The Methodology
The case study “Contemporary War & Aggression Issue: Azerbaijan & Armenia” is a complex topic that deals with wide-ranging issues, meaning that the correct methodology must be used to conduct our research. To this end, our team picked some notable threads of interest: the historical developments of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: a historical study since the formation of the Ottoman Empire; regional geopolitics and the role of international and regional organizations; and the role of political economy in the region.
A recent peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2020 has the potential to bridge the gap and underlying mistrust to a certain extent between both nations. This could be the source of further diplomatic and social developments in the region which could lead to long-lasting stability.[1] There could also potentially be a focus on the Armenian participation in Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union which could play a major role in the economic side of the power equation.[2]
The Historical Context
The tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan began in the early 20th century and has rapidly evolved overtime as globalization and technology have come into play. To begin, World War One was a calamity of unprecedented proportions for the Caucasus region. At least 16 million people were killed and another 20 million were wounded, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires collapsed, boundaries changed dramatically, and large scale human migrations occurred.
The tensions between Armenia and Turkey (and indirectly Azerbaijan), is not simply one of oppressor and oppressed. Despite the events of World War One, until the Armenian assassination of numerous Turkish ambassadors in the early 1970s, Armenians, Azerbaijani, and Turks shared a personal connection. Individual Turks, Azerbaijani, and Armenians share a common Anatolian and Ottoman heritage and most aspects of its culture, even language. Furthermore, Turkey was also one of the first countries to recognize Armenia as an independent country following its breakage from the Soviet Union. Finally, Armenia and Turkey are not isolated from one another. The land border is the only border that is closed, air travel is possible between both countries, and trade still occurs between the two nations.
Contemporary Challenges
a) Regional Actors and Their Strategic Interest in the Conflict
Unfortunately, despite these connections and similarities, diplomatic ties between the two nations are far from amicable. The greatest source of tension is the regional/territorial dispute that Armenia claims over both Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turkey has made it clear that they would like to normalize its ties but asserts that Armenia needs to acknowledge their desired borders and territorial claims. Armenia asserts that these regions are rightfully theirs due to the strong number of ethnic Armenians that occupy the regions. For example, Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory, including by Armenia, but is dominated by ethnic Armenians who broke away from Baku, an Azerbaijani city. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan claim historical rights to these regions and say the previous ownership overrules the ethnic majority.
b) The Impact of Political Economy
Both sides also hold reasons why trust with the opposition and talks of diplomacy seem feeble. The current military aid of Turkey towards Armenia weakens trust between the nations’ alleged desire for diplomacy. “Currently, Turkey’s military exports to its ally Azerbaijan have risen six-fold [in 2020], with sales of drones and other military equipment rising to $77 million last month alone before fighting broke out over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, according to exports data” [3]. Considering the strength of Turkey’s military power (11 of 140 out of the countries considered for the annual GFP review), it can be understood why the Armenian government and Armenians feel threatened and pressured unfairly by the larger power’s backing of Azerbaijan.
c) Outcry For Nationalism
Another source of eroding trust recently comes from the diaspora of these countries and the hyper-nationalism that they possess relative to actual citizens of the ethnic groups’ nation). The mentality of holding residuals against the opposition is greatly embedded within the diaspora, which creates negative feelings against one another and makes feelings of amiability harder. This type of nationalism is referred to as “long-distance nationalism”: “a set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various geographical locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home” [4]. Actions taken by long-distance nationalists on behalf of this reputed ancestral home may include “voting, demonstrating, lobbying, contributing money, creating works of art, fighting, killing, and dying” [5].
Much of the expansion of long distance nationalism can be attributed to the exponential evolution of technology (i.e. social media). A significant degree of scholarly attention is being paid to topics such as how populist politics uses social media to instigate nationalist sentiments [6]. Digital technologies create new opportunities for citizens to participate in the symbolic construction of community and social movements, whether it be state-led patriotism or an oppositional minority movement [7]. In other words, nationalism has become even more pleasurable and engaging in the technological age. No longer is it an elitist enterprise: “it became more accessible for ordinary folk, which makes it an attractive framework for making sense of daily life in an increasingly complex world” [8]. The possibility to engage whenever possible makes nationalism an attractive way to be politically involved and feel a sense of purpose and belonging through engagement in the digital platform. Both the Armenian diaspora and Western world has said that Armenia deserves the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia is now hesitant to return them to Azerbaijan, even despite the large Azeribaijani population in the region.
The Role of the Media
Furthermore, Armenia is looked at fondly by the West, and is always seen as the victim in most Western media. The lack of fairness in representation in the media makes it hard for both sides to trust one another, as Azerbaijan is left constantly feeling demonized.
The Role of International and Regional Institutions in Peaceful Settlement of Dispute
Dialogue between the involved nations should replace statements made through a third party, such as declarations made by the United States. This type of intervention is non-neutral and non-constructive and therefore makes it more difficult for both sides to reconcile. Much of this tactic is due to the influence of the strong Armenian diaspora in Western countries. These individuals push their Western governments to support a more Armenian inclined policy, which deters Azerbaijan and Turkey from attempting reconciliation. For example, one of the biggest factors that caused the Armenian diaspora to outcry at a possible signing of accord was the stakes the government were willing to give up simply to find diplomacy, one of those was allowing Turkey to deny the genocide and the other was to increase the Turkish border and take Armenian land.
Consequently, the Armenian national narrative has been widely circulated in a series of aggressive public relations campaigns, creating the impression that there is widespread acceptance and even a consensus on the Armenian view of history. It is misleading to believe that there is a “political consensus” on this issue. In fact, in a limited number of countries, only around 20 out of 200 countries, have parliaments made declarations, mostly of a non-binding nature, supporting the Armenian view of history [9]. Not surprisingly, these are all countries where the Armenian diaspora is very active [10].
On the opposing side, the recent deal reached by the OSCE Minsk Group, a group created to encourage a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, has reversed the power balance in the conflict in favour of Azerbaijan as well as increasing power in the region to Azerbaijan’s supporters, Turkey and Russia. Under the terms of the agreement, Armenia was forced to withdraw from three areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, along with seven surrounding territories (). From dominating power in the region in the late 20th century, they now maintain only nominal political control of the region’s capital. This loss and pressure from Turkey and Russia as the Kremlin maintanis 2,000 peace keeping troops in a three-mile area of the Lachin corridor that connects Armenia to the region and the goal to create a joint peacekeeping center, only creates a greater feeling of a threat for Armenia.
In summary, the biggest challenges to forming diplomatic relations amongst these nations comes from the lack of trust that has grown from both political and military aggression/interest of third-parties within the conflict, pressure from their respective ethnic diasporas as well as territorial/historical disputes.
The Policy Recommendation
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should continue to develop deconfliction and confidence-building measures in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It should maintain regular contact with Turkey in areas that immediately threaten security of the Alliance (i.e. arms control, military transparency and maintaining channels of communication) to avoid misunderstandings in the region that could escalate into a major crisis.
The state of Russia in particular could mandate the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey. However, along with keeping open communications channels with both the warring parties, NATO should incentivize Turkey to develop healthy diplomatic relations with Armenia.[11]
Since the 1990s, NATO and Azerbaijan have worked closely in the Kosovo Force and the International Security Assistance Force in Kosovo and Afghanistan respectively. Along with Turkish involvement, NATO should therefore press Azerbaijan to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. If Azerbaijan agrees, NATO should incentivize all three parties with a direct European road connection, which would be particularly beneficial to the landlocked country of Armenia.
[1] “Relations with Azerbaijan.” n.d. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed June 3, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49111.htm.
[2] “The Eurasian Economic Union, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.” n.d. Eurasian Economic Union. Accessed June 9, 2021.
[3] Toksabay, Ece. “Turkish Arms Sales to Azerbaijan Surged before Nagorno-Karabakh Fighting.” Reuters, October 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-turkey-arms-int-idUSKBN26Z230.
[4]Schiller, Nina Glick. “Long-Distance Nationalism.” In Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, edited by Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian Skoggard, 570–80. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-29904-4_59.
[6]Krämer, Benjamin. “Populist Online Practices: The Function of the Internet in Right-Wing Populism.” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9 (September 2, 2017): 1293–1309. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328520.
[7]Yusupova, Guzel, and Peter Rutland. “Introduction: Transformation of Nationalism and Diaspora in the Digital Age.” Nations and Nationalism 27, no. 2 (2021): 325–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12683.
[9] Schiller, “Long-Distance Nationalism.”
[11] Ward, Alex. 2020. “The surprising Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal over Nagorno-Karabakh, explained.” Vox, November 10, 2020.
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