Author: chaowdur

Sample: Securities Offerings Memorandum

You have asked me to write about the issues and potential solutions as we act as underwriter counsel to Buffay Phalange Group in the offering from Bluemingdale. I have made general comments with respect to the possible issues with the deal along with possible solutions, and I also included more specific comments for the bought deal letter and term sheet.

Timing

Public Offering

Currently, the timeframe is too tight between the receipt for the preliminary prospectus and the receipt for the final prospectus. Remember, first comments on the preliminary prospectus are usually issued after about two weeks and the entire review process takes around four to five weeks until the receipt of a final prospectus. To be safe, we should aim for five weeks for the receipt of the final prospectus. As such, we will change the November 22, 2021 final prospectus receipt date to December 24, 2021. We should also update the closing date accordingly and set it to December 31, 2021.

The new dates are also necessary to reflect the constraints around the flow of the deal. I appreciate that we have a tight timeline to raise money for R&D, but we need to ensure that the people on the deal have enough time for their respective roles. For instance, we need to give sufficient time for auditors for the comfort letter, we need to give time for the company to prepare their materials for due diligence, and we need to align with regulatory timelines—many of these aspects are beyond our control. We can consider adding a “time of the essence” provision to ensure that any delays in performance of the contract can contribute to damages against anybody who is late with their respective roles. In any case, we can be timely with things within our control, such as drafting the agreements, prospectus, and conducting diligence.

Private Placement

We only have Geller Funds who is willing to buy shares, so a roadshow for the private placement may not be necessary. If there is more interest in buying under the prospectus offering after the public offering, then we do not need a separate marketing campaign for the private placement.

In case we do need further marketing for the private placement—especially with respect to attracting more institutional investors, as outlined below—we should be wary of the timeline. Typically, the road show usually begins after the preliminary offering memorandum is made available to potential investors and before we land on a price for the securities. Although the concept of “marketing materials” does not apply to private placements, any pitch or communication must be consistent with the preliminary offering memorandum. While there is no requirement to provide investors with the offering memorandum, any information provided to potential investors can trigger disclosure and representation requirements.

The private placement is currently closing concurrently with the public offering, so it will also close on December 31, 2021. However, we do not need the longer timeline for the private placement, especially since we do not need the review and comments from the OSC. Since this is a treasury offering, there should be no issues with respect to coordinating with the public offering.

Roadshow and Marketing

Pre-marketing

While there are restrictions on communications between the deal announcement and the preliminary prospectus receipt (see s 65(2), 66, 67 OSA), we can rely on the bought deal exemptions for pre-marketing (see s 7 NI 44-101). There is no issue with soliciting expressions of interests as long as, before the solicitation, we enter into the bought deal agreement with fixed terms and file a press releasing announcing this agreement. We also need to file a preliminary prospectus within four days after entering the bought deal; once we receive the receipt for the preliminary prospectus, we need to send a copy of the preliminary prospectus to everyone we are soliciting. We can use a standard term sheet to solicit interest, but it cannot go beyond the information in the press release and the prospectus (see s 7.5 NI 44-101). We can also do a road show (see 7.7 NI 44-101), as needed, and use marketing materials during this time (see s 7.6 NI 44-101). However, I suggest we conduct the roadshow during the waiting period—that is, after the receipt for the preliminary prospectus but before the receipt for the final prospectus.

Waiting Period

The waiting period has further restrictions on marketing (see s 13.7 NI 41-101) and we are allowed to conduct road shows during this period (see s 13.9 NI 41-101). There are some requirements to keep in mind for the road show. We have to be careful around the requirements for marketing materials (s 65 OSA). We have to ensure that all contact information is on the marketing material, we need to include cautionary language in bold on the cover page, we need to have it approved by the issuer, and we need to have a template version filed on SEDAR on or the day before the material is presented. We should also be clear that marketing materials are distributed to only folks who qualify for a prospectus exemption and have received a risk-acknowledgement form; if not, we have to include the appropriate legend and collect their information. Even if we pitch to sophisticated institutional investors, it is important to minimize liability (see s 130 OSA).

We should review the contents of the presentation and ensure that any oral presentations are also limited to the language and information in the preliminary prospectus. I also recommend consulting specialists to get the language around this right, particularly in terms of the risks around intellectual property, environmental, and tax. Again, we have to avoid any misleading or untrue statement which would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price. In the same vein, we should check the company’s website and ensure compliances with restrictions on electronic media (see NP 47-201). Any marketing materials must be clear in its scope and limits.

Representations and Disclosure

We should be careful about any representations we make in our disclosure, especially around financial information (see NP 51-201). Remember, we have a role in seeking out and questioning all relevant material facts to the best of our knowledge, information and belief. We need a full, true and plain disclosure as to why they burn cash quickly and always need more money, and whether they made a real profit or not. We should schedule a meeting to assess the veracity of the CEO’s statements and warn that directors and officers have secondary market liability for any misrepresentations (see s 138 OSA; see also s 122 OSA).

We need to take extra precautions around discussing the potential M&A with Seers Inc, Relaxi Taxi, and the new beauty products arm. This should be disclosed in the prospectus, but, if not, we absolutely cannot discuss beyond what is in the prospectus. Information that conflicts or goes materially beyond the preliminary prospectus can be a misrepresentation, or worse, insider trading or tipping. We need to ensure that any discussions or communications do not contain material non-public information or else any non-public information should be simultaneously disclosed to the public (see NI 51-201). We cannot disclose selectively. We have to ensure that some investors are not able to make a profit at the expense of those who did not have access to the same information, so we cannot give special information to selective investors.

We should also check the marketing material for how non-GAAP or other financial measures are presented (see NI52-112). Please also make sure to include disclaimers for forward-looking statements, and, as applicable, consider the guidelines around the electronic delivery of documents (NP 11-201). Additionally, we should provide notice to purchasers of their statutory rights of action available to them (MI 45-107). Finally, at closing, we should check for the disclosure of any non-public information; at launch, we should check if we need any non-ordinary course filing.

Terms and Business Considerations

Public Offering

There is a potential conflict of interest in our positions in the debt as a part of the syndicate (see NI 33-105). There might be a “connected issuer” conflict since we are part of a syndicate that lent material amounts of funds through the loan facility. While there is no explicit fiduciary relationship between underwriter and issuer—which I assume is made explicit in the underwriting agreement—we need to be explicit about our interest in the use of proceeds and our debtor relationship with Bluemingdale. The use of proceeds in this manner can materially affect the market price of the shares, and we should disclose anything that questions our independence as underwriters or will affect our performance (see NI 33-105CP). If we cannot be independent, then we may need another independent underwriter to participate in the transaction (see NI 33-105).  We should disclose details around the debt, such as the amount, compliance, and secured property; in any case, the financial position of the issuer must be disclosed whether or not the proceeds will be used to pay the debt.

There is also a potential conflict with the CEO doing a merger with her sister’s company. We should remind the CEO of an officer’s fiduciary duty and to disclose all potential conflicts. Importantly, there should be an impartial business justification for the merger.

The compensation arrangement we currently have is not problematic on the face of it (see s 11.1 NI 41-101). To ensure that there are no restrictions on our ability to resell the shares, we need to look carefully at lock-up periods (see NI 45-102). The exemptions allow underwriters to sell in certain cases (see 2.13 NI 45-102). Remember, regulators are concerned about prospectus exempt parties selling their securities and the more onerous resale rules restrict exempt transactions that can be abused (see s 2.5 NI 45-102). The seasoning period requires the issuer be reporting for four months and the date of distribution is not relevant; however, the restricted or hold period requires a holding of security for four months from the date of distribution, and that they are reporting issuer for four months prior to the trade. If they fall under the restricted period, shares are not freely tradeable and must stay within the closed system. We can doublecheck that the company is a reporting issuer for four months and confirm that there is no concern for triggering resale restrictions—here, we can check the date of the initial prospectus.

Strategically, since the company may be upset about the share price, we can consider doing a post receipt pricing to omit the pricing and related information for the offering (see NI 44-103). While underpricing may give us minimal risk in this bought deal, we can hold off on the pricing and make a new assessment. Since the share price closed at $49.50, we can keep Bluemingdale happy by reconsidering the price, and, after we showed reasonable efforts to raise the share price, land back at $45 per share if necessary. For this route, we should review PREP prospectus procedures (see s 3 NI 44-103). However, I am hesitant to pursue this route as we would have to delay completing the underwriting agreement since we are leaving out the price (see s 4.10 and s 9 NI 44-103). This would affect our approach to marketing, as enumerated above (see s 4A NI 44-103). If we still want to pursue PREP, we should consider seeking an exemption from Ontario Securities Commission to PREP requirements (see s 6 NI 44-103).

Alternatively, we may also consider a dual offering in the United States, or even a private placement to qualified institutional buyers. If so, we would be subjective to the multi-jurisdictional disclosure system (see NI 71-101) and need to fill out SEC Form F-10. Perhaps this will increase the demand for the company and allow us to offer the shares at a better price. If we decide against an U.S. offering, we should add a legend, “Not for distribution to U.S. news wire services or dissemination in the U.S.”

Procedurally, I assume we are eligible to file a short form prospectus and that we have a base shelf prospectus filed (see NI 44-101). We should also be wary of testing the waters, Pre-Marketing and Marketing Amendments to Prospectus rules and any recent amendments to NI 44-101. Note also that the offering of 10 million shares exceeds 20% of outstanding securities for an inadvertent takeover bid, but we can sidestep this by relying on the statutory exception (see s 4 NI 62-104).

More generally, we can try to minimize diligence costs and time by doing a thorough diligence of the company for the public offering and using that for the private offering. The ultimate aim is to establish a due diligence defense, and this can be done by going through the diligence process once to check for any material misstatements or omissions. Although, we should be wary of timing and any outdated diligence that we may need to update. We should talk to the client about the scope of the diligence and the threshold for materiality.

Private Placement

We need to ensure that there are no restrictions or hold periods for Geller Funds since they need their shares to be freely resold in Canada (see NI 45-102CP). First trades under exemptions from the prospectus are considered “distributions” unless some conditions are met, and these conditions restrict some resale (see s 2.4 NI 45-106). It is important to remember what the CSA considers a “distribution.” A distribution commences when we discuss the selling of the distribution and it is sufficiently specific or that it is reasonable to expect that we will underwrite them. Since they already hold shares, we can rely on the private issuer exemption whereby they would be subject to a seasoning period for four months; moreover, placements through an offering memorandum counts as an exception (see Appendix D NI 45-106). We should also consider the fact that they are technically a foreign company (see s 2.15 NI 45-102). As such, we should file Form 72-503F on their behalf electronically within thirty days (see OSC rule 72-503).

We should warn Geller Funds that 13 million of the common shares would come close to the 20%—namely 14 million shares—which triggers a takeover bid (see NI 41-101). Therefore, we may need to search more aggressively for institutional investors for subsequent private placements.

We should make sure that your pitch to the bankers about the prospectus offering are acceptable communications, especially with respect to the timing outlined above. Also, they would not need to rely on exemptions to restrictions on resale because they can freely resell under the prospectus.

We may need to get creative with our approach to attracting other institutional investors. The institutional investors who want to help “top up” the company’s balance sheet seem worried about the performance of the public offering and are not willing to accept the risks of the private placement. We may be able to explore the possibility of subscription receipts, since there is a potential M&A with Seers Inc. Investors can hedge risks of the M&A transaction not closing; that is, if it does not close, they can get their money back. Alternatively, we may also consider special warrants (NI 41-101CP). In any case, please remember that we cannot provide for any other option to increase the number of securities purchased, except with an over-allotment option (see s 7.1 of NI 44-101). We should also be wary of TSX restrictions (see s 607 TSX Company Manuals).

Bought Deal Letter

Dates

We should update the dates with respect to the prospectus receipts and closing to reflect the general comments above. The same changes should be reflected in the term sheet below.

Confirmation Clause

A bought deal cannot be conditional on having additional underwriters agreeing to purchase securities from the offering, except for some confirmation clauses (see s 7.4 NI 44-101). To be sure, if a confirmation clause will be used, please provide the issuer with a copy of the bought deal agreement and have them sign it on the same; moreover, it must occur the business day after the bought deal is signed (see s 7.4 NI 44-101). We also need to discuss with the other underwriters regarding their participation and provide notice to issuer confirming the specific terms of the bought deal agreement within one business day after signing.

Liability

We do not want joint and several liability. Joint liability is problematic as it ties us to the actions of the other underwriters. We should specify we will be “severally (and not jointly)” liable. We should be only responsible for our portion and we should not be required to take on any liability for the other underwriters.

Filing

We do not need to obtain a receipt for the preliminary short form prospectus in each jurisdiction is Canada. We have a passport system (see MI 11-102) and only need the receipt from our jurisdictional regulator, the OSC. We can change the language to say, “to qualify the distribution in all the provinces and territories of Canada (other than Quebec).”

We should also add language around closing procedures and further procedural details around the transfer of funds.

Termination

The “ratings out” and “market-out” clauses are not appropriate for bought deals (see s 7.1 of NI 44-101). We should replace them with “disaster out”, “regulatory out”, and “material change out” along with “any other termination that are customary in underwriting agreements.” We should also note that any indemnities and termination rights apply equally to the agreement.

Additionally, for the underwriting agreement, we should consider our registration rights and piggyback rights, as well as other representations and warranties or any lock-up provisions.

Blackout

We may want to specify the additional restriction not to enter into any agreements or arrangement for the transfer or acquisition which have the economics consequence of share ownership. When we start the distribution, we cannot have any market making, communications, or other trading activities (see s. 3 of OSC Rule 48-501). To this end, we can add language to “halt the trading of units of BLUE at the TSX.”

Marketing

We should have explicit language in the letter authorizing us to immediately release a press release upon acceptance of the offer.

Additionally, we should receive authorization to distribute copies of the term sheet to potential investors as well as any other marketing materials.

Diligence

We can be more detailed in our language around diligence. We need broad cooperation from the company in providing information for preparing marketing materials. We should add that the issuer is required to file the marketing material (see s 7.6 NI 44-101). We may also want a termination right tethered to diligence in case we identify some material adverse fact or a failure of their representations and warranties (see s 7.3 NI 44-101).

Term Sheet

Option

We should specify that it is an overallotment option (see s 11 NI 41-101; see also s 2 and 6 NI 41-101CP), or else we could be offside for bought deals. We also need to reduce the 3 million shares to 1.5 million, since any overallotment option cannot exceed 15% of the base offering (NI 41-101).

Use of Proceeds

We can specify that it is for repaying debt and R&D, along with other general corporate purposes.

Resale Restrictions

We should be explicit about resale restrictions and note that shares can be subject to a four month hold period, with some exceptions (NI 42-102). We should also build in lock-ups for directors and officers, since they are also exempt from resale restrictions (see s 2.24 NI 45-106).

Sample Essay: Canadian Securities Law and ESG

Canadian Capital Markets, ESG Reform, and the Moral Investor

Environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) disclosure is an important consideration for both institutional and retail investors.[1] While there is no explicit requirement for disclosing ESG in Canadian securities laws, some material aspects of disclosure may capture parts of ESG. Nevertheless, it is becoming a practice among companies to voluntarily disclose ESG information. In this essay, I explore the relationship between the “moral” (e.g., environmental ethics) features of ESG and policy rationales behind securities legislation.[2] More specifically, I explore the rationale behind the legislation around securities disclosure requirement and how this disclosure information is supposed to assist investors in their decisions to purchase securities. The purpose of this essay is therefore to consolidate the conceptual thinking around ESG, morality, and securities disclosure regulations in Canada. I argue that increases in access to information through technology has made investors more sensitive to moral issues in their investment decisions, and the securities law ought to respond to these changes in their regulation around ESG considerations.

In the first part, I provide some brief context on Canadian securities law and trace the evolution of attitudes toward ESG disclosure. I explore some of the reasons why ESG has become the center of many present conversations and, more specifically, explore the role of morality in ESG, disclosure, and investment decisions. In second part, I explore the scholarship around arguments claiming that higher ESG scores attract more investors, and I compare this with the policy rationale in securities legislation around disclosure and why ESG in itself is not explicitly required to attract more investors. In the third part, I build an argument around the role of morality in investing decisions and what this means for ESG regulations. I explore how more information has led to more morally savvy investors and how regulators can respond to this through ESG reform. I conclude with a brief glimpse into how other jurisdictions may offer solutions and speculate on how Canadian securities regulators can operationalize ESG reform.

Canadian Securities Law and ESG

The current securities regulatory framework in Canada reflects its commitment to federalism by having provinces and territories regulate their capital markets.[3] In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”), “It is open to the federal government and the provinces to exercise their respective powers over securities harmoniously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism.”[4] The aspirations toward harmonization are presently in disarray. There are partially harmonised securities national instruments as well as guiding national policies, and the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) provides some national cooperation—still, there is no accountability that is fully national.[5] Notably, the SCC noted that Federal Parliament and provinces may exercise their combined powers to collaboratively create a national cooperative capital markets regulatory system.[6] To this end, in 2020, Ontario’s Capital Markets Modernization Taskforce recommended to implement a single piece of legislation to apply across Canada.

Procedurally, to distribute securities in Canada, a prospectus is required (or, for private placements, an offering memorandum) and must provide “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities issue.”[7] The prospectus must include a description of risk factors in the issuer and its business. Any new material changes must be disclosed in a news release and a material change report.[8] The existing disclosure regime gives companies a high amount of discretion and little guidance insofar as what is material enough to be disclosed. The rationale behind the current framework addresses the variability in companies in terms of industry, size, and business type which inform varying factors in determining risk and materiality.[9]

Currently, the existing ESG disclosure framework is outlined in CSA Staff Notice 51-333 (Environmental Reporting Guidance)[10] and CSA Staff Notice 51-358 (Reporting Climate Change-related Risks),[11] but factors of materiality are highly context sensitive. For example, a corporation’s Annual Information Form must disclose any information that will influence a reasonable investor’s decision on the issuer’s securities. However, this is not the test for materiality in Canadian securities law; rather, the materiality of information depends on what would be reasonably expected to have a significant effect on the market price of securities.[12] This means there is a gap in disclosing what shareholders might care about and what directors are obligated to disclose as material. In this vein, boards often make vague representations about managing risks, corporate culture, and internal policies, and a lack of regulatory guidance can partly explain the problematic vagueness in disclosure.

The Ontario’s Capital Markets Modernization Task Force’s final report recommends a mandatory ESG disclosure for all non-investment fund issuers, which is consistent with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate Change-Related Financial Disclosure.[13] The CSA proposed National Instrument 51-107 (Disclosure of Climate-related Matters)[14] whereby reporting issuers would be required to disclose their governance around climate risks and opportunities in the Management Information Circular; additionally, reporting issuers must disclose the impacts of climate-related risks on the company’s business and financial planning, how the company plans to manage risks, and the metrics and targets for managing risks. [15] In terms of timeline, the recommendation starts with the largest issuers (500 million in market capitalization) to comply within two years, and the smallest issuers (150 million in market capitalization) to comply within five years. The disclosure requirements would apply to all reporting issuers and entail “governance, strategy and risk management” as well as varying “scopes”[16] of green house emissions on a comply-or-explain basis. The task force also called on the CSA to impose similar standards across Canada.

With a basic sketch of Canadian securities regulation in place, we can now shift the discussion to exploring the market practices and attitudes around ESG. ESG investing came from the socially responsible investing movement in the 1980s, and it was based on effects other than investment returns, such as moral considerations around divestments from South Africa’s apartheid regime.[17] However, ESG investors evolved to argue that positive moral outcomes can be tethered to positive investment returns. For example, instead of arguing fossil fuels are a bad investment due to the environmental effects, ESG investors have shifted to arguing fossil fuels are a bad investment due to the risks of litigation, regulation, and sustainability; as such, the ESG investor may argue that renewable energy has better risk-adjusted returns and the positive environmental effects are an incidental positive outcome.[18]

Following ESG trends, institutions are working on standards for ESG criteria in the investment process, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.[19] There are many prominent ESG rating agencies which attempt to provide a standardized ESG rating similar to credit rating agencies.[20] What is notable about these private firms is that their pecuniary interest is tied to the propagation of ESG. Such interests and motivations for ESG should be subject to skepticism and scrutiny. While it is too idealistic to expect firms to have purely altruistic motivations in connection with ESG, one should be wary of whether financial motivations and moral motivations can conflict—for instance, maximizing ESG may be inconsistent with maximizing economic gain.[21] The lesson here is that readers ought to be sensitive to pecuniary interests associated with ESG and try to disentangle the morality of ESG from the money in ESG. Currently, there is a strong case for attributing the rise in voluntary ESG disclosure by companies to selfish motives of attracting investors, bolstering public relations, and strategically addressing climate risks.[22]

There are a number of studies outlining the efficacy of ESG for financial performance. Some have shown that increased corporate transparency on ESG information has positive correlations with corporate efficiency. One meta-study noted that 88% of sources find that companies with robust sustainability practices have better operational performance translating into cashflows.[23] The ultimate thesis of these studies is that ESG and profitability are compatible and complementary. In other words, ethical investing and strong financial performance can go hand-in-hand.[24] Others have taken a more attenuated approach and note that ESG as an investment strategy is too varied to compare.[25]

Some finance experts are radically skeptical towards the value ESG really adds.[26] They note that increased value should be reflected through higher cash flows or a lower discount rate, but none of these are increase solely by ESG; rather, there is a false correlation between profitability and the perceived “goodness” of ESG. At best, the goodness of ESG can penalize bad companies so investors do not buy their shares, but it is more difficult to establish a positive benefit with ESG itself. The correlation between ESG and increased valuation can instead be attributed to the gamification of ESG by large companies.[27]

To take stock, Canadian regulatory reform around ESG disclosure have been largely focused on targeting companies and using stricter, more detailed rules to provide clarity and to incentivise compliance. Companies, however, have been largely responsive to market forces demanding more ESG from companies and this has sparked a trend of voluntary ESG disclosure. The primary market force influencing companies are potential investors. While one explanation of why these external investors pursue ESG is for profit maximization and the perception that ESG adds to the value of a company, it is possible that the relationship between ESG and increasing value is temporary. If this is true, then once ESG stops providing value, investors would stop caring about ESG. However, there may be other more permanent reasons that investors care about ESG.

ESG and the Moral Investor

We can make further distinctions to clarify what external investors really care about in deciding on potential investments: first, ESG as a moral end in itself; and, second, ESG as being an instrument for higher returns and more money. An attractive feature of ESG is that it has the potential to solve a dilemma for investors, that is, investors no longer need to choose between money and morality. In 2020, there were an estimated 300 ESG funds which had the benefit of building wealth while also contributing to ethical practices.[28] Recently, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the trends have been that investors are incorporating ESG as a premium in their valuing of companies.[29] In response, companies pledging to be climate-neutral have doubled since the pandemic.[30] Nonetheless, these notions of guilt-free investing might be exaggerated. While sophisticated investing decisions are often determined by incredible amounts of financial analysis and modelling, retail investors often take a more subjective and personal approach. This can include personal morality. Due to their lack of sophistications, retail investors are susceptible to misinformation, manipulation, and misdirection, and their vulnerability needs to be protected.

Returning to the idea of guilt-free investing, it may indeed be too good to be true. Without consulting exact details and poring over disclosure documents, retail investors may buy into corporate virtue signalling.[31] Virtue signalling is the act of portraying a good moral character to others. This can be problematic if one does not genuinely hold such moral beliefs and acts disingenuously. We can see how this applies to ESG: companies may signal that they are allies of ESG to lure investors with their perceived moral character yet fail to operationalize any principles of ESG. ESG virtue signalling can take the form of promising both morality and money, and, while this in itself is not repugnant, it can be harmful if their promises are anything less than the truth and intended to deceive investors.

ESG virtue signalling may partly explain how ESG became a fad. By claiming they maximize both morality and financial gain, they have the moral high ground against their competitor companies who only focus on financial gain. Latching onto this trend, more companies may try to signal their virtue through ESG and creep into the lines of dishonesty and deception. ESG, currently conceived, is too easy a solution to the dilemma of morality and money, and the recent fads are propagated by people in the ESG space profiting from this trend. Deceptive practices which prey on an investor’s moral sentiments, information asymmetry, and false perception of competitive advantage needs to be penalized.

Nevertheless, there are strong arguments for why ESG needs to be the primary aim, in and of itself—that is, apart from any financial gain. ESG can combat risks of poor governance and practices which threaten the sustainability of our global capital markets. Additionally, it addresses broader existential threats caused by global inequality, climate change, and rights violations. This may invoke debates about weighing short-term versus long-term issues and what needs to be properly prioritized. However, we can sidestep these vexing debates and concede that there are short-term issues which ESG policies can address. There are current damages and risks in businesses related to climate change, current human rights violations in supply chains, and current inequities in corporate governance. It is odd to think of such moral claims in financial terms. While financial gain can be an incidental effect of attending to these moral claims, these moral claims should still be pursued at no financial gain or even at a short-term financial loss. These are issues in front of us that ESG can address.

It is at this point we must deal with an objection. If the relationship between financial gain and morality can be challenged, then, in the case that the ESG fad dies down and ESG no longer adds value to investors, investors may then no longer care about the morality of ESG. This may be framed as an empirical question: in other words, would investors still pay a premium for good behaving companies? One might assume through economical models that investors do not care about morality and only care about maximizing their investments. However, even sophisticated investors are increasingly adding moral considerations into their investing decisions.[32]

One interesting area where morality and investing have a tight relation is equity crowdfunding.[33] Crowdfunding can support businesses that cannot access traditional sources of small business financing and present this business as an attractive investment opportunity to a wider range of people.[34] With crowdfunding, businesses have the added flexibility to choose virtually any kind of business. Businesses do not have to be concerned with high growth, rather they can choose something like personal passion or social impact and still attract investors.[35] This is just one example of investors being more morally conscience when given the opportunity.

Technology and access to information through the internet have had profound impacts on investing behavior and its relation to morality.[36] The internet and other information technologies have certainly lowered information costs, and this can benefit all parties. Since its advent, some have been optimistic about the role of technology for enhancing risk disclosure.[37] Technology not only lowers the cost of disclosure it also speeds it up. For example, press releases of material updates are instantly accessible and company websites often contain detailed ESG reports. Sophisticated institutional investors also have modes of instant communication to assist in understanding risks. However, the sheer amount of readily available and free information can pose a challenge for parsing out the quality of information.

Many have been worried about an “information overload.”[38] More information can counterintuitively worsen investment decisions and potentially lead to immoral or amoral decision-making. For example, imagine having to sift through a box full of diligence materials on a company within a week; then, imagine having to sift through fifty boxes full of diligence materials within a week. In the latter instance, one is more prone to be overwhelmed, confused, and unable to effectively process the information. Simply believing more information and disclosure leads to more informed investors ignores psychological limitations. Discussions around the density of information in prospectuses and the opaqueness of some legal or financial jargon suggest the need for simplified information for retail investors. Thus, a necessary part of disclosing information is also ensuring that it can be processed effectively. This can be achieved through clearer and more manageable disclosure that is easily searched and digested, which must be a policy aim for any reform of the securities disclosure regime.

One should also be wary about misinformation available through technology.[39] It can further manipulate the perceived moral character of companies. Search engine algorithms have become increasingly sophisticated and tailored or targeted content can skew information. Most retail investors do not have sophisticated means of attained reliable information, and negative information about companies or material risks will not necessarily be the most salient or readily accessible on the internet. Even blogs and social media platforms can affect an investor’s decision.[40] There are certainly sophisticated tools to assist in analysis and self-education resources available, but these are no replacement for the expertise of a professional. Retail investors often act without consulting intermediaries and are frequently unequipped to filter out unreliable or biased information.

The availability of information and globalization has certainly led to some moral progress.[41] In the last century, we have seen the gradual acceptance of progressive attitudes towards homosexuality, anti-racism, and gender equality. This moral evolution can be partly attributed due to technological advances. Granted, technology also cuts the other way and contributes to tribalism and other moral failures.[42] Nevertheless, we do not need to go as far as saying that technology contributes to the development of our morality; rather, more modestly, we can say that technology facilitates our existing morality by providing information as the raw material to inform our decisions. For example, without media to distribute information, we may have never learned about the human rights violations of Nevsun Resources Ltd.[43] It is not that the information provided by media sources changed our moral judgments, rather that we were only able to exercise our moral judgements once we had adequate information. An investor may make this judgment and choose not to invest in a company involved in morally repugnant behavior. In this sense, the advent of more freely accessible information can lead to a more morally conscience investor.

ESG Reform and the Future of ESG in Canada

Since investors can influence companies to be moral with their wallet insofar as deciding which shares to purchase, we should be cautious about having legislation step in. The suggested upshot is that we do not need strict legal intervention; we can keep letting the morality of external investors influence the morality of companies. To this end, principles-based regulation—aiming at high-level rules rather than more detailed prescriptions—can be an effective approach for reform.[44] Rules should be designed by market participants rather than regulators as this would be more efficient and have stronger rates of compliance. Regulator should certainly still act to protect consumers or protect against market failure, but they should only implement prescriptive rules when there is clear evidence of harm. This would assist in the growth of Canada’s capital markets and reduce limits on the speed or volume of transactions. Prescriptive regulations always lag a bit behind innovations and changes in the market, so it is important to have a more flexible approach to regulation. Thus, principle-based regulation is a natural fit for ESG reform rather than the rules-based approach to regulation.[45] It recognizes the variability in businesses in terms of size, sector or industry.[46] We can look at the success of principle-based regulation through an outcomes-based approach.[47]

Rather than trying to influence corporations, regulatory reform could be better served by targeting other market players. We have discussed external investors, but there are also internal investors—that is, the present shareholders of a company—who can influence the direction of a company. The Capital Markets Modernization Taskforce had ESG related recommendations focusing on board composition and governance.[48] Corporations should not be viewed as mindless profit maximizing machines. By changing how we think about a director’s responsibility—metaphorically, the workings of the corporation’s brain—we can understand the corporation beyond a profit maximizing machine and move towards a more morally sensitive corporation.[49] In the corporate governance context, the incentives are directly aimed at the duties of directors and their accountability to current shareholders. The directors are incentivised to behave well by the potential of being ousted by shareholder actions or incurring liability through a breach of fiduciary duty. Through this lens, directors are still concerned about the overall value of the company and potentially attracting new shareholders, yet these concerns are secondary to the primary incentive of keeping internal shareholders happy. This broadening of a director’s fiduciary duty to include ESG is entirely possible— investment consultants and asset managers, for instance, already have a duty of care to raise ESG considerations with their client.[50]

This approach to ESG of targeting director’s duty can be fruitful, but there are other market players to target as well. Interestingly, creditors could also demand ESG and influence a company’s decisions on developing their ESG. Environmental risks are a part of the profile of a company and inform their creditworthiness.[51] Creditors may be more generous with their terms if companies meet a standard of ESG. Of course, creditors have to be motivated and incentivised to move companies in this direction. It may appear that we just moved the problem of incentives backwards instead of addressing it, but it may be worth thinking about how incentives for creditors are different from that of the company.[52]

By and large, the ESG disclosure regime remains problematic in Canada. The CSA reported that, despites the guidance provided in NI 51-333, 22% of sampled issuers made no climate-related disclosure at all and 22% included only boilerplate disclosure.[53] There are a number of conclusions one might draw from this. First, clarity in the disclosure procedures is not the issue when it comes to voluntary disclosure; rather, it may be a problem of incentive. Second, this may indicate that mandatory disclosure is necessary for detailed climate-related disclosure and issuers need to be incentivised by stricter regulation standards. Third, if firms are not voluntarily disclosing climate-related disclosure, the value it brings to the company or its role in attracting investors might be minimal or at least lower than the costs of the disclosure. Whatever the case may be, stricter laws are not the answer.

Another worry with stricter ESG disclosure policies is that it will add to costly over-disclosure that may obscure useful information.[54] Overcomplexity is certainly counterproductive for ESG.[55] The aim of investor protection should make disclosure as accessible as possible, but the information must first be adequately disclosed before we look at the problem of accessibility. A stricter ESG disclosure regime could also give rise to more litigation. Some have identified an increase in litigation stemming from a company’s conduct not matching their statements about ESG as well as suits directly challenging a company’s performance.[56] The line to navigate here is between companies providing aspirational ESG statements and material misrepresentations.

One may also question the approach of the Modernization Task Force in seeking comments.[57] Third-party professionals offering advice might choose recommendations for political or self-motivated reasons rather than for the quality of the contribution. Similarly, the Canadian government is incentivised to promote ESG for other political motivations. Canada, through the Responsible Investment Association, is looking to lead the world charge for managing climate risks and reaffirm Canada’s place in the global capital markets through establishing the International Sustainability Standards Board in Canada.[58] Notably, this is another way of instrumentalizing ESG—that is, the aim of sustainability and equitable practices is incidental to another valuable target, which, in this case, is not money but political currency. This is problematic because making the actual aims of ESG a mere incidental effect means that the priority is on political gain; in other words, when the aims of ESG and politics conflict, then politics would be prioritized.[59] ESG cannot be used as a guise for some other end like money or political power.

            Many hurdles remain for a unified, possibly global ESG standard. One vexing issue is compliance and combatting the gamification of ESG data and disclosure.[60] The morality of ESG should not be a strategy to cover up ingenuine attitudes toward ESG goals nor should it be instrumentalized for some other end, which is the central issue of greenwashing. This gamification of ESG tries to bolster ESG through massaging scores, finding biased ESG rating agencies, and relying on vague language in disclosure. The game is to maximize perceived ESG—whether it is through scores, ratings, or public image—while minimizing the resources invested into ESG. Another is that the lack of standardization is based on the fact that ESG risks vary by industry, business, and geography. We may look to other jurisdictions for guidance on the future of ESG in Canada.


            In the United States, the Biden administrations announced the appointment of a “Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG for the Securities and Exchange Commission”, and a Climate and ESG Taskforce; in May 2020, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) Investor Committee recommended that the SEC start updating reporting requirements to include ESG factors.[61] In December 2020, the ESG Subcommittee proposed recommendations on the disclosure of ESG risks.[62] The acting chair announced in March 2021 an opportunity to comment on climate change disclosure.[63] The issues were around the disclosure of the internal governance of climate issues and risks, and whether disclosure standards should be comparable to financial disclosure requirements (e.g., audit, assessment, certifications). Predictably, Canada followed suit in October 2021.[64] Increasing investor confidence in the capital markets is a clear policy objective. Some have shown that a demanding and actively enforced disclosure system with heavy civil and criminal penalties towards management promote investor confidence. This line of argument is buttressed by American reform through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the change in investors’ confidence in financial statements after the Enron scandal.[65]

Other jurisdictions have already operationalized rules to mandate the disclosure of ESG. Overseas, the European Union began a comprehensive mandatory ESG disclosure regime.[66] The “EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act” introduced disclosure obligations for companies based on expert criteria on contributors of climate change; moreover, the “Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive” is supposed to act as a uniform reporting standard for sustainability disclosure. [67] The EU also aims at reinforcing fiduciary duties and corporate governance regulations to promote sustainability. EU securities regulators have adopted a scheme of mandatory disclosure through the “Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation” and called for increased oversight of ESG ratings to address “greenwashing” and other gamifying practices.[68] Others have pursued their own scheme of mandatory ESG disclosure, such as the UK[69] and New Zealand[70] which have slightly longer timelines. Australia has had some interesting developments, such as its June 2021 ASIC targeted surveillance of “greenwashing.”[71] Additionally, there have been several examples of litigation around climate risk disclosure, which is an important lesson for other jurisdictions.[72] Nevertheless, Canada’s capital markets are unique, and it is not clear that transplanting another nation’s laws will be the appropriate fix. As investors are becoming more sensitive to moral factors connected to ESG in their investment decisions, it is important to think about how this can be used to incentivise companies to devote more attention to ESG.[73]

To conclude, it is important to define the scope of this essay, which have been modest and only suggestive. I have provided a sketch of Canadian securities law as it relates to ESG, and I noted some emerging attitudes towards ESG as a temporary trend. I discussed the utility of ESG as a means of increasing returns for investors and distinguished it from ESG as a mere moral consideration, which I suggest more investors are turning their minds toward. I argued that even apart from the utility of ESG, investors are becoming more sensitive to the morality of their investment decisions, especially with increased access to information through technology. The suggestion is that even if the instrumental value of ESG wanes, investors will continue to be attracted to the moral value of ESG and thereby influence companies to have a more robust ESG policy. The ultimate conclusion is that stricter legal rules around ESG is the wrong approach, and that regulator should think creatively about tackling reform through other capital market players.


[1] It is important to distinguish ESG from the related concept of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). CSR arose in the United States in the 1970s by the Committee for Economic Development. ESG is distinguishable from CSR in that ESG is focused on measurable criteria applicable to specific targets, like diversity, supply chains, and climate change. CSR is aimed at general accountability of business across a wide variety of sectors with little measurability; in other words, CSR is more applicable in the context of a high-level mission statement or business commitments. While much of what this essay covers can apply to CSR, for clarity and precision, this essay will focus on ESG. 

[2] It is important to further define some terms and comment on the scope of this paper. The distinction between “moral” and “ethical” is not important for the purposes of this essay and are used interchangeable unless otherwise indicated. The same goes for “duty” and “obligations” as well as “company” and “firm” for all intents and purposes.

[3] Thus, there are 13 securities regulators accountable to 13 governments, and each regulator is supposed to reflect the different strategic priorities for their jurisdiction.

[4] 2011: Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, at para 9.

[5] There are approximately 130 national instruments, 11 multilateral instruments, and 800 local rules.

[6] Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48.

[7] Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5.

[8] Moreover, National Instrument 51-102 requires periodic disclosure of material information in its Annual Information Form (including risk factors influencing an investor’s decision to purchase securities) and Management Discussion and Analysis (including risks or uncertainty for the business’s future performance).

[9] However, too little guidance can have the effect of companies innocently failing to identify material risks or potentially shirking their disclosure obligations. More explicit and clear regulation can also assist in offsetting information costs for companies; by providing guidance, companies do not need to waste resources in trying to discern what the requirements for disclosure are, and often these requirements can be generalized through categories of industry, size, or the type of business. This general approach to policy focuses on stricter rules and penalties to achieve certain aims in the capital market.

[10] Canadian Securities Administrator, CSA Staff Notice 51-333 – Environmental Reporting Guidance (October 27, 2010).

[11] Canadian Securities Administrator, CSA Staff Notice 51-358 – Reporting of Climate Change-related Risks (August 1, 2019).  

[12] Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., 2007 SCC 44.

[13] The final report contains 74 recommendations and is the product of consulting with over 110 stakeholders and 130 comment letters.

[14] Canadian Securities Administrator, CSA Staff Notice 51-358 – Consultation Climate-related Disclosure Update and CSA Notice and Request for Comment Proposed National Instrument 51-107 Disclosure of Climate-related Matters (October 18, 2021).  

[15] Alternatively, this can be in the AIF or MD&A

[16] Scope 1 refers to direct GHG emissions, Scope 2 refers to indirect GHG emissions from purchased energy. and Scope 3 refers to indirect GHG emissions not covered by Scope 2.

[17] John H Langbein & Richard A Posner, “Social Investing and the Law of Trusts” (1980) 79:72 Mich L Rev.

[18] Andrew W Lo & Ruixun Zhang, “Quantifying the Impact of Impact Investing” (2021), online SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944367.

[19] In 1998, the International Labour Organization passed the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which were the precursors to the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Global efforts have been focused on implementing these UN principles.

[20] Florian Berg, Julian F Kolbel, & Roberto Rigobon, “Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings” (2020), online SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438533.

[21] Ideally, maximizing ESG would also maximize economic gain; while some suggest there may be some minimal correlation between the two, maximizing ESG will not maximize economic gain.

[22] As we shall see, cynical attitudes towards ESG argue that ESG is a fad that is extremely profitable for those involved in it while failing to produce any actual good or contributing minimally to ESG’s aspirational goals.

[23] Gordon L Clark, Andres Feiner, & Michael Viehs,” From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance” (2015), online SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281.

[24] Tamas Barko, Martijn Cremers, & Luc Renneboog, “Shareholder Engagement on Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance” (2021), J Bus Ethics (forthcoming).

[25] Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, “Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds” (2020) 41:5 Cardozo L Rev 1921.

[26] Bradford Cornell & Aswath Damodaran, “Valuing ESG: Doing Good or Sounding Good?” (2020) online SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557432.

[27] Aswath Damodaran generally argues that ESG does very little for increasing the value of a company. He further notes that outsourcing one’s conscience to corporate boardrooms is not the solution and that boardrooms should be focused on building the business.

[28] John Hale, “Sustainable Fund Flows in 2019 Smash Previous Records” (2020) online Morningstar: https://www.morningstar.com/articles/961765/sustainable-fund-flows-in-2019-smashprevious-records.

[29] Maura Souders, “Survey Analysis: ESG Investing Pre- and Post-Pandemic” (2020) online ISS ESG Solutions: https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/ISS-ESG-Investing-Survey-Analysis.pdf.

[30] Ecosystem Marketplace, “EM Global Carbon Hub” (2021) online: https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/carbon-markets/.

[31] Tyge G Payne, Curt B Moore, Greg R Bell, & Miles A Zachary, “Signaling Organizational Virtue: an Examination of Virtue Rhetoric, Country‐Level Corruption, and Performance of Foreign” (2013) 7:3 Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 230-251.

[32] Duffy Morf. “Shifts in corporate accountability reflected in socially responsible reporting: A historical review” (2013) Journal of Management History.

[33] There has been a recent prospectus exemption granted for equity crowdfunding in Canada.

[34] A useful analogy that academics use is that crowding funding is a combination of crowdsource (i.e., combining contributions from many people to achieve a goal, like Wikipedia) and microfinancing (i.e., lending small amounts of money to poor borrowers who don’t have access to traditional funds, like purchasing new nets for financially struggling fishers).

[35] Christopher H. Pierce-Wright, “State Equity Crowdfunding and Investor Protection” (2016) 91 Wash. L. Rev. 847.

[36]Brad M Barber & Terrance Odean, “The internet and the investor” (2011) 15:1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 41-54.

[37] Donald C Langevoort, “Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing” (1997) 75:2 Wash U L Q 753.

[38] Troy A Paredes, “Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation” (2003) 81:2 Wash U L Q 417.

[39] Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, “The consequences of financial innovation: a counterfactual research agenda” (2011) 3:1 Annu Rev Financ Econ 41-85.

[40] Chong Oh & Olivia Sheng, “Investigating predictive power of stock micro blog sentiment in forecasting future stock price directional movement.” (2011) Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems.

[41] Peter Singer, The expanding circle: Ethics, evolution, and moral progress, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[42] Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind : Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, (New York: Vintage Books, 2013).

[43] Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5.

[44] Julia Black, Martyn Hopper, & Christa Band, “Making a success of principles-based regulation” (2007) 1:3 Law and financial markets review 191-206.

[45]Brigitte Burgemeestre, Joris Hulstijn, & Yao-Hua Tan, “Rule-based versus principle-based regulatory compliance” (2009) Legal Knowledge and Information Systems IOS Press 37-46.

[46] One interesting example of integrating ESG into the capital markets is through a more focused approach, like fixed income investments.

[47] To illustrate, if ESG metrics set by regulators are not met, and there is clear evidence of harm (e.g., environmental), the regulators would need to step in for more prescriptive measures to address the harms.

[48] First, corporate board diversity requirements for executive officers who identify as women, BIPOC, persons with disabilities, and LGBTQ+. The taskforce recommends that issuers aim for 50% women (implemented over five years) and 30% of the other named groups (implemented over seven years). Second, board tenure limits for most board members. Third, a mandatory (non-binding) say-on-pay votes on executive compensation. Fourth, mandatory annual director elections on uncontested elections.

[49] The aims of fiduciary duty and ESG disclosure regulation overlap in important ways. In sum, they aim at incentivising good behavior from corporations and disincentivized bad behavior through penalties. In the public disclosure context, the incentives are aimed at avoiding regulatory sanction while also attraction new investors. The directors are incentivised to behave well by the potential of investors choosing another company that has higher ESG outcomes or regulators punishing them for lying about their falsely disclosed ESG outcomes. However, they achieve these aims through different means. One way to illustrate this is by tracking the relationships of incentive and duty.

[50] Paul Watchman et al, “Fiduciary Responsibility: Legal and practical aspects of integrating environmental, social and governance issues into institutional investment” (2009) Asset Management Working Group: United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative.

[51] ESG risks can be important in the bond market for credit analysis (e.g., green bonds, social bonds, sustainability bonds).

[52] A clear example of this is the case of the creditor being a government—governments are not private parties incentivized by profit, and governments can directly implement these policy aims through public funds. This can be further reason to think that ESG is not just a fad.

[53] Supra note 6.

[54] Virginia Harper Ho, “Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release” (2020) 65:1 Vill L Rev 67.

[55] Granted, it remains that under-disclosure is currently the problem.

[56] David Hackett et al, “Growing ESG Risks: The Rise of Litigation” (2020) 50:10 Envtl L Rep 10849.

[57] Douglas Sarro, “Incentives, Experts, and Regulatory Renewal” (2021) 47:1 Queen’s Law Journal.

[58] Ontario Securities Commission, “Canadian securities regulators strongly support the establishment of the International Sustainability Standards Board in Canada” (2021) online: https://www.osc.ca/en/news-events/news/canadian-securities-regulators-strongly-support-establishment-international-sustainability-standards.

[59] The worry here is that instrumentalizing ESG would lead to suboptimal outcomes and, if we believe ESG is just a fad, it may no longer be discussed or operationalized.

[60] Another related and salient issue is defining materiality and trying to balance between generally applicable rules while also being flexible.

[61] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Recommendation of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee Relating to ESG Disclosure” (2020) online: https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/esg-disclosure.pdf.

[62] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Asset Management Advisory Committee Potential Recommendations of ESG Subcommittee” (2020) online: https://www.sec.gov/files/potential-recommendations-of-the-esg-subcommittee-12012020.pdf.

[63] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures” (2021) online: https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures

[64] Ontario Securities Commission, “Canadian securities regulators seek comment on climate-related disclosure requirements” (2021) online: https://www.osc.ca/en/news-events/news/canadian-securities-regulators-seek-comment-climate-related-disclosure-requirements

[65] John C Coffee, Jr, “Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” (2002) 57 Bus. Law. 1403.

[66] European Commission, “Sustainable Finance and EU Taxonomy: Commission takes further steps to channel money towards sustainable activities” (2021) online: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1804.

[67] Robert G Eccles et al, “Mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure in the European Union” (2012) Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Case No 111-120.

[68] European Securities and Markets Authority, “ESMA Calls for Legislative Action on ESG Ratings and Assment Tools” (2021) online: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-calls-legislative-action-esg-ratings-and-assessment-tools.

[69] HM Treasury, “A Roadmap towards mandatory climate-related disclosures” (2020) online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933783/FINAL_TCFD_ROADMAP.pdf.

[70] David Clark, “Financial Sector (Climate-related Disclosures and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2021 (2021/39)” (2021) online: https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_109905/financial-sector-climate-related-disclosures-and-other

[71] Australian Securities & Investments Commission, “21-295MR ASIC and ATO engage with directors as part of ASIC’s Phoenix Surveillance Campaign” (2021) online: https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2021-releases/21-295mr-asic-and-ato-engage-with-directors-as-part-of-asic-s-phoenix-surveillance-campaign/.

[72] In Mark McVeigh v Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (REST), McVeigh claimed that REST failed to disclose risks which prevented him from making an informed decision about the fund’s performance. This case was settled and REST undertook to adopt TCFD reporting recommendations. In Australian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Santos Ltd, a shareholder advocacy group alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in Santos’s 2020 report claiming natural gas as a “clean fuel.” They also claimed that Santos’s plan to achieve net zero emissions by 2040 is misleading because it was based on undisclosed assumptions about carbon capturing.

[73] This also lends further support to approaching regulatory reform from the viewpoint of broader principles rather than more granular rules.

Sample Essay: ESG and Corporate Governance

ESG Regulatory Reform, Canadian Corporation Governance and Securities Law

Environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) has been a popular topic in capital markets discussions. Governance—or the “G” in “ESG”—is the outlier from environmental and sustainability concerns.[1] Although they are cast together, it is often thought that there is no strong conceptual tie between governance and environmental or sustainability concerns.[2] What broadly ties ESG together are the aspirational moral aims such as environmental ethics, intergenerational justice, and equality of opportunity.[3] The legal framework around ESG attempt to guide companies towards these aims through various incentives.[4] Many approaches to ESG analysis focus solely on the putative value it brings to a company, such as attracting new investors; less focus has been put on the internal incentives, such as moral considerations or the views of current shareholders on ESG policy.

Corporate governance can have a role in incentivising management to develop and implement an ESG strategy.[5] The duties of directors are one way to influence the decisions of the directors, which is important since directors regulate a company’s strategy, operations, and performance.[6] There is a move towards directors (and officers) having a broader moral duty flowing from their fiduciary duty, or “looking beyond legality, to what is fair, given all of the interests at play” to address what is “wrongful even if it is not actually unlawful.”[7] This move in Canadian jurisprudence towards expanding the fiduciary duty can capture the moral dimensions of ESG while also incentivising ESG compliance. I argue that an expansion of a director’s fiduciary duty can buttress the current reforms to the ESG disclosure regulatory regime. Corporate governance laws can be a fruitful avenue for operationalizing ESG beyond mere disclosure and towards corporations being more morally conscious.

In part 1, I provide an overview of Canadian securities laws as it relates to ESG, and some of the standard market practices and attitudes towards ESG. I take a closer look at the disclosure regime and current discussions around market practices. This leads to a look at some potential weaknesses around the proposed reform with respect to corporate incentives. In part 2, I propose that a closer look at a director’s fiduciary duty can lead us to a more robust ESG regime. I begin by contextualizing fiduciary duty within the framework of current Canadian corporate governance law. I then suggest that the aims of ESG disclosure reform overlap with a director’s fiduciary duty and explore some potential problems with this view. In part 3, I expand on the relationship between corporate governance and securities disclosure laws. I look at the aims of each framework and how they go about incentivizing these aims. I then look at some speculative solutions and explore how other jurisdictions have approached these issues.

  1. The Legal Framework Around ESG in Canada

I want to begin by contextualizing this discussion with some background on ESG and the current views surrounding it. The purpose of this section is to provide a basic background of the laws around Canadian capital markets and corporate governance; to this end, I highlight only what is necessary for understanding the relevant legal aspects of ESG. Additionally, I provide further context around ESG market practices and how they relate to the legal framework. In essence, laws and market practices track incentives, particularly around increasing value and avoiding loss, and this results in some problematic outcomes.

  1. Securities law, disclosure, and ESG

            To start, it is necessary to briefly outline the legal framework in Canada’s capital markets. The current securities regulations in Canada reflect its federalist commitments. Each of the provinces and territories regulate their capital markets: in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”), “It is open to the federal government and the provinces to exercise their respective powers over securities harmoniously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism.”[8] Thus, there are 13 securities regulators accountable to 13 governments, and each regulator is supposed to reflect the different strategic priorities for their jurisdiction. There are partially harmonized securities national instruments as well as guiding national policies,[9] and the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) provides some national cooperation. Despite substantial attempts to completely harmonize the capital markets regime in Canada, there is currently no fully national body for securities accountability. Notably, in response to attempts at harmonization, the SCC noted that the Federal Parliament and each province may exercise their combined powers to collaboratively create a national cooperative capital markets regulatory system.[10] In 2020, Ontario’s Capital Markets Modernization Taskforce (“taskforce”) recommended to implement a single piece of legislation to apply across Canada.[11]

            To take a closer look at the securities disclosure framework, let us narrow the focus to the province of Ontario as a case study. A prospectus is required for public issuers and must be filed with the Ontario Securities Commission. A prospectus must provide “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities issued.”[12] The prospectus must include a description of risk factors in the issuer and its business. Procedurally, any new material changes must be disclosed in a news release and a “Material Change Report” must be filed on the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (“SEDAR”).[13] As a reporting issuer—namely, one who has obtained a receipt for a perspective from their respective regulator—there is also an obligation to continuously disclose information to investors. A corporation’s AIF must disclose any information that will influence a reasonable investor’s decision on the issuer’s securities. However, this is not the test for materiality in Canadian securities law; rather, the materiality of information depends on what would be reasonably expected to have a significant effect on the market price of securities.[14]

Material information relating to ESG can be a part of a number of securities disclosure forms. Some material risks might be disclosed in an issuer’s MD&A, especially as it relates to consumer preferences, supply chain management, or carbon allowances.[15] Material risks can also be a part of an issuer’s AIF, especially as environmental and social policies can affect operations and influence an investor’s decision to purchase securities.[16] It also includes elements of environmental protection requirements and disclosures of risks which can affect the price of securities. It is important for investors to have accurate, accessible, timely and up-to-date information which may have significant impact on the prices of securities. Nevertheless, in terms of ESG, boards often only make vague representations about managing risks, corporate culture, and internal policies.

The CSA has provided some guidance on what environmental information is material for disclosure. Currently, the existing ESG disclosure framework is outlined in CSA Staff Notice 51-333 (Environmental Reporting Guidance)[17] and CSA Staff Notice 51-358 (Reporting Climate Change-related Risks)[18] whereby factors of materiality are highly context sensitive. The CSA noted there is no bright-line test or quantitative threshold for materiality; rather, both quantitative and qualitative factors are considered in light of contextual information.[19] The CSA further notes that that environmental disclosure is only required insofar as it relates to material risks.[20] Current factors for material risk include probability, timing, context, and magnitude of the risk. This gives companies a high amount of discretion and little guidance insofar as what is material enough to be disclosed.[21]

            There are consequences for failing to disclose or misrepresenting information. [22] Institutional penalties take the form of criminal, quasi-criminal, and administrative enforcement. Yet, in theory, civil liability can be the costliest and the most incentivising for companies. Misrepresentation flows from securities statutes and mainly focuses on representations made by the prospectus and the offering memorandum.[23] In the primary market, purchasers may bring a cause of action if they purchased a security during the period of distribution.[24] In the secondary market, misrepresentations can flow from documents related to the prospectus (e.g., annual information forms, annual financial statements, interim financial reports, MD&A) or public oral statements (e.g., press releases, websites, roadshow presentations). The remedy can be damages or recission; when damages are awarded, they are calculated with respect to the real value of the purchases at the time of purchase and the depreciation of the security price.[25] Civil liability is a strong incentive for companies to make full, true and plain disclosure.

The taskforce’s final report recommends mandatory ESG disclosure for all non-investment fund issuers which is consistent with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate Change-Related Financial Disclosure.[26] The CSA proposed National Instrument 51-107: Disclosure of Climate-related Matters[27] whereby reporting issuers would be required to disclose their governance around climate risks and opportunities in the management information circular (alternatively in the AIF or MD&A); additionally, reporting issuers must disclose the impacts of climate-related risks on the company’s business and financial planning, how the company would manage such risks, and the metrics and targets for managing risks.[28] The disclosure requirements would apply to all reporting issuers and entail “governance, strategy and risk management” as well as varying “scopes”[29] of green house emissions on a “comply-or-explain” basis. The task force also called on the CSA to impose similar standards across Canada.[30]

By and large, the ESG disclosure regime remains problematic in Canada. The CSA reported that, despite the guidance provided in NI 51-333, 22% of sampled issuers made no climate-related disclosure at all and 22% included only boilerplate disclosure.[31] There are a number of conclusions one might draw from this. First, clarity in the disclosure procedures is not the issue when it comes to voluntary disclosure; rather, it may be a problem of incentive. Second, this may indicate that mandatory disclosure is necessary for detailed climate-related disclosure and issuers need to be incentivised by stricter regulations. Third, if firms are not voluntarily disclosing climate-related disclosure, then the value it brings to the company or its role in attracting new investors might be minimal or at least lower than the costs of the disclosure. While there still is no explicit requirement for disclosing ESG in Canadian securities laws, some material aspects of disclosure may fall under the purview of ESG; nevertheless, it is becoming a common practice among firms to voluntarily disclose detailed ESG information.

  • Market practice

Market practices are intimately linked to laws and changes in laws can have profound impacts on market practices; conversely, market forces can also impact legal reform and it is important to keep in mind the reciprocity of this relationship. Market practices have led to a trend towards increased voluntary disclosure and the causes of these trends are variegated. There is a strong case for attributing the rise in companies’ voluntary ESG disclosure to selfish motives of attracting investors, bolstering public relations, and strategically addressing climate risk. More idealistically, we might view this practice as corporations becoming better moral citizens and that there is an evolution in the morality of companies, investors, and stakeholders. On the other end, cynical views understand the trend as corporations acting in self-interest and view ESG as a mere mode for maximizing profit. Some remain skeptical about the underlying financial value that ESG can really bring and explain recent trends as a temporary response to market forces.[32]

            More attenuated optimistic views towards the value creation of ESG explain recent trends towards ESG in terms of a welcomed alignment between the financial benefits of ESG with moral considerations.[33] For example, a firm that cares about environmental ethics may be more attractive to shareholders and therefore ESG can become financially advantageous. It is important to disentangle these two motivations as they tend to be conflated. Claims that ESG can both contribute to moral ends while also maximizing returns should be approached with some skepticism.[34] It is difficult to convincingly argue that corporations are being altruistic in their voluntary disclosure of ESG. The more likely explanation is that companies are trying to attract investors and largely concerned about their public perception.

There is some talk about ESG being a fad.[35] The significance of whether ESG is a fad or not is partly due to the idea that ESG creates permanent value for companies. The veracity of this idea is important because if ESG is only creating perceived value on the market without contributing any intrinsic value for the company, then ESG would cease to provide any value when market sentiments shift.[36] In 2020, there were an estimated 300 ESG funds that claimed to build wealth while also contributing to ethical practices.[37] With the prevalence of profitable companies contributing to environmental disasters, human rights violations, and deplorable conditions for their employees, the promise of ESG is that investing can also contribute to positive ethical practices while simultaneously providing increased risk-adjusted returns.[38] Recently, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the trends indicate that investors are incorporating ESG as a premium in their valuing of companies.[39] Whether investors are becoming more morally conscious in their investing decisions or perceive ESG as a mere means for more returns remains to be seen. In any case, companies have been responding to this trend as pledging to be climate-neutral have doubled since the pandemic.[40]

There is a lot of money in ESG. There are many prominent ESG rating agencies which attempt to provide a standardized ESG rating similar to credit rating agencies.[41]  What is notable about these private firms is their pecuniary interest is tied to the propagation of ESG.[42] Such interests and motivations for ESG are suspect. While it is idealistic to expect firms to have purely altruistic motivations in connection with ESG, one should be wary of whether such motivations can conflict—for instance, maximizing ESG may be inconsistent with maximizing economic gain.[43] The lesson here is that readers ought to be sensitive to pecuniary interests associated with ESG and try to disentangle the morality in ESG from the money in ESG.[44]

There are a number of studies outlining the efficacy of ESG for financial performance. Some have shown that increased corporate transparency on ESG information has positive correlations with corporate efficiency, and one meta-study noted that 88% of sources find that companies with robust sustainability practice have increased operational performance translating into cashflows.[45] Some finance experts are skeptical towards the value ESG really adds.[46] Nevertheless, others argue that ESG does very little for increasing the permanent value of a company. At best, the goodness of ESG can penalize bad companies so investors do not buy their shares, but it is more difficult to establish a lasting positive benefit of ESG.[47]

To tie this all together, market practices and laws around ESG need to be understood holistically. Without clear laws, the markets will be left to its own devices and companies will only chase financial incentives. The ESG trend conveniently brings financial incentives, but it is entirely possible that this is temporary and dependent on market sentiment instead of intrinsic value. At this point, it appears that companies cannot be left to pursue moral ends without financial incentives, and this leaves ESG in a precarious situation.

  • Incentives and issues with the current ESG framework 

Reforming the regulations around the ESG disclosure regime may not be the most effective way at incentivising companies to be good, especially since this partly relies on the assumption that ESG will bring short-term returns to a company. In other words, if the fad disappears and ESG no longer brings short-term returns, then companies will no longer attend to ESG.[48] Absent any altruistic motivations, companies may need some other incentive. Rules and penalties are the obvious choice from the perspective of securities regulators. However, detailed prescriptive rules can be too restrictive, inflexible, and inefficient. Moreover, if companies are amoral and indifferently maximize profits, companies may try to gamify such rules.[49] For instance, a company might deem it is less costly to take on the risks of regulatory penalties than comply with expensive ESG changes and disclosure. While this is a cynical view of companies, it is important to address this possibility when reforming the ESG framework.

Another issue with the current ESG disclosure framework is investor protection.[50] Due to their lack of sophistications, retail investors are susceptible to misinformation, manipulation, and misdirection, and their vulnerability needs to be protected;[51] although sufficient disclosure can satisfy legal requirements, it is often not practical enough to protect retail investors.[52] Notably, without consulting exact details and poring over disclosure documents, retail investors may buy into corporate virtue signalling.[53] Virtue signalling is the act of portraying a good moral character to others. This can be problematic if one does not genuinely hold such moral beliefs and acts disingenuously.[54] We can see how this applies to ESG: companies may signal that they are allies of ESG to lure investors with their perceived moral character yet fail to operationalize any principles of ESG in their company. ESG virtue signalling can take the form of promising both morality and money, and, while this in itself is not problematic or illegal, it can start to become harmful if their promises are anything less than the truth and deceive investors. ESG virtue signalling may partly explain how ESG became a fad.[55] Latching onto this trend, more companies may try to signal their virtue through ESG and creep into the lines of dishonesty and deception.[56] Deceptive practices which prey on an investor’s moral sentiments, information asymmetry, and false perception of competitive advantage needs to be penalized.

Since its advent, some have been optimistic about the role of technology for enhancing risk disclosure and protecting investors.[57] Technology and access to information through the internet has had profound impacts on investing behavior.[58] The internet and other information technologies have certainly lowered information costs, and this can benefit all parties. However, the sheer amount of readily available and free information can pose a challenge for parsing out the quality of information.[59] Retail investors often act without consulting intermediaries and are frequently unequipped to filter out unreliable or biased information. A related worry with disclosure for retail investors is an “information overload.”[60] More information can counterintuitively worsen investment decisions.[61] Discussions around the density of information in prospectuses and the opaqueness of some legal or financial jargon suggest the need for simplified information for retail investors. Thus, a necessary part of disclosing information is also ensuring that it can be processed effectively. This can be achieved through clearer and more manageable disclosure that is easily searched and digested.[62]

To take stock, returning to the role of securities law intervention, the current laws around ESG disclosure targets only what is material. There is a gap in disclosing what shareholders might care about and what directors are obligated to disclose as material. Recall that the materiality threshold is based on a test of significant impact of market price and not what would affect a reasonable investor’s choice to purchase a security. There is a disconnect between what impacts market price and what impacts an investor’s decision. Market practices have picked up on this and often voluntarily disclose beyond what is legally required in order to attract new investors. Canadian regulatory reform around ESG disclosure have been largely focused on targeting companies and using stricter, more detailed rules to provide clarity and to incentivise compliance. Companies, however, have been more responsive to market forces rather than stricter rules.[63] This suggests that securities laws around ESG disclosures is not the proper incentive for companies; rather, the best incentive for enhanced ESG disclosure must track the sentiments of shareholders towards ESG.

  • Expanding the ESG framework

It is important to think about the hypothetical scenario whereby the trends around ESG subside and ESG investing is no longer financially beneficial.[64] Exploring this scenario can be helpful for understanding the effectiveness of the current ESG disclosure regime and whether corporations are sufficiently incentivised to disclose detailed ESG information. In this scenario, it is possible that directors may stop caring about ESG altogether. At this point, we should think about the current shareholders. Ideally, directors would ask for input from their shareholders on ESG matters, but directors currently have no explicit duty to ask their shareholders for input on ESG.[65] Some may argue differently and try to capture ESG under one of the director’s duties to their shareholders, but this view depends on what the role of the directors ought to be.[66]

            Both fiduciary duties and a duty to disclose have the aim of encouraging companies to act in morally beneficial ways. Directors can have a duty of disclosure under securities laws, but we have seen that this is an insufficient incentive and leads to vague, boilerplate ESG disclosure. The better incentive might be achieved through corporate governance law and a director’s fiduciary duty. The relationship between morality and legal duty is vexed, but there is some indication that Canadian courts are becoming increasingly more sensitive to moral considerations in the context of corporate law.

  1. Fiduciary duty and corporate governance law

Before exploring the relationship between corporate governance and ESG, I want to sketch out some key relevant laws and developments in Canada. By way of background, the CBCA[67] and OBCA outline the core duties for directors and officers:[68] the fiduciary duty; and, the duty of care, diligence and skill. [69] Courts have read in three duties flowing from the general statutory fiduciary duty: a duty to monitor management of the corporation to address risk and misconduct, a duty to treat stakeholders fairly, and a duty to act ethically.[70] First, a duty to monitor flows from the idea that it is unrealistic to expect directors to directly manage a large business. They must have acted reasonably on an informed basis and includes reasonable steps taken to evaluate ESG performance. This entails environmental and social risks relating to increased risks of litigation; more concretely, the directors and officers must have a process that is documented to verify and oversee ESG performance. This must be done within the backdrop of mitigating financial risk and performance.

            Second, a duty to treat shareholders fairly is captured broadly in Canada as shareholders are understood to be only one of many stakeholders. The SCC’s decisions in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise[71] and BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders[72] marked a shift from a director’s duty to shareholder primacy to acting in the best interest of a plurality of stakeholders. Additional stakeholders include employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, the government, the environment, and the long-term interests of the corporation. One set of stakeholder interests does not override another. Many writers of pointed to the vague and potentially conflicting nature of understanding a director’s duty as owed to multiple stakeholders.[73] It is unclear how directors are expected to ensure each stakeholders’ interest is treated fairly and which circumstances are relevant in prioritizing varying interests. While this vagueness may be understood to defer to the business judgment of directors, it can weaken claims for breaches of the duty and attaining a remedy for damaged parties.

Third, a duty to act ethically implies a director should go beyond mere compliance with laws. In BCE, the SCC noted that the duty of loyalty entails a “duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”[74] Fiduciary duties have the broader goal of fostering trust in social institutions.[75] Interestingly, this suggests a broadening of fiduciary duties beyond the scope of legal requirements. We can understand this to mean that directors need to be sensitive to moral considerations affecting the “goodness” of corporations and its place in contributing positively to the norms of society. This final branch of the fiduciary duty has the most potential for expanding into ESG reform.

            Crucially, and consistent with the “business judgment rule,” the fiduciary standard is not about outcome but the process of rationally accounting for relevant issues and the circumstances of the information available.[76] The business judgement rule covers such decisions by the director provided they act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the best interest of the corporation.[77] If directors breach their duty, shareholders might bring an oppression claim for a broad range of remedies.[78] One should note that decision-making is context-specific and draws on factors like “general commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; the relationship between the parties; past practice; steps the claimant could have taken to protect itself; representations and agreements; and the fair resolution of conflicting interests between corporate stakeholders.”[79] This duty is separate from corporate governance legislation and the duties which flow from them.[80]

It is important to clarify what it means to be “good” in the moral sense and “good” in the legal sense, and how they relate with respect to BCE.[81] Some have balked at the court’s liberal expansion of fiduciary duty and the use of contentious moral terms in BCE.[82] What can be confusing to understand is the separation between legal duty and moral duty. It is possible to follow legal requirements without being morally good or following a moral requirement. A clear example of this is in private law and the use of equitable doctrines in contract law.[83] Even when one has a legal right in common law, equitable doctrines step in to fix immoral or unjust transactions. Despite there being no strict equivalent of equitable doctrines for corporate governance and fiduciary duty, it is important to recognize that satisfying a legal duty like a checkbox is not sufficient. Indeed, the court draws on “concepts of fairness and equity rather than on legal rights.”[84] Directors may have a moral duty owed to the environment that goes beyond their legal duty, which is housed under their fiduciary duty.

            From the lens of securities law, the existing disclosure requirements around corporate governance is clear. However, the taskforce recommends greater corporate board diversity.[85] The governance portion of ESG relates to enhanced disclosure of corporate governance practices. This intersects with topics of board diversity, transparency, and shareholder rights.[86] Governance-related disclosure is required by securities law whereas environmental and social disclosure is not expressly required. The taskforce has specific ESG related recommendations focusing on board composition and governance.[87] The policy rationale for greater diversity is again both moral and instrumental. Morally, we aspire to have a more equitable society free of systemic discrimination and prejudice, and this needs to be reflected in our corporate boards. Instrumentally, diversity can be beneficial for the health of companies and create more value.[88]

The relationship between environmental and social disclosure with governance is significant. The board and management are in charge of overseeing, assessing, and managing environmental risks, opportunities, and related policies. They are naturally accountable for any deficiencies or misstatements in ESG disclosure, and they are responsible for moving the company towards better ESG. Expanding a director’s fiduciary duty to include ESG as a moral rather than financial consideration can be a productive way forward for ESG reform. The SCC have made suggestive indications about expanding the fiduciary duty to include moral considerations that are independent of any material financial risks. This shows that moral on its own has a role to play in the duties of a director, and protecting interests does not always mean maximizing only economic interests. Taken to its extreme, directors must be sensitive to the morality of the company, its shareholders, and other stakeholders in their decisions.

  • Expanding fiduciary duty for ESG reform

Directors and officers are responsible for the interests of internal stakeholders, particularly current shareholders.[89] Shareholders can have a profound role in pushing companies to care more about ESG and incentivising directors and officers to invest more into ESG. The line between business risks and environmental risks is becoming blurred. Shareholders want companies to articulate how growth can come from ESG and how companies will address long-term risks. It is becoming increasingly important for management to demonstrate how a company can protect against issues, like a public health crisis or climate change. While this might be more obvious for companies in industries like agriculture or fossil fuel, ESG risks are affecting all industries. Indeed, as issues such as climate change become exacerbated, the business risks start to become existential.[90]

            Corporate governance incentives are a more targeted approach towards directors. It is a core principle of corporate law that corporations have a separate legal entity. While it is clear the current laws would not pierce the corporate veil,[91] we may slowly move in that direction for ESG related violations. Courts have reserved piercing the veil of separate corporate legal personality and holding directors personally liable in the most aggregious cases of fraud, criminality, or objectionable purposes.[92] We should be careful that this is not punitive rather it is for just and equitable ends.[93] A duty of care held by directors and corporations could also extend to be owed to the environment and future generations.[94] The disclosure of morality can be tied to ESG and one might argue that shareholders ought to know about the moral decisions of a company. [95] This moral dimension might be initially introduced through ESG by its relationship to increasing the value of a firm and the general health of a firm, but it may go further to the discrete claim that shareholders ought to know about the moral outcomes of the decisions of the board, as suggested in BCE.

            Directors may also have a fiduciary duty owed to their shareholders to act in the best moral interest of the shareholders. In operation, this can take the form as a duty to consult their shareholders about their moral interests. In the same vein, one aspect of the duty of loyalty is to avoid conflicts. A conflict in morality might be understood in this way.[96] Notably, directors and officers are using other people’s money to act in their best interest of what is moral.[97] A problem arises when the demands of one stakeholder conflict with the judgment of the directors (and officers). For instance, while it can be reasonably said that shareholders defer financial decisions to the expertise of the directors, it is not clear that they defer moral decisions as well, particularly the morality around ESG. BCE suggests a move away from the paradigm that corporations have the sole objective of maximizing profits. The nuances of a corporation’s purpose are reflected in a director’s fiduciary duty and the plurality of stakeholders. Directors must be sensitive to the moral considerations of the company’s stakeholders and cannot paternalistically impose their own morally questionable decisions onto stakeholders.

At this point, one might push back and argue that all this analysis is unnecessary because trends towards ESG are better explained by the moral evolution of corporations, investors, and other stakeholders.[98] These parties are already incentivised by morality and laws do not need to import the presumption from economic theory that agents all seek to rationally maximize their self-interest,[99] so the argument goes. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that ESG is not a fad driven by finances but a lasting change in moral attitudes. Perhaps laws can move to encourage reasonableness or acting with respect to the common good and political morality.[100] These claims should be met with some skepticism. The idea that investors are willing to pay a premium for morality without any added return on their investment is largely speculative and idealistic.[101]

It is also possible that corporations have no role to contribute in morality.[102] It may be more appropriate that businesses should solely focus on profit and thus directors should solely pursue this end amorally. However, we typically attribute moral attributes to corporate persons. For example, we might attribute moral responsibility to the human rights violations of Nevsun Resources Ltd.[103] Even beyond the legality and even if certain actions are technically legally permissible, we believe that there are further moral constraints on corporations in addition to legal constraints, that is, to behave in ways consistent with shared morality such as environmental ethics. Corporations should not be viewed as mindless profit maximizing machines.[104]

To be clear, even if shareholders did not care about moral considerations, they can egoistically care about avoiding long-term existential threats. Imagine if shareholders were only concerned with financial returns and did not care about ESG as a moral consideration. ESG would still be useful to them as far as ESG can combat risks of poor governance and practices which threaten the sustainability of our global capital markets. Additionally, ESG addresses broader existential threats caused by global inequality, climate change, and rights violations. This may invoke debates about weighing short-term versus long-term issues and what needs to be properly prioritized. However, we can sidestep these vexing issues and concede that there are short-term issues which ESG policies can address. There are current damages and risks in businesses related to climate change, current human rights violations in supply chains, and current inequities in corporate governance. It is odd to think of such moral claims in financial terms. While financial gain can be an incidental effect of attending to these moral claims, these moral claims should still be pursued at no financial gain or even at a short-term financial loss. These are issues in front of us that ESG can immediately address.

In sum, it is currently not clear how courts will continue to expand the fiduciary duty. Some subsequent caselaw have moved in the direction of emphasizing good corporate citizenship.[105] However, further test cases are necessary to clarify the exact relationship between this expansion of the fiduciary duty and its application to ESG matters. It is possible to move this agenda forward concurrently with ESG reform.

  • ESG reform

The need for integrating a broader fiduciary duty into ESG reform comes from the worry that corporations will not be sufficiently incentivised to invest in ESG (in the case that the ESG fad dies down). The fad brings a lot of value returns from investing in ESG, but if the returns start to wean it could cause companies to devote less attention to ESG.[106] This can cause ESG to be a mere checkbox to meet regulatory requirements whereas the current voluntary scheme (combined with the current fad) results in more enthusiastic and generous diverting of resources to ESG. Incorporating broader fiduciary duties as a part of the ESG scheme would provide another source of incentives for directors to invest in ESG. More specifically, independent of the ESG fad attracting external shareholders, the current shareholders can keep directors accountable.

  1. Combining fiduciary duty and disclosure duties

The aims of fiduciary duty and ESG disclosure regulation overlap in important ways. Both securities and corporate governance regulations work with incentives.[107] However, they achieve their aims through different means. One way to illustrate this is by tracking the relationship between incentive and duty. In the corporate governance context, the incentives are directly aimed at the duties of directors and their accountability to current shareholders.[108] The directors are incentivised to behave well by the potential of being ousted by shareholder actions or incurring liability through a breach of fiduciary duty.[109] In the public disclosure context, the incentives are aimed at avoiding regulatory sanction while also attracting new investors. The directors are incentivised to behave well by the potential of investors choosing another company that has higher ESG outcomes or regulators punishing them for misrepresenting their ESG disclosure. Remarkably, both fiduciary duty and ESG disclosure regulation target directors.

We can try to speculate on how corporate governance law and securities law can further merge.[110] Reform can try to target other market players that have an influence on directors and officers. Beyond directors, underwriters may be another gatekeeper for scrutiny of ESG disclosure. While directors are better positioned to obtain information about the company, underwriters have a role in seeking out and questioning all relevant material facts to the best of their knowledge, information and belief. In other words, “they are expected to exercise a high degree of care in investigation and independent verification of the company’s representations.”[111] Creditors are another stakeholder for companies and can influence a company’s decisions.[112] Creditors may be more generous with their terms if companies meet a standard of ESG.[113] Of course, creditors have to be motivated and incentivised to move companies in this direction and they need to be similarly incentivised. In some sense, it may appear that we just moved the problem of incentives backwards instead of addressing it, but it may be worth thinking about how incentives for creditors are different from that of the company.[114] Employees are also more interested in working for sustainable companies; while attracting talent is important, directors should consider current employees as a stakeholder and how employees view ESG.[115] The plurality of stakeholders to which a fiduciary duty is owed opens up a lot of creative modes to implement ESG.

            Principles-based regulation—or, aiming at high-level rules rather than more detailed prescriptions—can be an effective approach for reform.[116] Rules should be designed by market participants rather than regulators as this would be more efficient and have stronger rates of compliance. Regulator should certainly still act to protect consumers or protecting against market failure, but they should only implement prescriptive rules when there is clear evidence of harm.[117] This would assist in the growth of Canada’s capital markets and reduce limits of the speed or volume of transactions. Prescriptive regulations always lag a bit behind innovations and changes in the market, so it is important to have a more flexible approach to regulation.

            Principle-based regulation is a natural fit for ESG reform rather than the rules-based approach to regulation.[118] It recognizes the variability in businesses in terms of size, sector or industry. We can look at the success of principle-based regulation through an outcomes-based approach. For example, if ESG metrics set by regulators are not met, and there is clear evidence of harm (e.g., environmental), the regulators would need to step in for more prescriptive measures to address the harms. An onerous disclosure regime with prescriptive rules can be inefficient if market participants are already voluntarily disclosing with similar outcomes—prescriptive rules would then punish the majority for the minority of free-riders and bad players. Despite the minority of bad players, the majority will establish a norm of ESG disclosure and create a penalty of reputational risk.[119]

  • Speculation on reform from other jurisdictions

Current ESG legal reform in Canada is primarily focused on securities disclosure in terms of making voluntary disclosure mandatory (rather than focusing directly on the duties of the directors). While the disclosure regime is connected to the duties of the director, implementing regulatory reform solely through the disclosure regime is an ineffective way of incentivising ESG. A further worry with stricter ESG disclosure policies is that it will add to costly over-disclosure that may obscure useful information.[120] Overcomplexity is definitely counterproductive for ESG; however, it remains that under-disclosure is currently the problem. The aim of investor protection should make disclosure as accessible as possible, but the information must first be adequately disclosed before we look at the problem of accessibility. Stricter securities regulations may undercut Canada’s competitive edge on the international stage.[121]

            Even without strict and detailed legal requirements, corporate governance practices would survive.[122] Voluntary commitments to environmental policy can be aimed at avoiding high compliance costs in the future. Firms may also try to signal that their governance is also attractive to investors—that is, directors who are transparently ethical and listen to the moral imperatives of their shareholders and other stakeholders. ESG factors can often engage the best interest of the corporation.[123] Increasing investor confidence in the capital markets is a clear policy objective that is tethered to investor sentiments and confidence in directors.[124] Some have shown that a demanding and actively enforced disclosure system with heavy civil and criminal penalties towards management promote investor confidence.[125] This line of argument is buttressed by American reform through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the change in investors’ confidence in financial statements after the Enron scandal.[126] Similarly, we may look to other jurisdictions for guidance on the future of ESG in Canada.

The United States fiduciary framework gives primacy to shareholders and this can open up more avenues to pursue insofar as a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty.[127] The argument is that a director or officer pursuing their own morality or benefiting a third party over shareholders is a violation of a duty of loyalty. From this perspective, the need to argue that ESG coincides with maximizing value is necessary.[128] ESG focused investing would be permissible if it benefits the shareholder by improving risk-adjusted returns and if the motives are to obtain this benefit.[129] While American corporate governance is different from the Canadian approach, we can prudently look to American reforms in securities law and ESG reform.[130]

Recently, the Biden administration announced the appointment of a “Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG” for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and a Climate and ESG Taskforce. In May 2020, the SEC’s Investor Committee recommended that the SEC start updating reporting requirements to include ESG factors,[131] and, in December 2020,[132] the ESG Subcommittee proposed recommendations on the disclosure of ESG risks. The acting chair announced, in March 2021, a chance to comment on climate change disclosure.[133] The issues were around the disclosure of the internal governance of climate issues and risks, and whether disclosure standards should be comparable to financial disclosure requirements (e.g., audit, assessment, certifications).

Overseas, the European union began a comprehensive mandatory ESG disclosure regime.[134] The “EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act” introduced disclosure obligations for companies based on expert criteria on contributors of climate change.[135] The “Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive” is supposed to act as a uniform reporting standard for sustainability disclosure. The European Union also aims at reinforcing fiduciary duties and corporate governance regulations to promote sustainability. EU securities regulators have adopted a scheme of mandatory disclosure through the “Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation” and called for increased oversight of ESG ratings to address “greenwashing” and other gamifying practices.[136] Others have pursued their own scheme of mandatory ESG disclosure, such as the United Kingdon[137] and New Zealand[138] which have slightly longer timelines. Australia has had some interesting developments, such as its June 2021 ASIC targeted surveillance of greenwashing.[139] Additionally, there have been several examples of litigation around climate risk disclosure, which is an important lesson for other jurisdictions.[140] These are useful datapoints that Canadian reform can draw upon.

Many hurdles remain for a unified and possibly global ESG standard. A vexing issue is compliance and combatting the gamification of ESG data and disclosure.[141] The morality of ESG should not be a strategy to cover up indifferences to ESG goals nor should it be instrumentalized, which is the central issue of greenwashing. This gamification of ESG tries to bolster ESG through massaging scores, finding biased ESG rating agencies, and relying on vague language in disclosure. The game is to maximize perceived ESG (whether it is through scores, ratings, or public image) while minimizing the resources invested into ESG. The overarching problem is the lack of standardization based on the fact that ESG risks vary by industry, business, and geography.[142]

In Ontario, nearing the end of 2021, the taskforce is working to receive comments from market participants.[143] This approach is questionable.[144] Third-party professionals offering advice might choose recommendations for political or self-motivated reasons rather than for the quality of the contribution. Similarly, the Canadian government is incentivised to promote ESG for other political motivations. Canada, through the Responsible Investment Association, is looking to lead the world charge for managing climate risks and reaffirm Canada’s place in the global capital markets through establishing the International Sustainability Standards Board in Canada.[145] Notably, this is another way of instrumentalizing ESG—that is, the aim of sustainability and equitable practices is incidental to another valuable target, which, in this case, is not money but political currency.[146] The primary worry here is that instrumentalizing ESG would lead to suboptimal outcomes and, if we believe ESG is just a fad, it may no longer be discussed or operationalized. ESG should not be used as a guise for some other end like money or political power.

  • Conclusion

I have tried to offer a conceptual link between ESG disclosure in Canadian securities law and a director’s fiduciary duty being expanded into moral considerations.[147] I have provided a sketch of the legal framework for disclosure under securities law and argued that the main weakness with approaching ESG from this angle is its weak incentives. I suggested that conflating financial incentives with moral incentives can be problematic when financial incentives disappear; in other words, we cannot build a legal framework for ESG by relying on companies to act altruistically. I then outlined how Canadian corporate governance jurisprudence is expanding a director’s fiduciary duty to include moral considerations above and beyond strictly legal requirements.

I argued that ESG can be housed under these moral considerations. The upshot is that ESG disclosure in securities law can be buttressed by ESG considerations as a part of a director’s fiduciary duty in corporate governance law. My aim is to give a modest account of laws relating to ESG in Canada and demonstrate that it is at least possible to connect ESG disclosure reforms with reforms in a director’s fiduciary duty. More work is required to fully paint how a duty to disclose and a fiduciary duty can provide a coherent foundation for fully ratifying ESG into Canadian law. 


[1] It is important to distinguish ESG from the related concept of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). CSR arose in the United States in the 1970s by the Committee for Economic Development. ESG is distinguishable from CSR in that ESG is focused on measurable criteria applicable to specific targets, like diversity, supply chains, and climate change. CSR is aimed at general accountability of business across a wide variety of sectors with little measurability; in other words, CSR is more applicable in the context of a high-level mission statement or business commitments. While much of what this essay covers can apply to CSR, for clarity and precision, this essay will focus on ESG. 

[2] It is true that corporate governance is important for contributing to environmental and sustainability policies, but it is also tempting to cast good governance as a separate aspirational end of enhancing diversity, social equality, and general corporate accountability.

[3] The distinction between “moral” and “ethical” is not important for the purposes of this essay and are used interchangeable, unless otherwise indicated. The same applies for “duty” and “obligations” as well as “company” and “firm.”

[4] Interestingly, incentives such as penalties and punishments assume that companies are self-serving and would not pursue moral aims without regulatory intervention.

[5] As some skeptics suggest, when the ESG fad is over and the link between ESG and the perceived increased value dissolves, we will then need a stronger incentive to promote ESG aims.

[6] If ESG alone cannot get companies to act morally, and if ESG’s adding value is temporary, then we need an alternative way to enforce good behavior.

[7] BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, at para 71.

[8] Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, at para 9.

[9] There are approximately 130 national instruments, 11 multilateral instruments, and 800 local rules.

[10] Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48.

[11] As of the end of 2021, it remains to be seen whether this recommendation will be realized.

[12] Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 56(1).

[13] Moreover, National Instrument 51-102 requires periodic disclosure of material information in its “Annual Information Form” (“AIF”), including risk factors influencing an investor’s decision to purchase securities; and, “Management Discussion and Analysis” (“MD&A”), including risks or uncertainty for the business’s future performance.

[14] Mary G. Condon, Anita I. Anand & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Law in Canada: Cases and Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005)

[15] The MD&A contains a narrative of the financial performance and reflections on the likely future performance of the company. The MD&A assists current and potential shareholders evaluate the value of a company and supplement financial statements.

[16] The AIF is a detailed document disclosing material information about business operations and future prospects.

[17] Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-333 Environmental Reporting Guidance (October 2010) online: <https://www.osc.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/irps/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-reporting.pdf&gt;

[18] Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-358 Reporting of Climate Change-Related Risks (August 2019), online: <https://www.osc.ca/en/securities-law/instruments-rules-policies/5/51-358/csa-staff-notice-51-358-reporting-climate-change-related-risks&gt;

[19] For example, emission standards future environmental-related risks can vary a great deal depending on a company’s industry, size, or business.

[20] The CSA has given some guidance as to what environmental information could be material, but again there remains no bright-line test for materiality.

[21] The rationale behind the current framework addresses the variability in companies in terms of industry, size, and business type which inform varying factors in determining risk and materiality. However, too little guidance can have the effect of companies innocently failing to identify material risks or potentially shirking their disclosure obligations.

[22] The distinction between private and public corporations is important to address since fiduciary duty can apply in both contexts but disclosure is more important in the public context.

[23] Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 130.

[24] The burden is on the plaintiff to establish a misrepresentation of a material fact whereby the defendant failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. A material fact is “a fact that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of the securities.” See Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5.

[25] Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., 2007 SCC 44.

[26] The final report contains 74 recommendations and is the product of consulting with over 110 stakeholders and 130 comment letters.

[27] Canadian Securities Administrators, Consultation Climate-related Disclosure Update and CSA Notice and Request for Comment Proposed National Instrument 51-107 Disclosure of Climate-related Matters (October 2021), online: <https://www.osc.ca/en/securities-law/instruments-rules-policies/5/51-107/51-107-consultation-climate-related-disclosure-update-and-csa-notice-and-request-comment-proposed&gt;

[28] The recommendation starts with the largest issuers (500 million in market capitalization) to comply within two years and smallest issuers (150 million in market capitalization) to comply within five years.

[29] Scope 1 refers to direct GHG emissions, Scope 2 refers to indirect GHG emissions from purchased energy, and Scope 3 refers to indirect GHG emissions not covered by Scope 2.

[30] More explicit and clear regulation can also assist in offsetting information costs for companies; by providing guidance, companies do not need to waste resources in trying to discern what the requirements for disclosure are, and often these requirements can be generalized through categories of industry, size, or the type of business.

[31] Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-358 Reporting of Climate Change-Related Risks (August 2019), online: <https://www.osc.ca/en/securities-law/instruments-rules-policies/5/51-358/csa-staff-notice-51-358-reporting-climate-change-related-risks&gt;

[32] Accordingly, the skeptic argues, as market forces die down, the financial creation will also die down; as such, tying the morality of ESG to its value creation is ultimately a fleeting and ineffective way of achieving moral policy objectives such as combatting climate change or addressing rights violations.

[33] Another appeal is ESG having the potential to solve a dilemma for investors of having to choose between money and morality.

[34] We can clarify the competing claims of morality and maximizing returns by imaging circumstances where one exists without the other. For instance, we might ask if investors or corporations would pay a premium for furthering moral aims if it had possibility of returns or even resulted in a net loss—here, it is clear that most are not purely altruistic in this sense. We can ask the opposite question: we can ask if investors or corporations further financial ends that further immoral ends—here, it is clear that egoism is rampant in corporate behavior.

[35] Witold Henisz, Tim Koller, & Robin Nuttall, Five ways that ESG creates value (November 2019), online: < https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/five-ways-that-esg-creates-value&gt;

[36] Zaghum Umar et al. “A tale of company fundamentals vs sentiment driven pricing: The case of GameStop.” (2021) 30: 100501 Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance.

[37] John Hale, Sustainable Fund Flows in 2019 Smash Previous Records (January 2020), online: <https://www.morningstar.com/articles/961765/sustainable-fund-flows-in-2019-smashprevious-records?

[38] Again, these claims of guilt-free investing are often exaggerated.

[39] Maura Souders, Survey Analysis: ESG Investing Pre- and Post-Pandemic (2020) online: ISS ESG Solutions <https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/ISS-ESG-Investing-Survey-Analysis.pdf&gt;

[40] Ecosystem Marketplace, EM Global Carbon Hub (2021) online: <https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/carbon-markets/&gt;

[41] Florian Berg, Julian F Kolbel, & Roberto Rigobon, “Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings” (2020), online: SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438533.

[42] Some institutions are working on standards for ESG criteria in the investment process, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

[43] Ideally, maximizing ESG would also maximize economic gain; while there may be some correlation between the two, maximizing ESG will not maximize economic gain.

[44] As we shall see below, cynical attitudes towards ESG argue that ESG is a fad that is extremely profitable for those involved in it while failing to produce any actual good or contributing minimally to ESG’s aspirational goals.

[45] Gordon L Clark, Andres Feiner, & Michael Viehs, “From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance” (2015), online: SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281&gt;

[46] Bradford Cornell & Aswath Damodaran, “Valuing ESG: Doing Good or Sounding Good?” (2020) online: SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557432&gt;

[47] Aswath Damodaran (Ibid) notes that increased value should be reflected through higher cash flows or a lower discount rate, but none of these are increase solely by ESG. Rather, Damodaran argues that there is a false correlation between profitability and the perceived “goodness” of ESG. Damodaran attributes the ESG and increased valuation correlation to the gamification of ESG by large companies.

[48] In other words, if the motivation to attracting investors through ESG disclosure is attached to a temporary trend, and if this temporary trend towards ESG disappears, then companies may no longer be motivated to care about ESG.

[49] Miriam A. Cherry, “The Gamification of Work” (2012) 40:4 Hofstra L Rev 851.

[50] The distinction between institutional and retail investor matters here as well. Retail investors can more guided by morality in their investment decisions whereas institutional investors hardly take morality as a factor and focus on the numbers and models. Take the example of an initial public offerings (“IPO”), or a private company’s choice to go public. Communicating an ESG strategy is important for IPOs. IPOs can be a hotbed for misleading investors, especially about ESG. It is often difficult to test the veracity of the company’s claims because private companies have a lower profile and have little history. Moreover, the story that the company spins during their roadshow can add a lot of room to massage ESG claims.

[51] Aaron A. Dhir, “Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through Enhanced Social Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law” (2009) 47:3 Can Bus LJ 435.

[52] While sophisticated investing decisions are often determined by incredible amounts of financial analysis and modelling, retail investors often take a more subjective and personal approach.

[53] Tyge G Payne, Curt B Moore, Greg R Bell, & Miles A Zachary, “Signaling Organizational Virtue: an Examination of Virtue Rhetoric, Country‐Level Corruption, and Performance of Foreign” (2013) 7:3 Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 230-251.

[54] If firms know that markets are watching them, they are incentivised to act in way that seem desirable to the markets.

[55] That is, by claiming they are more moral and make more money, they have the moral high ground against their competitor companies who may only make money while committing morally repugnant acts.

[56] ESG, currently conceived, is too easy a solution to the dilemma of morality and money, and the recent fads are propagated by professionals in the ESG space profiting from this trend.

[57] Donald C. Langevoort, “Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing” (1997) 75:2 Wash U L Q 753.

[58] Brad M Barber & Terrance Odean, “The internet and the investor” (2011) 15:1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 41-54.

[59] There are certainly sophisticated tools to assist in analysis and self-education resources available, but these are no replacement for the expertise of a professional.

[60] Troy A. Paredes, “Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation” (2003) 81:2 Wash U L Q 417.

[61] Imagine, for example, having to sift through a box full of diligence materials on a company within a week; now, imagine having to sift through fifty boxes full of diligence materials within a week. In the latter instance, one is more prone to be overwhelmed, confused, and unable to effectively process the information. Simply believing more information and disclosure leads to more informed investors ignores the psychological limitations.

[62] Disclosure is a means to an end of ensuring investors make informed decisions. Investors do not want information for its own sake; rather, investors want more information to make more informed investment decisions. It can also have the effect of increasing efficiency and reducing agency costs since investors will not have to devote resources to find this information. The policies structure the disclosure system to incentivise disclosure by penalizing nondisclosure.

[63] The primary market force influencing companies are potential investors. While one explanation of why these external investors pursue ESG is for profit maximization and the perception that ESG adds to the value of a company, it is possible that the relationship between ESG and increasing value is temporary. If this is true, then once ESG stops providing value, investors would stop caring about ESG. However, there may be other more permanent reasons that investors care about ESG.

[64] After all, according to some skeptics, this is the direction capital markets are headed in.

[65] We can push the scenario further. Imagine the shareholders of a company are only concerned with maximizing immediate returns and do not care about ESG or any moral contributions it makes. Now imagine the director is particularly concerned with moral causes and sincerely believes that going against the immediate interests of shareholders and investing in ESG is the best decision. We know that directors in Canada have a plurality of stakeholders beyond shareholders, but we might question whether the director violated a duty owed to shareholders. At this point, we might question whether moral decisions can be business decisions; moreover, we might question whether a stakeholder’s interests can go beyond money and whether it would be correct to defend a stakeholder’s moral interests.

[66] Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law” (2006) 44:2 Alta L Rev 299.

[67] It is important to recall the May 2018 amendments to the CBCA, which were supposed to come into effect July 2021. First, some corporations are required to have discrete voting and no longer allow slate voting for elections for directors. Second, public companies are required to implement majority-voting in uncontested elections, which supersede Toronto Stock Exchange majority voting policies; additionally, shareholders can vote for or against nominees in uncontested director elections rather than withholding shares from voting.

[68] Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 [CBCA]; Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16 [OBCA].

[69] Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122(1)(a) and (1.1); Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 134(1)(a)

[70] Edward J. Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, “The Public Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in Canadian Fiduciary Law for Pension Trustees” (2012) 91:1 Can B Rev 163.

[71] Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68.

[72] BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69.

[73] J. Anthony Vanduzer, “BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The Supreme Court’s Hits and Misses in Its Most Important Corporate Law Decision since Peoples” (2010) 43:1 UBC L Rev 205.

[74] BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, at para 81.

[75] Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377, at p. 422.

[76] The business judgment rule gives a fair bit of room for discretionary decision-making which can end up with short-term approaches instead of long-term care towards ESG. If short-term options are within a reasonable range, then in order to counter-act this we need to increase accountability and stringency through laws. Still, directors should have discretion in terms of which issues are material for a sustainability strategy as well as how to integrate ESG factors into operations. The financial market requires a critical mass of investors to invest in companies that have long-term ESG plans. This will create reputational pressures not to freeride or deviate from market norms. Market norms are a powerful tool for self-regulating among market players without the need for legal intervention. However, establishing new market norms among sophisticated parties can be challenging. Often, long-term sustainability undermines short-term returns. Arguably, the prevalent structure of corporate governance incentivises short-term returns. Management is expected to maximize returns in the short-term for investors. Compensation options for directors incentivise short-term actions and shareholders often penalize long-term strategies through their vote in board elections. There remains an issue that current incentives to create short-term returns for shareholder undermines a long-term ESG plan.

[77] See Unique Broadband Systems Inc., Re, 2014 CarswellOnt 9327 (Ont. C.A.), at paragraph 72

[78] Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 241

[79] BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, para 72.

[80] Moreover, under section 122 of the Ontario Securities Act, directors and officers can be sanctioned if they authorized a breach by the issuer; if they are found to have acted contrary to public interest, they can be prohibited from acting as a director or officer and be ordered to pay penalties. All actions applicable to financial disclosures, in theory, should apply to ESG related disclosure, such as class action litigations (see section 130 of the OSA).

[81] I should stipulate that I do not aim to dive deeply into philosophical issues or policy analysis.

[82] Li-Wen Lin, “The “Good Corporate Citizen” beyond BCE” (2021) 58:3 Alta L Rev 551.

[83] Jennifer Nadler, “What is Distinctive about the Law of Equity?” (2021) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.

[84] BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, at para 71.

[85] Aaron Dhir, Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[86] Poonam Puri, “The Future of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance” (2009) 48:3 Canadian Business Law Journal 427-445.

[87] First, corporate board diversity requirements for executive officers who identify as women, BIPOC, persons with disabilities, and LGBTQ+. The taskforce recommends that issuers aim for 50% women (implemented over five years) and 30% of the other named groups (implemented over seven years). Second, board tenure limits for most board members. Third, a mandatory (non-binding) say-on-pay votes on executive compensation. Fourth, mandatory annual director elections on uncontested elections.

[88] The heterogeneity and varying demographics can unlock new perspectives, talent, and business acumen which were previously supressed. 

[89] If external incentives of attracting potential shareholders is too weak a foundation to ground the future of voluntary ESG disclosure, then we might look to the internal structure of the corporation for answers.

[90] COVID-19 is one recent example of an unforeseen risk which decimated businesses and had profound impacts on business risk analysis. 

[91] Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 83(4), 118(2), 146(5), and 226.

[92] Neil C. Sargent, “Corporate Groups and the Corporate Veil in Canada: A Penetrating Look at Parent-Subsidiary Relations in the Modern Corporate Enterprise” (1987) 17:2 Man LJ 155.

[93] Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Insurance Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2.

[94] Although it is difficult to conceive of this in legal terms because the environment and future generations do not have legal personhood. We might ask who may bring such causes of action. One answer might be the government as they act as the guardians of these interests. Alternatively, we may understand this in slightly more modest terms as stakeholders.

[95] A shareholder might have a right to know about ESG disclosure and a right implies a corresponding duty.

[96] Similar problems are found in the investment sphere where “ESG investing” can trigger a fiduciary duty. ESG investing is a fairly broad term meant to capture an investment strategy that prioritizing a company’s ESG as being ideal for risk-adjusted returns. While directors and officers are not “investing” in the same sense, their decisions in steering the firm and managing its resources has parallels to investing.

[97] Edward J. Waitzer and Douglas Sarro, “Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for the Financial Sector” (2014), 69 The Bus. Lawyer 1081.

[98] It is also possible to challenge the premise that shareholders actually do care about ESG. Imagine a shareholder population that is adamantly opposed to ESG and aggressively seeks directors that fulfil their anti-ESG agenda. This might lead one to conclude that directors have a fiduciary duty to pursue an anti-ESG agenda. Fortunately, in Canada, shareholder primacy does not inform a director’s fiduciary duty, and ESG can be responsive to multiple stakeholders. Still, even in jurisdictions with shareholder primacy, one can reasonably argue that anti-ESG objectives are oriented towards a short-term strategy and pro-ESG directions may still act in the shareholder’s long-term interest. Directors may still be incentivised to keep shareholders happy so they can avoid being replaced by shareholder votes, but there is little to do about attitudes in the general population that staunchly oppose ESG concerns; after all, in a liberal democracy, we are free to hold views and use our capital power to reflect these views, and forcing the choice to exercise choices of private capital is an unacceptable form of paternalism. 

[99] Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, “An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law” (1980) 30:2 U Toronto LJ 117.

[100] Steve Lydenberg, “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty” (2014), 81 J. Bus. Ethics 365.

[101] One issue that undermines this point is that ESG disclosure is being gamified. For example, stricter disclosure requirements for public companies can incentivize them to go private or change their business structure. This avoidance strategy is just one route companies can take to gamify for their own gain at the detriment of everybody else. Avoidance strategies must be considered for structuring an ESG disclosure regime.

[102] Abraham Singer, “Justice failure: Efficiency and equality in business ethics” (2018), 149:1 Journal of Business Ethics 97-115.

[103] Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5.

[104] By changing the way we think about a director’s responsibility (metaphorically, the corporation’s brain) we can understand the corporation beyond profit maximizing machine and move towards a more morally sensitive corporation.

[105] Icahn Partners LP v Lions Gate Entertainment Corp., 2011 BCCA 228.

[106] Consistent with skeptical views, corporations are largely responding to temporary market forces favoring detailed ESG disclosure, and the resultant positive moral or ethical policy objectives are also contingent on temporary market forces.

[107] In general, they aim at incentivising good behavior from corporations and disincentivized bad behavior through penalties.

[108] We can try to explore how to incentivise both internal and external stakeholders to care about ESG. We should start by distinguishing duties between current shareholders and potential shareholders. This is important because the duties to current shareholders relate to corporate governance whereas duties to potential shareholders relate to securities disclosure regulations. Failing to consider the long-term value of ESG should be understood as a failure of fiduciary duty understood broadly, and this should be disclosed to potential investors on the outside. This becomes an issue of internal corporate governance and disclosing this issue of corporate governance to the public.

[109] Through this lens, directors are still concerned about the overall value of the company and potentially attracting new shareholders, yet these concerns are secondary to the primary incentive of keeping internal shareholders happy.

[110] Some understand there to be dilemma arising for directors to either follow corporate law or securities law. For example, it is entirely possible that a director may use ESG regulation to look after long-term interests in bad faith and in violation of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders. However, these cases are marginal and the real issue is harmonizing the objectives between these two legal frameworks.

[111] YBM Magnex International Inc (Re), [2003] 26 OSCB 5285.

[112] ESG risks can be important in the bond market for credit analysis (e.g., green bonds, social bonds, sustainability bonds).

[113] Interestingly, creditors could also demand ESG and influence a company’s decisions on developing their ESG. Environmental risks are a part of the profile of a company and inform their creditworthiness.

[114] A clear example of this is the case of the creditor being a government—governments are not private parties incentivized by profit, and governments can directly implement these policy aims through public funds.

[115] Moreover, specialist employees in charge of ESG should be a welcomed addition to the growth of the company. Incidentally, ESG is also crucial for capital raising and M&A, but it is also important for shareholder activism and executive compensation. 

[116] Julia Black, Martyn Hopper, & Christa Band, “Making a success of principles-based regulation” (2007) 1:3 Law and financial markets review 191-206.

[117] Richard E. Mendales, “Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities Law, Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process” (2008) 91:4 Marq L Rev 979.

[118] Brigitte Burgemeestre, Joris Hulstijn, & Yao-Hua Tan, “Rule-based versus principle-based regulatory compliance” (2009) Legal Knowledge and Information Systems IOS Press 37-46.

[119] Principles-based regulation can stop gamification of prescriptive rules since it increases the individual accountability for companies and their actions; moreover, this can give a broader scope of enforcement actions and consequently better protect investors.

[120] Virginia Harper Ho, “Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release” (2020) 65:1 Vill L Rev 67.

[121] An important policy aim is to encourage the growth of the capital markets.

[122] Anita Indira Anand, “An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley” (2006) 31:1 Del J Corp L 229.

[123] A clear instance is in pecuniary or value terms of avoiding future risks or the immediate value-add of ESG; although, this may need more specificity since ESG is such a broad term.

[124] As noted in section 1.1 of the OSA, the statutory and public policy goal of the security regime is investor protection, capital market efficiency, and public confidence in capital markets.

[125] Eric Talley, “Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine” (1998) 108:2 Yale LJ 277.

[126] John C Coffee, Jr, “Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” (2002) 57 Bus. Law. 1403.

[127] Mohammad Fadel, “BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law” (2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 190.

[128] The upshot of this is that in no case should a trustee’s personal morality about ESG be a consideration for investing in ESG. Notably, the fiduciary duty derives the trust law whereby a trustee holds an asset for the benefit of the beneficial owner. In the securities market, intermediaries have this role and owe a fiduciary duty where there is a reasonable expectation.

[129] Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, “Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee” (2020) 72 Stanford Law Review 381.

[130] Cynthia Williams & Jill E Fisch, “Request for rulemaking on environmental, social,

and governance (ESG) disclosure” (2018) Commissioned Reports, Studies and Public Policy Documents Paper 207.

[131] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Recommendation of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee Relating to ESG Disclosure” (2020) online: <https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/esg-disclosure.pdf&gt;

[132] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Asset Management Advisory Committee Potential Recommendations of ESG Subcommittee” (2020) online: <https://www.sec.gov/files/potential-recommendations-of-the-esg-subcommittee-12012020.pdf&gt;

[133] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures” (2021) online: <https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures&gt;

[134] European Securities and Markets Authority, “ESMA Calls for Legislative Action on ESG Ratings and Assment Tools” (2021) online: <https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-calls-legislative-action-esg-ratings-and-assessment-tools&gt;

[135] Robert G Eccles et al, “Mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure in the European Union” (2012) Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Case No 111-120.

[136] European Securities and Markets Authority, “ESMA Calls for Legislative Action on ESG Ratings and Assment Tools” (2021) online: <https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-calls-legislative-action-esg-ratings-and-assessment-tools>

[137] HM Treasury, “A Roadmap towards mandatory climate-related disclosures” (2020) online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933783/FINAL_TCFD_ROADMAP.pdf&gt;

[138] David Clark, “Financial Sector (Climate-related Disclosures and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2021 (2021/39)” (2021) online: <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_109905/financial-sector-climate-related-disclosures-and-other&gt;

[139] Australian Securities & Investments Commission, “21-295MR ASIC and ATO engage with directors as part of ASIC’s Phoenix Surveillance Campaign” (2021) online: <https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2021-releases/21-295mr-asic-and-ato-engage-with-directors-as-part-of-asic-s-phoenix-surveillance-campaign/&gt;

[140] In Mark McVeigh v Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd (REST), McVeigh claimed that REST failed to disclose risks which prevented him from making an informed decision about the fund’s performance. This case was settled and REST undertook to adopt TCFD reporting recommendations. In Australian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Santos Ltd, a shareholder advocacy group alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in Santos’s 2020 report claiming natural gas as a “clean fuel.” They also claimed that Santos’s plan to achieve net zero emissions by 2040 is misleading because it was based on undisclosed assumptions about carbon capturing.

[141] Another salient problem is defining materiality and trying to balance between generally applicable rules while also being flexible.

[142] Different asset classes have different ESG risks and issues. Venture capital, fixed income, private equity or debt have specific strategies that intersect with ESG; more obviously, infrastructure and real estate have environmental concerns. Smaller start-ups have little resources for ESG, but they have a better opportunity to build their board policies around ESG.

[143] Ontario Securities Commission, “Canadian securities regulators seek comment on climate-related disclosure requirements” (2021) online: <https://www.osc.ca/en/news-events/news/canadian-securities-regulators-seek-comment-climate-related-disclosure-requirements&gt;

[144] Douglas Sarro, “Incentives, Experts, and Regulatory Renewal” (2021) 47:1 Queen’s Law Journal.

[145] Ontario Securities Commission, “Canadian securities regulators strongly support the establishment of the International Sustainability Standards Board in Canada” (2021) online: <https://www.osc.ca/en/news-events/news/canadian-securities-regulators-strongly-support-establishment-international-sustainability-standards&gt;

[146] This is problematic because making the actual aims of ESG a mere incidental effect means that the priority is on political gain; in other words, when the aims of ESG and politics conflict, then politics would be prioritized.

[147] It is important to note the limitations of this essay. It would be too ambitious to spell out the details of securities law, corporate law, or comparative perspectives. Additionally, many claims around morality or goodness are contentious and required empirical support.

Canadian Business Organizational Structures

II. OVERVIEW OF THE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES

Before deciding on the type of organization you would like you choose for your business, you should know a little about your options. Business organizations are typically organized into three categories: sole proprietorships, corporations, and partnerships. Sole proprietorships and corporations are the most applicable to your current business needs, so this memorandum will focus on those two organization structures.

1. Sole Proprietorship

An unincorporated business owned by one individual is called a sole proprietorship. This is the simplest form of business organization.

There is no legislation dealing specifically with sole proprietorships, but there are many federal and provincial regulations affecting commerce, licensing, and registration. For example, in Ontario, where an owner carries on business under a name other than such individual’s own legal name, the name that is used to carry on business must be registered under the Business Names Act (Ontario) (the “BNA”). Most businesses need to register with the provinces and territories where they plan to do business. In your case, since you have yet to register your name, you would need to register the business in Ontario under the name you have selected, [•].

As a sole proprietorship, you would retain all profits directly. This also means that there is no separate taxable entity and the tax is at personal rates; however, it is important for you to speak with a tax professional about tax considerations, including offsetting the business income against your personal income and avoiding double taxation.

Sole proprietorships retain all control over the business. There is no legal separation between the individual and the business. This means that you, as the owner of the business, would be liable for all of the business’s obligations and your personal assets (including those not connected to your business) may be seized to meet these obligations.

The financial costs associated with registering your business as a sole proprietor are few, and are less than the other options considered in this memorandum.

2. Corporation

A corporation has a legal personality distinct from its owner and the owner becomes a shareholder of the coproration. As a separate legal entity, a corporation has the rights, powers and privileges (and potentially the obligations) of a natural person. It can hold property and carry on a business, and it is subject to legal and contractual obligations. As a shareholder of the corporation, owners do not personally own the assets of the corporation, nor are they personally liable (subject to some limited circumstance) for the liabilities of the corporation.

Incorporation must be completed either at the federal level under the Canada Business Corporation Act or at the provincial level under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario). The differences between incorporating federally and incorporating provincially are minimal, and you can functionally accomplish the same things under both. The primary consideration is that if you were to incorporate federally, you would not need to register for separate provinces and territories if you would like to carry on business beyond Ontario. And although it is easier to register the business name in Ontario, this would only protect the corporation’s name within the province. There is an option to electronically incorporate the Business the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services.

III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP

As a sole proprietor, you will be the sole owner of the Business, fully responsible for all debts and obligations related to it. However, sole proprietorships are simpler to set up and require very little extra costs to continue operating as this form of business.

Advantages

(1)  Directly Retain Benefits

Under this business structure, you as the sole proprietor will retain all the benefits, including profits (after tax), of the Business directly. On this note, you will be taxed on the profits at your personal tax rate, as they have been earned through you directly.

(2)  Compliance & Reporting Obligations

There are no compliance or reporting obligations that are specific to sole proprietors beyond applicable business name registration, licensing requirements, and personal tax returns.

(3)  Potential Tax Advantages

Sole proprietorship offers some tax advantages. You should contact a tax professional for more information on this aspect if it is of interest to you.

Disadvantages

(1)  Unlimited Personal Liability

The main disadvantage of operating as a sole proprietor is unlimited personal liability for all debts and obligations related to your business. This means your personal assets could be seized by potential creditors to cover business liabilities, even if the assets are not connected to the Business. If a client or third party were to suffer a loss for which your business is responsible, you could be held personally liable for any potential damages awarded following a legal proceeding against the Business. However, you could limit your liability by contract or through insurance. You may want to reach out to an insurance advisor to learn more about your options.

 (2)  Potential Tax Disadvantages

Income is taxable at the sole proprietor’s personal rate. As a result, if your business is very profitable, it could result in you paying a higher rate of income tax than if you were to claim the profits via an incorporated business. You may need to contact a tax professional for more information on tax implications.

IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INCORPORATION

As a corporation, you will be able to limit your personal liability, create a separate legal entity away from yourself, and have better access to capital. However, this can be significantly more costly and require continuous administrative work. 

Advantages

(1) Limited Personal Liability

First, as the shareholder of the corporation, you will not be personally liable for the debts and obligations of the corporation. This means that your personal assets are separated and protected from any claims on the Business (except in certain limited cases of fraud or criminal activities). In contrast, a sole proprietorship has unlimited personal liability, which means that your personal assets could be seized to cover business liabilities.

However, please keep in mind that a shareholder’s exposure to liability for debt obligations will not be limited if that shareholder were to provide a personal guarantee for any such obligations.

(2) Separate Legal Entity

Second, because a corporation is a separate legal entity from the shareholders (you), this also means that you can transfer your ownership of the corporation by selling your shares. This means you can bring in new investors into your business and it can potentially exist perpetually without you. There are a number of restrictions and rules on these processes governed by laws which are beyond the scope of this memorandum. However, it is important to note that in a sole proprietorship, the only way to sell your business is through selling your assets.

There are also some potential tax advantages, such as a small business tax deduction. Corporations are taxed separately from their owners and corporate tax rates are generally lower than individual tax rates. Corporate taxes are on every dollar of profit the corporation earns, which means your company must generate a certain amount of profit before incorporation offers tax advantages. Additionally, small business corporations have several tax incentives, such as the small business deduction. Nevertheless, taxes are largely outside o the scope of the OBC, so we recommend seeking the advice of a tax professional on specific matters on taxation.

(3) Access to Capital

Third, you can access more capital by either selling shares or seeking financial lending from institutions. On the latter point, corporations often receive more favorable terms for loans than sole proprietorships. On the former point, incorporating allows you sell shares and issue other types of securities; although, as a private corporation, you would not be allowed to sell shares to the general public. This can be a complicated process and you should consult experts in corporate and securities law if you wish to sell shares of your business after incorporation.

Disadvantages

(1) Costs of Incorporation

First, the cost of incorporation and possible maintenance costs are higher than a sole proprietorship. The expenses related to incorporations include filing of incorporation documents (approximately $360 in Ontario), corporate name searches (approximately $60 in Ontario), and the maintenance of a minute book (approximately $50 in Ontario). Please note that these approximate costs could change next year—in any case, should you proceed with incorporation, we would provide you with the exact cost breakdown at that time.

(2) Extensive Record-Keeping and Filing Requirements

Second, the complexity of continuing a corporation can be extensive, especially with respect to record-keeping, filing, and other laws and regulations.

Incorporating [•] would require the maintenance of clear records and documentation as set out by the CBCA or the OBCA, as applicable:

(a) Corporate Minute Book: The minute book contains the entirety of the corporation’s incorporation documents, including articles of incorporation, by-laws, directors’ registers, financial statements, registration documents, and share registers. In addition, a record of director and shareholder meetings and other documents related to the corporation must be filed in the minute book, which must be stored in the registered office of the corporation. Note that the “registered office” can be any address provided in the articles of incorporation as the “registered address”, including your home address as long as it is in Canada, if incorporated under the CBCA, or in Ontario, if incorporated under the OBCA.

(b) Annual Corporate Tax Returns: The corporation must file an annual corporate tax return, which is separate from your personal tax return. This tax return is calculated based on the annual revenue and expenses of your business. Because the tax rates and rules differ from those of personal taxes, the preparation and filing of this tax return may increase your annual tax filing costs.

(c) Annual Returns: The corporation must file annual returns with up-to-date information about the corporation, including information pertaining to directors and officers. Associated annual fees if incorporated under the CBCA are approximately $40 if filed by email or phone and $12 if filed online. If incorporated under the OBCA, there are no associated annual fees for these filings.

(3) Process

Third, the process of incorporating is more onerous than operating as a sole proprietorship. Should you choose to incorporate we would largely guide you through the process. The specific steps involve choosing a jurisdiction, completing a name search for “[•],” preparing the required documents (mainly, the Articles of Incorporation), and covering some procedural steps (e.g., filing, banking arrangements, or pre-incorporation contracts).

Key Takeaways

You may wish to consider how much risk your business faces in terms of incurring potential liabilities and how much you value the protection provided by incorporation. You mentioned the risks associated with contracts, working with minors, and in-person tutoring. As a sole proprietor, you may wish to consult insurance professionals to address such risk.

Additionally, you should think about the nature of your business and what the growth of your business would look like in terms of your financial planning. You mentioned the possibility of expanding across and beyond Canada. This can carry additional risks and costs. We would recommend considering other businesses in your sector and the feasibility of scaling your business with financial planning experts if that is something you wish to pursue.

The next section of this memorandum will now cover what the processes look like for you to get a better idea of what it will entail to register as a sole proprietor or incorporate your business.

V. BUSINESS REGISTRATION PROCESS

Should you choose to operate as a sole proprietorship, you may operate under your legal name without the need to register a business name. If you would like to use another name for your business and operate under [•], you are required to register your business name under the BNA. Registration under the BNA serves as a public record for creditors to prevent sole proprietors from evading liability. This means that any potential creditors may find your legal name and information by searching for the name of your business. The process of registering your business name can be found at: https://www.ontario.ca/page/register-business- name-limited-partnership.

The cost is $60 if you register online or $80 if you register by mail or in person. There are additional fees associated with a business name search, which you can undertake to check available business names. Registering a business name does not protect it as a trademark and other companies may use that same name unless you register it as such. The OBC does not provide legal advice regarding intellectual property; however, you may choose to retain independent legal advice if you would like to learn more about trademarking your company.

Registering a business name in Ontario automatically provides you with a Federal Business Number and a Master Business License (“MBL”). You can use your MBL as proof of business name registration at financial institutions and in business transactions with the Ontario government.

VI. INCORPORATION PROCESS

1. Choosing a Jurisdiction

If you choose to incorporate your business in Ontario, you will have the right to carry on business only in Ontario. If you subsequently seek to carry on business in another province or territory, separate registration for each province or territory will be required. If you choose to incorporate your business federally under the CBCA, the corporation will have the legal right to carry on business across Canada, subject to additional provincial registration requirements (continuance extra-provincial registration fees are free for Ontario, but range from approximately $200-$350 in other provinces and territories). Your decision will be based on some of the concerns we discussed regarding your plans to potentially grow your business outside of Ontario. 

While there is no added fee to register in Ontario, there may be applicable registration fees in other provinces. If you are planning to expand your business operations outside of Ontario, you may wish to consider incorporating federally under the CBCA.

It must be noted that provincial incorporation will protect the corporation’s name only within the province in which it has been formally incorporated. Should this be a concern, federal incorporation may be better suited for your business. The following considerations should be considered when deciding whether to incorporate federally or provincially:

  • Is federal name protection a primary concern for [•]? Is the corporate name unique enough to justify protection across a federal jurisdiction?
  • In which geographic regions will [•] operate? Will it remain in one province or expand across Canada?

2. Name Search

Before incorporating, a name search must be conducted to ensure that the corporate name is not overly similar to any other registered business name, trademark, or corporate name in the jurisdiction in which you have incorporated. If it is found that another corporation has a similar name, it is generally recommended to not proceed with that name. If the name you intended to use for your corporation has already been registered, you must choose a new name. This name search must be conducted within 90 days prior to the filing date.

Prior to incorporating on the federal level, approval of your business’s name must be obtained from Corporations Canada. Corporations Canada is Canada’s federal corporate regulator and is responsible for compliance activities under the CBCA.

Under both the OBCA and the CBCA, the incorporated name must include a suffix such as “Corporation”, “Corp.”, “Incorporated”, “Inc.”, “Limited”, or “Ltd.”. The suffix indicates to persons dealing with the corporation that the business is operating as a corporation and its liability is limited. It is important to note that the incorporated name and its suffix must be included in all business documents and interactions with others.

This name search can be conducted through Canada’s Newly Upgraded Automated Name Search (NUANS). Each report conducted in NUANS costs $13.80. It can also be conducted using Ontario’s electronic name search system, which ranges from $8 to $26 per search depending on the type of report generated.

3. Preparing Required Documents

Articles of Incorporation must be completed and filed in order to incorporate a business. This can be done electronically, in person or by mail. The following should be included in the Articles of Incorporation:

  • The name of the corporation;
  • The address of the registered office of the corporation;
  • The number of directors (can be a fixed number of directors or a minimum and maximum number of directors);
  • The full names and addresses for service for each of the first directors;
  • Restrictions, if any, on the business the corporation may carry on or on the powers that the corporation may exercise;
  • The classes and any maximum number of shares the corporation is authorized to issue;
  • The rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions (if any) attached to each class of shares and directors’ authority with respect to any class of shares;
  • Restrictions on issue, transfer or ownership of shares (if any); and any additional provisions.

4. Filing Documents and Paying Applicable Fees

In order to incorporate your business in Ontario under the OBCA, the following information must be provided to the Ministry:

  1. Completed articles of incorporation;
  2. A covering letter identifying the name, return address, and telephone number of a contact for the corporation;
  3. A business name search not older than 90 days prior to the filing date (however, this is not required if you were to incorporate a numbered company); and
  4. Filing fee of $300 must be paid if filed electronically, or $360 if filed in person or by mail.

This can be completed either online at http://www.oncorp.com, by fax, by mail, or in person.
If you incorporate your business federally under the CBCA, you must provide Corporations Canada with the following:

  1. Articles of Incorporation;
  2. Initial Registered Office Address;
  3. First Board of Directors (subject to residency requirements of directors under the CBCA, this can include yourself);
  4. A business name search not older than 90 days prior to the filing date; and
  5. Filing fee of $200 must be paid if filed online, or $250 if filed by paper.

This can be completed either online (at http://strategis.gc.ca/corporations), by fax, by mail, or in person.

The preparation of these documents will likely require the help of a legal professional to ensure compliance with relevant corporate statutes and that all relevant information is included. This process can significantly increase the cost of incorporation. The incorporation process is completed when a certificate of incorporation is issued. At this point, the corporation comes into existence.

5. Banking Arrangements

The corporation will be required to set up a bank account that is separate from the personal bank account(s) of the incorporator(s).

6. Pre-Incorporation Contracts

Please note that pre-incorporation contracts are not automatically binding on a company immediately upon incorporation. The corporation will only become entitled to the contract’s benefits and subsequently be held liable for its performance once the corporation signifies its intention to adopt the contract, which can be approved and ratified by the board of the directors following incorporation.

VII. RESOURCES

There are various government sources online providing further information about the incorporation process, such as the ones below:

Federal Incorporation: https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cd-dgc.nsf/eng/cs06642.html

Provincial (ON) Incorporation: https://www.ontario.ca/page/incorporating-business-corporation

VIII. CONCLUSION

Choosing to operate the Business as a sole proprietorship would allow you to avoid potentially burdensome record-keeping, filing requirements and compliance with corporate statutes. Whereas, if you incorporate, you may be required to make certain onerous filings, but avail yourself of a number of advantages, such as potentially claiming tax benefits. But whether or not this is useful in your situation depends on the exact amount of income you and the Business each generate and may be something you wish to speak to a tax advisor about. Importantly, incorporation would shield you from personal liability and separate your personal assets from the business. Incorporation would also allow you to access capital, which could assist you in growing and scaling your business.

Should you choose to incorporate the Business, provincial incorporation in Ontario would suffice since you currently operate out of your home in Ontario. However, since you plan to expand your operations federal incorporation in Canada may be preferable. There is not much substantive difference between incorporating in Ontario or Canada, though we would recommend you seek further legal advice if you’re concerned with the specifics of the OBCA, CBCA, or extra-provincial registration requirements.

Sample: Jurisprudence Reflection

Q1

The Hart-Fuller debate is commonly understood as a debate about the connection between law and morality. Here, I mainly unpack Fuller’s critique of Hart. The outcome of this unpacking is met with a brief argument for advancing Fuller’s claim with the supplemental premise of a shared general aim of human flourishing.

Fuller admires the ingenuity of Hart’s general account of law; in particular, Hart takes law to be separate from the contentiousness of morality, yet also includes an account of sovereign obedience without the crude Austinian story of threats backed by sanction. While Fuller agrees that laws must include a normative dimension to generate the right kinds of reasons for its subjects to obey (or a “fidelity to law”), Fuller disagrees that law is just a sum of certain descriptive social states of affairs. To Fuller, law is purposive and instrumental to advancing the ends of humans, so it must somehow capture how law affects our practical reasoning.

Fuller’s account of law is best understood to criticize Hart’s approach to the normativity of law. In short, Hart’s account of law embeds normativity through a consensus among legal officials, which then sets a groupwide standard that officials use to influence and coordinate the social behavior of citizens; notice here that citizens do not need to have reasons for accepting the law and, in theory, can be coerced by officials. This problematically resembles Austin’s gunman view. Instead of building a theory of law based on the officials at the top, Fuller pushes the thought that law should start with its subjects and what is important for them.

Fuller understands the normativity of law as giving citizens the right kinds of reasons to obey the law. This is no coincidence. For Fuller, law must be designed in such a way as to generate the right reasons for obedience instead of the wrong reasons like coercion. Coercion does not accurately capture our relationship to the law and our sense of obligation. Fuller’s architecture of law is guided by eight principles, which Fuller calls “the internal morality of law.” (Fuller,1958,p644-645) Sensitive to the contentiousness of morality, Fuller provides formal principles which laws must conform to in order generate the right reasons for obedience. In contrast, Hart’s account of law need not follow Fuller’s eight principles; for Hart, anything flowing from the rule of recognition is valid law.

Fuller takes issue with Hart’s lax standards for what counts as law. Fuller illustrates the incoherence of Hart’s account through Nazi law (specifically, the grudge informer example). More generally, Nazi law clearly fails to conform to Fuller’s eight principles and thus fails to be law, yet Hart would understand Nazi law as valid law. Hart may understand Nazi law as having evil content, but it would be odd to have “loyalty” to evil laws. For Fuller, any reasons generated by evil laws are the wrong kinds of reasons that stifle good ends. This leaves little recourse for the morally upstanding Hartian judge to decide on Nazi law that is putatively valid. Fuller correctly argues that law must be capable of generating the right reasons for obedience and laws take this form by adhering to the eight principles, which Fuller takes to be “moral” principles because they are directed towards good ends. If we understand morality in terms of this good end, then it appears that Fuller has established a connection between law and morality.

Fuller’s thesis on the purposive nature of law cuts deeper into legal positivist approaches than first impressions. In what follows, I go beyond what Fuller claims. Fuller understands the purposive dimension of law as a better depiction of the normativity of law as a phenomenological feature of legal systems. But Hart may respond that “it doesn’t look like that to me.” (Fuller,1958,p631) A plausible way of breaking this stalemate is to look closely at human nature and what humans strive toward. Fuller notes that law “must represent a human achievement” and the “respect we owe to human laws” is different from the laws of gravity. (Fuller,1958,p632) Human laws are not like the laws of gravity because they are not static facts about the world. Laws must always be justified in relation to what is important for humanity and what unifies competing moral values. Let us call this general collective aim, echoing Aristotle, “human flourishing.”

It is clear that Fuller does not aim to provide a substantive account of what is specifically valuable for each individual because flourishing can be realized in differing ways between individuals. This is less a “moral” claim than it is a claim about human nature. Fuller respects the controversial nature of morality, especially if we mean “morality” to be a theory of right action or a theory of what is good. However, it is possible to state the function of morality without specifying its contents; Fuller’s eight principles are thin, in part, for this reason. These principles do more than strive towards morally good laws; they strive towards the shared ultimate end of both law and morality, namely, human flourishing. Flourishing provides reasons for the subjects to obey the law since it taps into the same motivational ends as morality. On this view, both law and morality must be justified in terms of human flourishing, so, to side with Hart, it may not be entirely accurate to say that law and morality are “necessarily” connected.

This reading of Fuller cuts to the core of Hart’s account of law. Flourishing explains why dissenters of a particular legal system should adhere to the law: namely, they have an interest in their own flourishing. There is some strain in Hart’s account of motivating dissenting citizens to obey the law without resorting to coercion; problematically, legal officials do not have to care about the flourishing of their citizens. By and large, if we accept the premise that law must be conducive to the flourishing of its subjects, and also that morality is also conducive to the flourishing of its subjects, then we are bound to see some overlap between law and morality.

After many years, the pedagogical upshot of the Hart-Fuller debate is the variegated nature of the questions raised, particularly in relation to ethics. We see with Hart that analytic jurisprudence must account for aspects of law as it exists in the world. Speculative claims of law being commands or predictions have little theoretical purchase when there are wide disparities with how we experience the phenomenon of law. However, Fuller teaches us that a purely sociological approach to law is also deficient. Law is a human construct and it is appropriate to understand law as purposive in relation to its subjects. Fuller pushes Hart to consider the normative implications of completely divorcing law and morality.

To be clear, I think the Hart-Fuller debate is deeper than a critique of positivism or Hart’s particular brand of positivism. Nevertheless, a forceful argument can be made that Hart can subsume Fuller’s eight principles into his brand of positivism and thereby undermine the necessary connection between law and morality. So, in a technical and narrow sense, Hart may have the better of the debate. Of course, a comprehensive response is beyond the scope of this paper. Interestingly, Fuller seems to be worried about a different and classical question related to political obligation. This blurs the line between analytic jurisprudence and political theory, and it seems to push Hart into deeper waters. A striking feature of this characterization of Fuller seems to ally him with Dworkin.

Q2

I offer a cursory look at the Hart-Dworkin debate (“the debate”) and focus primarily on the problem of theoretical disagreement. I suggest that Dworkin has the better of the debate but it is not a conclusive defeat for Hart. I further speculate as to how one might respond under a Hartian framework. 

The debate requires some background on Hart’s answer to “what is law” before the relevance of Dworkin’s objection becomes clear. Hart builds his theory of law by first distinguishing between “primary” and “secondary” rules. He argues that primary rules alone cannot work for sophisticated societies because they are uncertain, static, and inefficient. In response to uncertainty, he introduces a key secondary rule, a rule of recognition (“RoR”), which establishes legality and allows us to identify primary rules of obligation. (The other two issues with primary rules are also met by the secondary rules of change and adjudication.)

The debate mostly centers around Hart’s RoR. It is the ultimate criteria of legal validity because it picks out which rules count as law for a particular legal system. Whatever rules are established by the RoR, the legal officials of the system have a duty to apply it. Legal officials treat laws as authoritative by taking on the internal point of view, which is achieved by consensus and convergence (of “social rules”); through this, officials hold the attitude towards their own enforcement of primary rules towards the citizens as obligatory. This account is supposed to provide all the crucial features of law. Dworkin objects and points to a lacuna in Hart’s theory: theoretical disagreement. 

Dworkin enters the debate by focusing on what Hart’s account misses. To set the stage, Dworkin uses a key distinction between “propositions of law” (which are either true or false) and “grounds of law” (which make the propositions of law true or false). Theoretical disagreement is about the nature of the grounds of law. Dworkin describes positivists (like Hart) as being committed to the “plain-fact” view of the grounds of law—that is, laws are merely propositional, like books on a shelf that are verifiable by simply getting up and checking. Crucially, Dworkin then explicates a number of “hard cases” which illustrate theoretical disagreement between judges. This suggests that laws are not merely verifiable facts because the judges are not disagreeing about whether some proposition of law is true or false, but the nature of what makes law true or false. The cases show, on Hart’s account, what appears to be legal official disagreeing about the RoR. This is puzzling because legal officials are supposed to agree by consensus and this sort of disagreement is supposed to be impossible, yet such disagreements seem to be everywhere.

This key critique is what Dworkin calls the “semantic sting.” In short, plain-fact positivists understand law to be whatever passes the criteria for validity (for Hart, the RoR). On this view, legal officials would all agree on substantive matters of law and the only disagreement would be propositional, or concern the “open texture” of language. It precludes theoretical disagreements among legal official since it would undermine the idea that there is a shared criterion. This pushes positivists into an absurd view of theoretical disagreement: disagreement is superficial (or worst, disingenuous), or the law has run out and judges must then simply make up laws.

Dworkin takes this to be a knockdown argument against positivism. Laws do not run out and judges do not simply invent new law, as a matter of fact. Judges, Dworkin argues, are guided by moral principles that are beyond the RoR. Dworkin understands the starting point of the question “what is law” to now be in explaining theoretical disagreement. There is no “common criteria or ground rules” and “no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication.” (Dworkin,LE,90) It is crucial for Dworkin to establish that Hart’s central idea—a shared and uncontroversial rule of recognition—fails and must always fail due to the problem of theoretical disagreement. Dworkin’s project cannot get off the ground without first overthrowing the possibility of a comprehensive and universally applicable formula for deriving law. If this were possible for the positivist, then the “what is law” question would proceed to look for a more accurate criteria for legal validity. Indeed, the problem of theoretical disagreement sets the agenda for all legal theorists; that is, for positivists, in order to move forward with their project, they must have some answer to hard cases and theoretical disagreement. For Dworkin, he can happily move forward with his project of understanding law through adjudication and decision-making through constructive interpretation.

To be sure, Hart is offering a general account of the features of law whereas Dworkin aims at a theory of adjudication to arrive at an answer to legal questions. Where their agendas overlap is that both accounts provide some explanation for the content of law. If we narrow the debate to the problem of theoretical disagreement, then it seems Dworkin has the better of the debate (if we ignore the subsequent developments of positivism). It is a problem that positivists must confront and it has fractured positivists into separate factions. However, while Dworkin’s has the edge, I do not think it is a knockdown argument for Hart. I want to focus on a way to think about how Hart may respond to the claim that disagreement must be “disingenuous.”

One possible way to understand how judges reason within the Hartian framework is through counterfactuals. For example, the judge would ask herself, “What would other legal officials converge upon?” Judges are making an inference as to what social rule would generate obligations for their society because she cannot practically perform an empirical study of all the legal officials in her society. This inference would be informed by self-reflecting on what she finds obligatory. To be clear, the judge is not merely expanding the RoR and merely legislating by engaging in counterfactual reasoning. She is making inferences based on existing empirical facts about the past and current practices of officials. This amounts to a good faith attempt at discovering what the rule of recognition is for a given society.

Through this lens, we may understand theoretical disagreements to be different judges engaging in different lines of counterfactual reasoning. Each judge is trying to discern what the RoR is for a given case. This only becomes problematic for hard cases. For the vast number of cases in a legal system, judges engage in counterfactual reasoning and come up with convergent outcomes—the core of settled meaning is quite large, so reasoning within this core is unproblematic. However, hard case in the “penumbra” unsettle the reasoning process (through the open texture of language, individual peculiarities in reasoning, etc.) and different judges come up with different conclusions. In some sense, the judges do have a disagreement about what the RoR is because they arrived at different answers through divergent lines of counterfactual reasoning. However, in principle, this disagreement can be resolved by performing an empirical study of all the legal officials of the society.

Granted, my explanation does not square well with the phenomenology of judicial reasoning. If I interrogated a judge, they would not explain their job as an exercise of counterfactual reasoning. Dworkinians would likely diagnose my contrived reasoning as a product of the semantic sting. Still, my aim is only to illustrate that the Hartian framework is not completely incoherent even after Dworkin’s forceful critique. I have only offered speculative points which requires deeper analysis, especially as to the nature of counterfactual reasoning, but I am limited here.

Q3

I wish to focus my reflections on Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture (“the case”) and its connection to scholars that are critical of traditional legal theory. More specifically, I want to focus on liberal theories which start with the presumption of prioritizing an individual’s rights and protecting autonomy. I use these terms quite loosely as my aim is only to provide a modest reflection. I sketch how there is an overemphasis on protecting individual rights (e.g., exercising choice, defending property, non-interference…), and this comes at the cost of ignoring other elements of human flourishing (e.g., social attachments, conditions for wellbeing, communal responsibility…). I provide additional commentary as to how critical scholarship can begin to reform this skewed emphasis on rights discourse.

We can track the rights discourse in the case, especially in understanding the care owed to an individual as limited to guarding their rights. (I will assume the reader is familiar with the facts of the case.) The worry relevant for our purposes is the court struggling to respect the freedom of individuals to contract—bad bargain or not—while also protecting the right to meaningful consent. The court reasons that gross inequality in bargaining power may vitiate consent—for instance, a difference in business knowledge or negotiating power—and to hold somebody to an agreement absent consent would violate their rights. Such rights-based analyses to arguing a contractual claim is not special to unconscionability. Even apart from contract law, the wider Anglo legal system tends to employ this way of reasoning. The rights-based approaches understand the extent of harm to be violations of rights and thereby fails to appreciate other forms of harm.

The best connection to the case is through Patricia Williams’ piece. We may understand the “meta-story” as a direct critique to such rights-based approaches. (Ironically, we can use Dworkin’s analogy to literature to construct an interpretation of Williams’ meta-story.) The rights discourse engaged by lawyers are the “Word Magic” used by “priests” to advance legal arguments. It is necessary to engage in this discourse to be apart of the profession; it is the key to unlocked the gates to this “Celestial City.” The “gods” of this discourse—judges, professors, and theorists—affirm the coherence of rights-based approaches through “word-hurdles” and “playing with the concepts of the moon and of the stars.” In other words, the rights-based approach is continually affirmed by scholars through the game of academic publishing, rehearsing the same methodologies, and setting the agenda with trivial issues.

The metaphor to divinity is no coincidence. While the rights discourse has largely been secularized by positivists like Bentham, it has been progressively elevated in status by scholars, and it has been exaggerated point of sacrosanct. Rights are tethered to austere concepts like justice, equality, and liberty, almost as if we could not sensibly talk about these concepts without appealing to some notion of individual rights. Perhaps the rights-based approach needs to be placed in the background in order to tease out our blind spots. But the question remains: if not this approach, then what should be put in its place?

A possible starting point—although there are many plausible alternative—can be a relational approach. To be clear, a relational approach need not jettison rights entirely; rather, relations are put in the forefront and prioritized over rights. This can be expressed in many different ways, and my aim is only to sketch some possibilities to rebut the claim that there are no other alternatives. The focus on relationships may help us look at other forms of interpersonal harm beyond rights violations. Aaron Mill suggests the individualism of liberalism can hinder us from novel perspectives and thinks about how a starting point might look like through the lens of Indigenous law. One enlightening example is global warming and the constitution: from the liberal perspective, the natural world is not privileged with the same rights of the individual; in contrast, an individual may have robust property rights, so they are protected from, say, a corporation dumping garbage on their lawn. Mill teaches us that our relationship with the world may result in unique harms. Additionally, Patricia Smith also offers a feminist approach to jurisprudence, which further illuminates the gaps in liberalism through patriarchy. For instance, harassment in the workplace or conceptions of imminent harm for self-defence are patriarchal structures of law which disguise themselves under rights discourse. While a relational approach may begin to address such issues, it is perhaps unclear how a relational approach in the forefront can be operationalized in an existing legal system.

Returning to the case, we may try to see what a relational approach can add. A relational approach may empower the plaintiff in the case by teasing out what went wrong between plaintiff and defendant. Instead of focusing on the rights violation of the plaintiff and casting them as a victim, a better approach may look at how the relationship went sour and the actions of the offending party. Perhaps the defendant ought to have been more accommodating to the plaintiff and been sensitive to the socio-economic circumstances while conducting business, or look at each party’s relation to the community. Even more ambitiously, perhaps we may look at each party’s relationship to the government—for example, what social support is owed to undereducated and marginalized groups, and what is the role of commerce in underserviced communities? Nonetheless, a possible lesson from the case and the judicial reasoning might be that reform must be incremental.

A legal system and political culture entrenched in rights cannot be abolished overnight. Nevertheless, it is possible to work towards change from within the existing tradition by slowly changing the discussion. For example, Fuller, while squarely within this tradition, takes a step closer to reform by insisting that law must adhere to a minimal standard for it to deserve our loyalty. Professor Nadler’s approach to equity also seems to push forward the importance of a more meaningful conception of freedom that is sensitive to an individual’s purposiveness and wellbeing. Without such incremental steps, we might imagine that the case would not have even stopped to consider the possibility of unconscionability.

Dworkin may further assist with this project by providing a methodology for reform. For example, laws can be “constructively interpreted” to accommodate progressive social change. Suppose social norms increasingly push for mutual honesty in contractual dealings and is consistent with the purpose of contract law. We may then look to compare competing interpretations which fit this general category, like economic explanations. Next, we may show how good faith justifies contract law as a whole and why this interpretation puts contract law in the best light. One way to show this might be that it would give us the correct result in the case above—that is, it frames the issue as a duty breached by the defendant rather than as an incapacity in the plaintiff. This method provides a sensible way of communicating with traditional approaches to demonstrate why reform is necessary.

While some critical legal scholars have suggested a complete rejection of traditional jurisprudence, a more attenuated approach can lead to more meaningful change. Perhaps this could take the form of a more diverse methodology or include novel perspectives into the discussion. In any case, the case in light of critical scholarship offers an alternative pedagogical approach that is more valuable for reform than abstract and overly nuanced academic debates.

Good faith in Canada: Bhasin v. Hrynew

The facts of this case are particularly important because the doctrine of good faith is understood to be highly fact-driven. Canadian American Financial Corp (“Can-Am”) markets education savings plans to investors through dealers titled enrollment directors. Bhasin was one such enrollment director and so was Hrynew; Bhasin and Hrynew were therefore competitors. The agreement between Can-Am and the enrollment directors was for 3-years and set to automatically renew unless 6-months notice was given.

Hrynew wanted Bhasin’s market and proposed a merger but Bhasin refused, so Hrynew encouraged Can-Am to force Bhasin into a merger. Perhaps due to luck or deliberate maneuvering, Hrynew was appointed to be the provincial trading officer to review compliance with securities laws among enrollment directors. Naturally, Bhasin objected to having a competitor review his business records.

Can-Am seemingly sided with Hrynew and misled Bhasin in order to have Bhasin work for Hrynew. Can-Am told Bhasin that Hrynew’s role as the provincial trading officer required confidentiality and that the securities commission rejected the proposal to have somebody other than Hrynew. Both of these statements were false. When asked explicitly by Bhasin, Can-Am also failed to communicate that Hrynew’s proposed merger was proposed to the commission and the decision was already made.

Bhasin continued to refuse an audit from Hrynew whereby Can-Am threatened to terminate their agreement and gave notice of non-renewal. Upon non-renewal, Bhasin’s sales agents were solicited by Hrynew. Bhasin then sued both Can-Am and Hrynew.

The trial judge found that Can-Am was in breach of an implied term of good faith, and Hrynew intentionally induced a breach of contract. The appeal court allowed the appeal and dismissed Bhasin’s suit. The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) allowed the appeal against Can-Am but dismissed the appeal against Hrynew. The SCC recognized good faith as a general organizing principle of contract law and that this principle can manifest in a duty of honest contractual performance. The damages were approximately 87k plus interest, per the expectation damage measure.

There were four issues outlined by the SCC. First, did Bhasin properly plead good faith? In short, deference was given to the trial judge on this point. Second, was a duty of good faith owed between Bhasin and Can-Am, and was this duty breached? Third, is Hrynew liable for the tort of inducing breach of contract or civil conspiracy? In short, no. Fourth, if there are any breaches, what are the appropriate measure of damages? The court was split on this; the majority agreed that it was an expectation damage measure, while the minority argued that the reliance measure was more appropriate. Clearly, the most ink is spilled on the third issue.

The trial judge understood the agreement between Can-Am and Bhasin as analogous to a franchise or employment agreement, so good faith was understood as an implied term. Good faith is built into the statutes for employment, franchise, and insurance contracts. The rationale is that Bhasin is in a position of inherent vulnerability to Can-Am. The trial judge noted that, in the alternative, good faith can be implied by the intentions of the party. The SCC, in their reasoning, did not address whether good faith is an implied term and instead focused on the structure of the principle of good faith and how it is realized as a duty.

In short, the SCC concluded that the non-renewal clause was exercised in bad faith because it was contrary to its purpose and carried out dishonestly. In general terms, a duty of good faith goes beyond strict contractual rights. A duty of good faith prevents conduct “while consonant with the letter of a contract, exhibits dishonesty, ill will, improper motive or similar departures from reasonable business expectations.” (para 29)

The SCC notes the unsettled nature of the doctrine of good faith in Anglo-Canadian common law. While the “notion of good faith has deep roots in contract law and permeates many of its rules,” it remains “an “unsettled and incoherent body of law” that has developed “piecemeal” and which is “difficult to analyze”: Ontario Law Reform Commission (“OLRCˮ), Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract (1987), at p. 169. (para 32)

The SCC takes this opportunity to explicitly acknowledge good faith in order “to develop the common law to keep in step with the “dynamic and evolving fabric of our society” where it can do so in an incremental fashion.” (para 40) This move has the following motivations: “First, the current Canadian common law is uncertain. Second, the current approach to good faith performance lacks coherence. Third, the current law is out of step with the reasonable expectations of commercial parties, particularly those of at least two major trading partners of common law Canada — Quebec and the United States” (para 41) The current piecemeal approach is too arbitrary or ad hoc, and the court thought it necessary to enumerate this doctrine for clarity and consistency.

The SCC starts by laying the groundwork with some contextual factors. They note commercial realities whereby parties “reasonably expect a basic level of honesty and good faith in contractual dealings.” (para 60) The two poles are an arm’s length relationship on one end and a fiduciary relationship on the other; good faith, understood as “a basic level of honest conduct,” falls somewhere between these two poles. The SCC understands that sharp practices are not reflective of commercial realities. There is an emergence of “longer term, relational contracts that depend on an element of trust and cooperation clearly call for a basic element of honesty in performance.” (para 60) But even discrete transactions require a level of honesty, and this honesty is regulated by the reasonable expectations of parties.

The SCC notes that they must first establish “an organizing principle of good faith underlies and manifests itself in various more specific doctrines governing contractual performance.” (para 63) This is prior to any specific duties of good faith. This organizing principle states that parties must perform all contractual duties honestly and not arbitrarily; in other words, “parties must have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner.” (para 65) An organizing principle is understood to be “not a free-standing rule, but rather a standard that underpins and is manifested in more specific legal doctrines and may be given different weight in different situations…” (para 64)

The regard for another party’s interests is highly fact-dependent, especially with respect to the contractual relationship itself. Depending on the relationship, there are different standards and specific legal doctrines may be given more weight, and it is in principle possible to go beyond the existing doctrines. This also implies that there are some cases where one is not required to act to serve the other party’s interest, as the SCC properly notes, contract law “great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self-interest.” (para 70) It is clear that there is no duty of disclosure or fiduciary duty from the principle of good faith; rather, “it is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one’s contractual performance.” (para 73)

After establishing the principle of good faith, the second step of the inquiry is whether they “ought to create a new common law duty under the broad umbrella of the organizing principle of good faith performance of contracts.” (para 72) In the facts at hand, the general principle was not sufficient to protect Bhasin because it involved the contentious topic of implying good faith into the terms based on the intentions of the parties. The SCC recognizes that there “is a longstanding debate about whether the duty of good faith arises as a term implied as a matter of fact or a term implied by law” (para 74) and wishes to avoid this debate. The new doctrine (not principle) of good faith “imposes as a contractual duty a minimum standard of honest contractual performance” and “operates irrespective of the intentions of the parties.” (para 74)

When applying the new doctrine of good faith to the facts, the SCC notes that there is no unilateral duty to disclose information relevant to termination in a dealership agreement. The SCC does not apply a fiduciary standard to the agreement between Can-Am and Bhasin which would obligate Can-Am to disclosure the material fact of termination. What the SCC focuses on is the active dishonesty on the part of Can-Am and its active deception of Bhasin. 

Draft Abstract: Metaethics and Partiality

Anscombe’s rejection of the concepts of “moral obligation and moral duty,” in the absence of a divine lawgiver, shows a concern about the presumption that ethical standards are normative; that is, the idea that ethical standards seem to command or make claims on us, which then seems unjustified without some legitimate commander. Moral realists – like Prichard, Moore, or Ross – attempt to argue for the existence of intrinsically normative obligations and duties without appealing to a commander, yet it inevitably relies on an appeal to some sort of intuition and fails to address Anscombe’s worry.  Simon Keller’s Partiality (2013) presents a novel strategy to justify obligations and duties we have to intimates, like our friends and family; specifically, he appeals to the “phenomenology of partiality,” or our direct experience of intimates, which commands us to perform certain actions. I argue that an appeal to the phenomenology of partiality is epistemically similar to an appeal to a divine lawgiver, and that our experiences of partiality and partial obligations (or duties) provide examples of standards with legitimate normative force. The phenomenology of partiality, just like the appeal to a divine lawgiver, can justify their claims as, what Alvin Plantinga calls, “a properly basic belief” – such beliefs are primitive, like the belief in other minds or the belief in the existence of the external world. I further argue that the strategy of appealing to the phenomenology of partiality is categorically distinct from the moral realist’s appeal to intuition in that it meets different epistemic standards. My claim is that the appeal to the phenomenology of partiality, just like the appeal to the divine lawgiver, purports a higher epistemic standard than the moral realist’s rational intuition. The upshot is a justification of the normative force of obligations and duties which parallels the divine lawgiver.

Dangers of the “red pill”

First, it relies on a facile understanding of evolutionary psychology. The references to alphas and betas and how primitive species behaved in order to explain current social phenomenon of dating culture and female behavior: it’s too simplistic. The analogy can be made here is to homeopathic medicine having a too simplistic understanding of pathology. I could explain women wanting a financial stable partner in terms of primitive species relying on the alpha male for food and shelter in the same way I could explain pancreatic cancer in terms of my chi being out of line. Both explanations are unfalsifiable, ad hoc, and have little explanatory power; yet they have intuitive appeal because it fits with a narrative (viz. red pills: a misogynistic one; homeopathic medicine: a pseudo-scientific one).

Second, the narrative of the red pill is misogynistic. This is a term thrown around and poorly defined, but the general idea is the denigration of women. What is puzzling about the Red Pill is that it treats men as the victim. This obviously resonates with young men who have been rejected or feel an entitlement to the attention of women. In other words, the Red Pill victim mentality assumes that there is a shift in the natural order of power and men ought to be in a higher position than women. The resentment and envy originate from a place of perceived injustice: women seem to have it easy in society and dominate men. Using the flawed story above, the Red Pill approach reinforces this narrative and a story about women’s place in society.

Third, it’s a bad self-help approach. It takes victims and claims to empower them with knowledge. It seeks to guide its members to succeed in the narrative they concoct. It takes vulnerable people – full of resentment, anger, and ignorance – and it spoon-feeds them an answer they want: it’s not your fault, it’s society’s fault, it’s women’s fault… It’s a twisted sense of empowerment and community akin to cults.

Draft Abstract: Partiality and Regret

We sometimes explain away regrets by framing them as character shaping experiences. For instance, “If I never did drugs, I would never be who I am now – the strong, independent persons who beat a drug addiction.” Underlying this idea is the thought that the person we would be is not the person we are now, and that we prefer the person we are now. Some psychologists explain this phenomenon as a form of rationalization or a product of the cognitive dissonance of regret; in this explanation, there is a negative connotation of self-deception or delusion. This does not have to be the case. An alternative explanation is that we show partiality towards our current selves just as we show partiality towards our friends and family members. On an objective, impersonal view – like the psychologist’s – it is irrational to prefer our imperfect (regretful) selves over our (counterfactual) ideal selves, just as it is irrational to prefer our friends and family members over strangers. This analogy can be strengthened by looking at the justification of our partiality towards family members and making further connections to our partiality towards our current selves.

Draft Abstract: historical partiality, justice and favoring the winners of the present

One difficult problem in moral philosophy is determining how our moral theory ought to approach partiality and impartiality. Crudely put, the problem is this: we have reasons to act partially towards those dear to us, and we might even have special duties to towards them, but we also have a deep intuition that morality ought to be impartial. How do we reconcile these two seemingly contradictory thoughts in our moral theory?

A branching debate is between partiality and global justice. What are our obligations to those in the global community? Is it unjust to be partial to locals over those far away? Is this proximal partiality permissible?

Another branch of the debate grapples with our obligations to future persons. Should our policies treat individuals in the present and potential individuals in the future with the same amount of concern? Is it unjust to be partial towards individuals in the present over those in the future?

A topic that has not been explored in any depth is our obligations to those in the past, and our partial treatment to those in the present. If injustices have been committed, then we have a duty of restitution. However, we tend to be partial towards the “winners” of history. For instance, our duties to natives have been partial towards the contingencies of history – a duty of restitution would return the land, but the duty has been discharged haphazardly. The possible issue here is that it does not match our intuitions. Imagine, for instance, I steal a lottery ticket from you and win one million dollars; here, my impartial duty of restitution would be to give you the full sum of the winnings, and it would not be sufficient to repay you for the cost of the lottery ticket or any partial sum of the winnings. “Partiality,” in this sense, refers to the way the impartial duty of restitution is changed by our partiality towards the “winners” of history.

Does impartial morality demand that we act synchronically? Is diachronic partiality permissible? In this paper, I explicate the issue of diachronic partiality through surveying historical examples of injustices and subsequent responsive actions. I then explore how the literature in partiality and global justice, and partiality and environment ethics, might inform the discussion of partiality and history. I finally begin to sketch an argument which suggests that history partiality, though deeply ingrained into our psychology, is unjust. Note: my main aim is to suggest another avenue the partialist-impartialist debate seems to be important in ethical theory.