Tag: mcmaster

Ethics of Immigration: Commentary #2

I want look at the rhetorical structure of Carens’ argument; specifically, the arrangement of chapter 10 and 11. I want to focus on the rhetorical structure rather than the content because I suspect that any comment I would make on these two chapters will be dealt with in his last section.

Let me begin by commenting on how Carens orders his argument in this section, and how this order has rhetorical impact. His discussion on the rights and moral claims of refugees begins with the least controversial and existing practice. He often begins his chapter by appealing to a common ground or shared intuition (often a sympathetic vignette). Here, the uncontroversial stance Carens begins with is the principle of non-refoulement (appealing to the existing practice established under the Geneva Convention). It does not take much to move from this point to the idea that refugees seeking asylum have the moral claim on the state not to be sent back into peril. Carens subtly moves the reader from their own views to his own views.

So, Carens jabs, we agree that the principle of non-refoulement gives refugees moral claims on the state, but there are also implications to holding this view (what Carens calls “the moral logic”). As it stands, the principle does not fare well with our shared belief of equality (or justice): that is, there seems to be an issue with proportionality insofar as states being more burdened than others. This line of thinking is intuitive – for instance, if you and I had the duty of taking out the garbage whenever it is full, and I took it out for the past two months, I have grounds to complain that we are not sharing this duty equally. So what is a way that we can share the burden of the principle of non-refoulement? According to Carens, a formal duty for all countries to admit some refugees – going back to the garbage example, everybody now has a duty to take out the trash, not just the one who sees that it is full.

Since all states have a duty to accept some refugees, can we really deny entry? Again, it seems to be a consequence or implication of our shared beliefs in equality and freedom. This is Carens’ knockout punch, which seemed so far off in the distance at first, but he weakened our guards with his previous argument. He established that all borders should be somewhat open to meet the proportionality need of refugees. Now that we believe that all borders should be somewhat open, the open borders pill is much easier to swallow (and it essentially uses the same consistency reasoning as before – Carens calls this the “cantilever argument”).

I think we can learn from Carens about the importance rhetorical structure for philosophical argument. Philosophers often purport to be the pinnacle of abstract thinking, but many bias and preconceptions subtly disrupt our thinking. Rhetoric can be used to mitigate this. As someone who argues for a counterintuitive position, Carens makes excellent use of this rhetoric.