Anscombe’s rejection of the concepts of “moral obligation and moral duty,” in the absence of a divine lawgiver, shows a concern about the presumption that ethical standards are normative; that is, the idea that ethical standards seem to command or make claims on us, which then seems unjustified without some legitimate commander. Moral realists – like Prichard, Moore, or Ross – attempt to argue for the existence of intrinsically normative obligations and duties without appealing to a commander, yet it inevitably relies on an appeal to some sort of intuition and fails to address Anscombe’s worry. Simon Keller’s Partiality (2013) presents a novel strategy to justify obligations and duties we have to intimates, like our friends and family; specifically, he appeals to the “phenomenology of partiality,” or our direct experience of intimates, which commands us to perform certain actions. I argue that an appeal to the phenomenology of partiality is epistemically similar to an appeal to a divine lawgiver, and that our experiences of partiality and partial obligations (or duties) provide examples of standards with legitimate normative force. The phenomenology of partiality, just like the appeal to a divine lawgiver, can justify their claims as, what Alvin Plantinga calls, “a properly basic belief” – such beliefs are primitive, like the belief in other minds or the belief in the existence of the external world. I further argue that the strategy of appealing to the phenomenology of partiality is categorically distinct from the moral realist’s appeal to intuition in that it meets different epistemic standards. My claim is that the appeal to the phenomenology of partiality, just like the appeal to the divine lawgiver, purports a higher epistemic standard than the moral realist’s rational intuition. The upshot is a justification of the normative force of obligations and duties which parallels the divine lawgiver.
Tag: abstract
Draft Abstract: borders and genetically modified mosquitoes
A recent class of public health initiatives has the morally questionable consequence of crossing borders; more specifically, they are initiated by one state but have significant resultant impacts on neighboring states. One clear case of this is genetically modified mosquitoes: mosquitoes are difficult to contain within state boundaries and often crossover whereby associated risks are thrust upon neighboring states. While nuances of laws and international policies are crucial considerations, this paper explores the underlying ethical considerations relevant to such classes of border-crossing public health initiatives. I begin with an explication of what makes these initiatives intuitively wrong at the individual level, and I identify three key moral violations: violations of property rights, exposure to harm, and lack of consent. I then capture these issues under the general umbrella of justifying paternalistic actions and take states as moral agents responsible for complying with certain moral obligations. The following question arises: if neighboring states do not agree to the initiatives, are there good reasons of proceed regardless? I appeal to existing analogues in public health as the standard for moral legitimacy and distill their structure of justification. First, there is a structurally “cosmopolitan” justification which appeals to the positive consequence for the global community. Second, there is a “perfectionist” justification which appeals to the goods bestowed upon the dissenting state. Third, there is a “free-rider” type of justification which frames dissent as morally wrong. I argue that border-crossing initiatives are at least consistent with the moral justification of recent public health initiatives insofar permitting certain sorts of paternalistic actions. I then suggest a defensible fourth way of justifying such initiatives by making appeal to a state’s obligations to its own citizens.
Philo-so-fun 