I would like to focus on Carens’ reply to the objection for open borders on the basis of special priorities for compatriots (in his penultimate chapter). I think he moves all too fast here (I will also be guilty of that here); in other words, Carens does not sufficiently address the objection.

Carens concedes that special obligations are salient features of our moral lives, but he also adds that such obligations might be outweighed by other more pressing duties. In short, Carens takes the right to movement as so fundamental that it trumps obligations (the content being something like directing resources) to compatriots. Here, I think he short-changes the weight (i.e. the content) of the special obligations owed to compatriots.

First, there seem to extreme cases where special obligations to compatriots do outweigh the fundamental right to movement. Imagine a state with a scarcity of resources; to use the family analogy, a starving family. Clearly, in these instances, the state has a duty to prioritize its citizens over respecting the right to movement of a noncitizen. Similarly, the parent would have a duty to feed their child over anybody else’s child. But perhaps this is a fringe case; a mere stipulation to open borders: after all, Carens does admit that states do not have a duty to admit refugees until the state can “no longer function.”

Let us move on to a second, more contentious, issue with Carens’ reply. If Carens’ reply rests on the rights of noncitizens (i.e. movement being fundamental) outweighing the rights of the compatriots, then a counter might be to argue that the rights of the compatriots are just as fundamental. What sorts of rights could they be? I think an argument can be made for property rights. Citizens contribute to the funds and resources which allow noncitizens to enter their borders and enjoy similar rights. It might be a stretch to say that citizens have first-order property rights to these funds and resources; however, they do have a direct claim to it since it must be used in the interest of the citizens. If we are weighing between the citizens’ right to do what they wish with their property and the noncitizens’ right to movement, the state ought to side with the citizens (this is where the weight special obligations tip the scales).

This second line of thought, I think, is a more principled objection against open borders. Citizens ought to have the right to do what they want with their property, and this extends to how the state distributes its wealth. If citizens choose to have the state divert resources and funds to allow noncitizens inside their borders, so much the better – however, citizens choosing to do so is supererogatory.

This argument amounts to border remaining closed to respect the property rights of its citizens. I do not think this relies on the assumption of a majoritarian democracy; in fact, I suspect Carens is assuming a constitutional democracy, and this argument stands even on his own terms. This is all very sketchy, but I think property rights can be defended (with some work) as fundamental as the right to movement.