fat man off the bridge to his certain death, his fat body will stop the trolley from kill the dozen people. The fat man’s death is not a merely foreseen consequence and fails the counterfactual test because the fat man cannot be absent to achieve the consequence of saving the dozen people.

[2] Interestingly, Quong does not consider lack of information a relevant case of paternalism. (Quong, 2011, p.83) He notes Mill’s example of stopping a man from walking across an unsafe bridge – in this case, “intervention to save him does not imply a negative judgement,” thus, it is not a case of paternalism on Quong’s definition. Quong notes that “blameless of faultless” lack of knowledge does not entail a negative judgment, but he notes that there is a difference between “not knowing the bridge is about to collapse, and not appreciating the value of, say, listening to a doctor’s medical advice.” (Quong, 2011, p. 83) To extrapolate, had the man known the bridge is unsafe and chose to cross it anyway, our interference would then entail a negative judgement about the man’s mental abilities.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #7

This commentary will be on Chandran Kukathas’ chapter. He makes a point of the distinction between refugees and other immigrants being fairly weak, especially when we try to appeal to our respective duties towards them. For example, we might have a duty to rescue for refugees, but we can conceive of instances where we have the same duty to rescue for other immigrants. It would be tidy if we only had duties of rescue to refugees, and we can contrive such outcomes by narrowing the scope of who counts as refugees – however, this turns out to be just as problematic because it excludes some of those we seem to owe duties of rescue to. Kukathas suggests that the category of refugee is used by states to exclude, but picture seems a bit misguided.

Indeed, states are concerned with the “advantage […] of the state” (p. 252), but it seems to me that the category of refugee is intended to distinguish two distinct duties: duties to rescue and duties to aid. Duties of rescue are more immediate and require some of the expedited treatment which comes along with the refugee status. Imagine, for instance, where a ship crashes near shore, and we are in a position to rescue its occupants. It seems we have a more urgent duty to those who cannot swim, since their lives are in immediate danger. Imagine that we are near enough to the shore that many of the passengers can swim back. We still have a duty to aid them – perhaps there is some danger of swimming back. Nevertheless, the duty is not as strong as the immediate threat of drowning for the passengers who cannot swim. Similarly, we have a duty to aid those non-refugees, but it does not take priority over the immediate duty to rescue.

The author is right to say that the distinction between the two duties is not very clear. This is why so many people we owe duties of rescue to are falsely put into the category of non-refugee. Again, going back to the illustration, this would be like mistakenly judging swimming ability and failing to rescue the drowning passenger. So a mistake in categorizing people as refugee or non-refugee suggests a failing in our ability to discern the relevant factors involved, but I do not think it suggests a failing of the categories themselves. It seems clear that once a threshold is met – perhaps immediate danger of one’s life – then it becomes clear that we have a duty to rescue.

The author makes a further point about the economic migrant who might also have some immediate danger to one’s life in escaping poverty. Using the illustration again, I think this is the equivalent to the good swimmers. In some sense of the word, they face immediate danger since they can (say) get a leg cramp and drown, but this sort of counterfactual seems more distant or less likely than the non-swimmer.

By and large, I think the category of refugee does exclude some in some sense, but not in any dramatic sense. When we rescue the non-swimmer, we exclude the swimmers in some sense; however, this is because the duty to the non-swimmer is more immediate (note: not weightier or stronger). Of course, perhaps the author meant this point to be a practical point, which I would sympathize more with.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #6

This commentary will focus on the Sarah Song chapter; more specifically, on her general scheme of differentiating rights based on the normative grounds. Her overall position is founded on a cumulative case of the principles of affiliation, fair play, and coercion. I think each leg has some problems of its own, but I think this move of combining the principles is problematic. 

The basic idea is that the normative grounds (or justification) reflect what rights are owed each group. Song takes the minimal grounds of justification for sojourners is coercion. This also applies to residents, but as residents have more rights, we would also need another layer of justification — the same strategy is applied to the full member, and their full set of rights. The first layer, coercion, is very convincing, but the added layers seem problematic. I think Song’s attempt at building a cumulative case tries to patch up the weaknesses of the latter layers (viz. affiliation and fair player) with the sturdier first layer.  

I think this cumulative strategy is problematic. I can sympathize with the strategy: establishing minimal rights for all through the coercion principle seems to get us very far. However, if the added layers are principled reasons, anything that knocks down one principle does damage to the cumulative case. Imagine, for instance, that affiliation is connected to the right to stay in the territory, and fair play is connected to the right to public goods. Imagine further that the principle of affiliation was knocked down by some argument. Does this mean that members do not have sufficient grounds for the right to stay in the territory? I think it does. 

This might be a picky reductio argument, but I think this undercuts here cumulative strategy. of course, Song may claim that there are no such knockdown arguments for any of her principles, but even the claims of some of the other authors in the book give rise to worries. But I do not want to confront her individual principles; I merely want to comment on the problem of having a cumulative argument. The layering strategy only works when all the principles are all just as strong.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #5

The Moral Dilemmas of Guestworker Programs by Lea Ypi. By and large, I found her argument very convincing, particularly her argument showing class exploitation. In this commentary, I want to explore the idea of long-term positive effects and investigate a comment she says in passing: “[economic] growth and exploitation are perfectly compatible with each other.” (p. 170) I want to suggest that significant economic growth can outweigh even the “collective” exploitation she describes.

Let us begin by granting her general argument and assume guest worker programs are exploitative in all the manners she explained. I imagine Ypi would be quite satisfied at this point; indeed, my comments go beyond the scope of her aims and do not explicitly engage her arguments. I want to highlight a practical concern: would the guest worker care if they were being exploited? I think, as an empirical fact, generally no. When deliberating whether to take part in guest work programs, people have the capacities to weigh the costs, like giving up certain rights, with the benefits. Taking such an opportunity away from the worker because it is exploitive is to disrespect the worker as a rational, autonomous agent.

Now, a worry here might be that this misses the point of what it is to be exploited. Ypi gives two conditions for exploitation: “an offer that he could not refuse, on pain of being left with not enough resources to lead a minimally decent life,” and “the transaction is less beneficial or most costly than it would be if the agent started to bargain from a point of sufficiency.” (p. 162) The thought is that exploitation takes away the choice (“an offer that he could not refuse”) and does so on the basis of the worker’s disadvantaged economic position. The lack of a choice (or reasonable alternatives) may undercut the claim that taking away such opportunity disrespects their autonomy since they do not have any choices anyway.

I think this is a sort of victimization of workers; namely, it imagines workers as subjects of exploitation who need to be rescued. Again, this conception, I think, disrespects the worker as a rational, autonomous agent. Let me illustrate my point with a hackneyed (Frankfurt-style) example from free will arguments. Imagine you want to exit a room and had two doors to choose from, A and B, and, unbeknownst to you, A is unlocked and B is locked. You freely choose A, and you are happily out of the room. In reality, you did not have much of a choice, since only A could have led you out of the room, but we might say you still exercised your free will. Similarly, the worker could have no other choice in exploitative scenarios, yet still exercise their capacities as rational, autonomous agents. This analogy is not perfect, but I think it still fits.

 This is all very fast, and much more objections to this view must be dealt with. The obvious reply is saying we can have both long-term economic growth as well as non-exploitative practices. I think this is a case of having your cake and eating it too; in short, restructuring practices will ultimately lead to a loss of opportunity for some, meaning a loss entirely of long-term economic growth. More must be said, but here I merely wish to raise some interesting commentary.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #4

I want to focus on Arash Abizadeh’s argument against the special obligations challenge. He mounts this reply by attacking the premise that “compatriotic special obligations justify restricting immigration if immigration would harm the domestic poor.” (p. 107) He essentially investigates two questions: What grounds national obligations? And what force does it have to motivate more closed borders? The second question is an assessment of the first question, and it relies on a distinction made from the onset between “additive” and “prioritizing” special obligations. Here, I want to raise some subtleties with this central distinction, especially with “prioritizing” special obligations.

There are a lot of subtle (at times, implicit) premises loaded onto the additive-prioritizing distinction. Additive special obligations are the sorts of special obligations which require more sacrifice from you to your intimates. In contrast, prioritizing special obligations do not require any sacrifice from you; rather, it is about how you are required to weight moral decisions. He adds some further stipulations: he is open to the fact that special obligations can arise for non-instrumental reasons; also, special obligations (at least the additive special obligations) are couched in our general natural duties. He seems to allow additive special obligations in most cases – as he notes, the special obligations challenge needs the prioritizing special obligations. Let me now briefly suggest some of the more subtle baggage of the conception of prioritizing special obligations.

He seems to require that prioritizing special obligations must be considerably strong to outweigh the “duties of justice to the foreign poor.” (p. 109) Why is this important? It seems that when we have to make moral decisions, our reasons for picking out a particular choice must be significantly greater than the competing choices. This seems counterintuitive. Even a slight difference in weight would tip the scale to one side. Take for instance the rescue case: two people are drowning – one is a stranger, the other is a close intimate – and you can only rescue one. The author seems to think that we need significantly weightier reasons to save our intimate. These significantly weightier reasons seem present in this rescue case in virtue of the fact that they are a close intimate, but we can change this variable. Imagine again the two people drowning, however, this time one is a stranger and the other is a distant neighbor who you only exchange polite smiles with. Here, ceteris paribus, I have a slightly weightier reason to favor rescuing my neighbor over the stranger.

One more final, brief point about prioritizing special obligations: they seem, in principle, not to show equal respect to everybody. Again, this issue seems less problematic with additive special obligations because we may direct our beneficence to intimates without violating the equal respect for others. (p. 108) Clearly, when we prioritize intimates for the wrong reasons, we fail to show respect to non-intimates affected by our prioritizing. However, even when they are the right reasons, there is a sense in which we fail to show equal respect. I cannot go into the details of what “respect” precisely entails, so I will rely on just an intuitive conception. Going back to the rescue case, might say that our reasons to save our intimates is that we have some sort of relationship with them which he do not have with the stranger. We want to maintain that this move does not commit us to a disrespect of the stranger as a moral agent. Still, I think this is all too fast. We have residual feelings of compunction, and even if our actions were permissible, it does not mean that a wrong was not done.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #3

I would like to focus on Carens’ reply to the objection for open borders on the basis of special priorities for compatriots (in his penultimate chapter). I think he moves all too fast here (I will also be guilty of that here); in other words, Carens does not sufficiently address the objection.

Carens concedes that special obligations are salient features of our moral lives, but he also adds that such obligations might be outweighed by other more pressing duties. In short, Carens takes the right to movement as so fundamental that it trumps obligations (the content being something like directing resources) to compatriots. Here, I think he short-changes the weight (i.e. the content) of the special obligations owed to compatriots.

First, there seem to extreme cases where special obligations to compatriots do outweigh the fundamental right to movement. Imagine a state with a scarcity of resources; to use the family analogy, a starving family. Clearly, in these instances, the state has a duty to prioritize its citizens over respecting the right to movement of a noncitizen. Similarly, the parent would have a duty to feed their child over anybody else’s child. But perhaps this is a fringe case; a mere stipulation to open borders: after all, Carens does admit that states do not have a duty to admit refugees until the state can “no longer function.”

Let us move on to a second, more contentious, issue with Carens’ reply. If Carens’ reply rests on the rights of noncitizens (i.e. movement being fundamental) outweighing the rights of the compatriots, then a counter might be to argue that the rights of the compatriots are just as fundamental. What sorts of rights could they be? I think an argument can be made for property rights. Citizens contribute to the funds and resources which allow noncitizens to enter their borders and enjoy similar rights. It might be a stretch to say that citizens have first-order property rights to these funds and resources; however, they do have a direct claim to it since it must be used in the interest of the citizens. If we are weighing between the citizens’ right to do what they wish with their property and the noncitizens’ right to movement, the state ought to side with the citizens (this is where the weight special obligations tip the scales).

This second line of thought, I think, is a more principled objection against open borders. Citizens ought to have the right to do what they want with their property, and this extends to how the state distributes its wealth. If citizens choose to have the state divert resources and funds to allow noncitizens inside their borders, so much the better – however, citizens choosing to do so is supererogatory.

This argument amounts to border remaining closed to respect the property rights of its citizens. I do not think this relies on the assumption of a majoritarian democracy; in fact, I suspect Carens is assuming a constitutional democracy, and this argument stands even on his own terms. This is all very sketchy, but I think property rights can be defended (with some work) as fundamental as the right to movement.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #2

I want look at the rhetorical structure of Carens’ argument; specifically, the arrangement of chapter 10 and 11. I want to focus on the rhetorical structure rather than the content because I suspect that any comment I would make on these two chapters will be dealt with in his last section.

Let me begin by commenting on how Carens orders his argument in this section, and how this order has rhetorical impact. His discussion on the rights and moral claims of refugees begins with the least controversial and existing practice. He often begins his chapter by appealing to a common ground or shared intuition (often a sympathetic vignette). Here, the uncontroversial stance Carens begins with is the principle of non-refoulement (appealing to the existing practice established under the Geneva Convention). It does not take much to move from this point to the idea that refugees seeking asylum have the moral claim on the state not to be sent back into peril. Carens subtly moves the reader from their own views to his own views.

So, Carens jabs, we agree that the principle of non-refoulement gives refugees moral claims on the state, but there are also implications to holding this view (what Carens calls “the moral logic”). As it stands, the principle does not fare well with our shared belief of equality (or justice): that is, there seems to be an issue with proportionality insofar as states being more burdened than others. This line of thinking is intuitive – for instance, if you and I had the duty of taking out the garbage whenever it is full, and I took it out for the past two months, I have grounds to complain that we are not sharing this duty equally. So what is a way that we can share the burden of the principle of non-refoulement? According to Carens, a formal duty for all countries to admit some refugees – going back to the garbage example, everybody now has a duty to take out the trash, not just the one who sees that it is full.

Since all states have a duty to accept some refugees, can we really deny entry? Again, it seems to be a consequence or implication of our shared beliefs in equality and freedom. This is Carens’ knockout punch, which seemed so far off in the distance at first, but he weakened our guards with his previous argument. He established that all borders should be somewhat open to meet the proportionality need of refugees. Now that we believe that all borders should be somewhat open, the open borders pill is much easier to swallow (and it essentially uses the same consistency reasoning as before – Carens calls this the “cantilever argument”).

I think we can learn from Carens about the importance rhetorical structure for philosophical argument. Philosophers often purport to be the pinnacle of abstract thinking, but many bias and preconceptions subtly disrupt our thinking. Rhetoric can be used to mitigate this. As someone who argues for a counterintuitive position, Carens makes excellent use of this rhetoric.

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #1

I would like to focus this week’s reflective commentary on an objective Carens addresses at the end of chapter 8. His conditions for social membership (and by extension, any moral claims) rest on two conditions: residence and time. But is physical presence within the boundaries of a state sufficient for social membership? Carens thinks so, but I am hesitant to agree.

I was relieved to see Carens address this worry about his criteria for social membership (viz. residence and time) being too loose to justify social membership. Carens adds that his motivations were to make the conditions for social membership as verifiable as possible – in his words, “relevant, objective, and easy to measure.” However, the concern is that the conditions for social membership are not rigorous enough to filter out cases where people do not seem to meet Carens’ notion of “social membership.” Imagine a non-native born person that hides under a rock for twenty years. It is hard to say that this person fits Carens’ notion of “social membership” despite meeting his criteria.

Carens responds by saying that such “hypothetical questions” are the fringe cases; however, he does entertain the objection. Carens asks us to imagine the recluse (i.e. no job, no social ties, no political contributions; essentially living under a rock) native born person. We would not say that this recluse is not a citizen, so we should carry that intuition to cases of non-native born persons. I think this is specious.

If I want to push back on Carens’ point, I would have to find some non-arbitrary difference between the native born recluse and the non-native born recluse. I do not have anything fully substantive to offer, but I want to suggest that there is something different about the native born recluse which affords them social membership which the non-native born recluse does not have. I think this thing is the simple the fact that they were born here.

Let me try to explain a little more while also building a possible third condition. I think a shared narrative is essential to social membership. By this I mean how one’s life narrative – entailing whatever their conception of a good life, like projects, relationships, career, etc. – is tied with their society (whatever the “social” part of “social membership” entails). Now, how does this idea connect to the aforementioned objection?

The native born recluse has their narrative tied simply in virtue of birth. The must have had ties to parents, a network of medical professionals, and some minimal provisions to subsist at their birth. Their narrative is minimally and inextricably tied to their society by birth, granting them necessary social membership; the non-native born recluse, however, does not have this privilege.

Is this narrative condition substantive enough to be a condition for social membership? It might be in that it seems to measure one’s ties to society. One’s tie to society might be verified through personal ties, one’s career, or even knowledge of the society’s narrative (this might justify testing for citizenship, that is, through knowledge of the society’s principles and practices).

My conception of “narrative” is suggestive and vague. Nevertheless, I want to say that Carens’ two conditions for social membership are too broad.