Contemporary discussions of impartiality take it as a notion pervasive throughout morality, especially in conceptions of justice, fairness, or equality. The presupposition is subtle but can be teased out through a look at the moral virtues of partiality, like the special care of parents to their children or the special expectations between friends. These examples ostensibly pose issue to the assumption that impartiality is always required for an action to be properly moral. Euthyphro famously appealed to the higher piety of the gods in response to Socrates’ indignation to Euthyphro’s lack of filial regard; in other words, Euthyphro had faith that impartiality trumped his partiality towards his father. This essay traces to genealogy of impartiality and locates it to a divine commander, then argues that contemporary moral theory faces issues when proceeding with the assumption of impartiality absent some divine command theory. We can identify multiple instances of what I call “the fallacy of impartiality” in moral theorizing, such as the “demandingness” problem, “rule-worship,” and, what Michael Stocker calls, a “schizophrenia.” The upshots of this discussion are twofold: first, it identifies a religious vestige in modern moral theorizing in a faith in a notion of impartiality; second, it creates a lacuna for secular moral theories in that further justificatory work is needed for appeals to impartiality over partiality. This speaks to the methodological relevance of the philosophy of religion for topics in moral philosophy.