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Draft Essay: Godwin, Cottingham, Baron, and the Partialist Challenge to Consequentialist Moral Impartialism

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This paper attempts to outline the partialist challenge to consequentialist moral impartialism by drawing from the works of William Godwin, John Cottingham, and Marcia Baron. The aim is to situate the discussion between these writers and provide a brief (and somewhat crude) overview of the dialectic. Finally, I will develop some reasons to adopt a distinction between impersonal and personal morality, and how the distinction may alleviate some tensions between the partialism and impartialism.

Godwin’s model of utilitarianism seems to demand complete impartiality. Godwin tells us that it is our duty to maximize “the benefit of the whole.” (40) Obviously the whole entails the part – that is, a population consists of an aggregate of individuals – yet, actions that seem to be prudent on an individual basis may not maximize the benefit on the grander scale. Every decision must be tested by its contribution of maximizing benefit to the whole, and apart from this, other factors are of little relevance. We can thus evaluate decisions on the basis of how much a decision contributes to the benefit of the whole.

This model implies that certain individuals are of “more worth and importance than the other.” (41) Godwin considers a scenario where we are forced to choose between the life of the archbishop of Cambrai and the life of his chambermaid. Here we have some salient intuition[1] that we should save the archbishop. This is consistent with Godwin’s model that the archbishop contributes more to the benefit of the whole; in his words, “that life ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good.” (41) Perhaps we would let the archbishop die if the chambermaid was our mother or wife. He famously remarks, “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’ to overturn the decision of everlasting truth.” (42) Godwin says that the chambermaid being our mother or wife does not “alter the truth” (42) of the principle of maximizing the good of the whole. It looks like relational properties have little relevance on Godwin’s picture.

Nevertheless, relational properties have some relevance for Godwin insofar as it helps us with the application of his principle to our day-to-day activities.[2] He considers a scenario where somebody in need asks for money, but it is not entirely clear if it maximizes the good of the whole. Godwin answers, “if only one person offer himself to my knowledge of search, to me there is but one.” (47) Godwin understands that we cannot omnisciently apply his principle, so the fact that some individual makes their needs known to us is relevant for the application of his principle.[3]

Let us now look at a partialist challenge against consequentialist moral impartialism. [4] Baron’s quip on the matter is that “partiality is shortchanged.” (836) This is particularly true when it comes to personal relationships, which appear to “thrive on partial treatment.” (837) The worry is that impartialism precludes the possibility of personal relationships. Partialists want room for the special treatment of some individuals, but this conflicts with the impartialist’s agenda. As Baron suggests, Godwin’s type of consequentialist moral impartialism seems to be the prime target for the partialist’s challenge. Indeed, the partialist would say, “my relation, my companion, or my benefactor will of course in many instances obtain an uncommon portion of my regard,” (43) to which Godwin replies, “This compulsion however is founded only the present imperfection of human nature.” (43) It is clear that the detached impartialist outlook ought to always take priority over the partialist’s treatment loved ones.

An argument that the partialists bring is that it would be absurd to hold a moral theory that ignores the significance of personal relationships. We have a salient intuition that the fact that person “X” is my child has significance on how I act as a moral agent. For instance, Cottingham says that impartiality frowns upon tending to our sick child when we could be making a “greater contribution to human welfare by helping any other child in greater need of care and attention.” (88) This aspect of impartialism – that is, asking us to ignore personal relationships to maximize the good of the whole – appears to be unacceptable.  A moral theory should be rich enough to capture our basic moral intuitions.

Cottingham coins the impartialist’s positions as the “impartiality thesis.”[5] Godwin’s view seems to fit the mold. As earlier outlined, Godwin suggests that we should be blind to the fact that person “X” is our friend, mother, or child. Godwin goes further and says that we cannot show preferential treatment to ourselves; that if “I can promote the general good by my death […] I should be content to die.” (46) Even my personal projects should solely be directed for the general good, not a “shilling at the will of […] caprice,” and that I should “maintain my body and my mind in the utmost vigor and in the best condition for service.” (46) Cottingham thinks all this leads to “repugnant and absurd consequences which ultimately threaten the very basis of our humanity.” (83)

Cottingham has two challenges for the impartialist: first, is impartialism consistent with our psychology; second, if it is consistent, is it the right model for moral decisions? The first challenge takes an empirical form – namely, day-to-day life seems to indicate that impartiality is inconsistent with our general psychology. “To be a person […] implies the possession of plans, projects and desires,” (87) which all inevitably entail partiality towards oneself; moreover, friendships and family ties seem essential to us. The concern here is that various aspects of what is normally considered to be fundamental aspect of humanity are jettisoned. Perhaps adherence to the “impartiality thesis” is like asking us to have perfect memories or to never make mistakes.

Cottingham’s second challenge builds on his first. Hence, even if impartiality was feasible given human psychology, it does not follow that it is a good model to adopt. It is evident from our psychology that we value “special” (87) relationships with oneself and others. Conceptually, a “special” relationship “necessarily requires a certain exclusiveness: the concentration on particular individuals at the expense of others.” (89) If impartiality eliminates the “specialness” (90), then the impartialist model eliminates all “special” relationships. This leads to more absurd consequences – for instance, a parent giving no special attention to their child, which seems neglectful and contradictory to a parent’s duty. A proper model should not, as Cottingham puts it, “sever the crucial link between ethics and Eudaimonia, the good for man or human fulfillment.” (90)

Baron thinks Cottingham misinterprets Godwin. Baron suggests Godwin “never says that relational characteristics are per se morally irrelevant.” (840) Perhaps Godwin is not a staunch impartialist. As Baron puts it, “Godwin’s extreme views thus turn out to be based not primarily on a conception of impartiality or on moral notions which motivate it, such as fairness or equality.” (842) She thinks Godwin’s absurd conclusions are motivated by his “rather crude notion” (842) of utilitarianism. It is Godwin’s utilitarian principle of maximizing the good of the whole that overshadows any remnant of partialism. For instance, the chambermaid being my mother may significantly influence my decision to save her, but Godwin’s utilitarianism may have more robust demands that trump the significance of any relational properties. By and large, Baron’s approach is to demarcate Godwin’s utilitarianism from impartialism.

With this in mind, Baron believes Cottingham fails to distinguish “levels” (842) “at which impartiality might be deemed requisite.” (842) On this view, there are two levels of thinking: impartiality at the level of “rules or principles,” and impartiality at the level of deciding what to do in one’s “day-to-day activities.” (842) Baron thinks Cottingham’s “impartial standpoint” is ambiguous as to which level the impartiality thesis applies to. It would be fine if Cottingham’s thesis applies only to level 2 thinking, but some of his conclusions only work if they also apply to level 1 thinking; according to Baron, this is an unjustified jump, and Cottingham would need to provide a reason for saying impartiality as applied to level 2 thinking necessarily also applies to level 1 thinking as well.

All things considered, I find myself sympathetic to a view Baron opposes: namely, that personal relationships are only partly within the jurisdiction of impersonal morality, and in some special cases, completely independent of impersonal morality. Baron’s distinctions of levels for applying impartiality may even find extreme cases of partiality on the level of day-to-day activities excusable,[6] such as helping a friend dispose of a body; however, no interpretation would go as far as to require that one violate morality, that is, require that one help the friend dispose of a body. I think, however, there is some “specialness,” some je ne sais quoi, to certain relationships that make it completely independent of the realm of impersonal morality. For instance, if my wife, the woman I share this “specialness,” in her sane mind, asked me to help her dispose the body of a person she brutally murdered, I would find it my duty to oblige. This “specialness” might be called “love,” as described by C.S. Lewis, “Love is not affectionate feeling, but a steady wish for the loved person’s ultimate good as far as it can be obtained.” This might suggest that this morality qua “special” relationship also has a sort of consequentialist principle.[7]

What would this mean to the partialist challenge to consequentialist moral impartialism? The challenge would turn into a dilemma of which moral realm to appeal to for a verdict – that is, choosing between impersonal morality and personal morality. For instance, in Godwin’s case, we can say that impersonal morality demand that we save the archbishop over the unknown chambermaid; however, if that chambermaid was our wife, personal morality demands that we save her instead. 

Adjudication is beyond the scope of this paper, but aim of this paper is to develop the partialist challenge to consequentialist moral impartialism. We have seen one formulation of impartialism, in the form of Godwin’s utilitarianism, and one version of a challenge, provided by Cottingham’s two arguments; furthermore, we have seen Baron’s challenge to Cottingham’s challenge. Lastly, I provided some reasons to think that a distinction between personal and impersonal morality may have some use in this discussion.

References

Marcia Baron (1991), “Impartiality and Friendship,” Ethics 101(4): 836-857.

Godwin, W. (1798), ‘Enquiry concerning political justice’

John Cottingham (1983), “Ethics and Impartiality,” in Philosophical Studies 43(1): 83-99.

[1] By “salient intuition,” I mean something like a general idea or inclination of what the right course of action is. 

[2] I use some of Baron’s terms here because it is not far off from her “level” talk.

[3] The relational property in this case would be something like, “having knowledge of only this person’s specific need.”  

[4] For now, general definitions will suffice: partialism can be thought of as “being partial” (having certain exceptions or preference) when applying certain moral principles; the other camp, consequentialist moral impartialism, stipulates that one aim at the best consequence, without any exception. Impartialism can be looked at schematically, which in this case is applied to consequentialist principles.

[5] He states it as such: “when we are making moral decisions […], we ought not to give any special weight to our own desires and interests; instead of giving preferential treatment to ourselves, or to members of our own particular social group, we should try to adopt a neutral standpoint, detaching ourselves as far as possible from our own special desires and involvements.” (83)

[6] “Excusable” implying some degree of morality violation, whereas “permissible” would be morally neutral.

[7] Perhaps another illustration will reinforce my point. If a stranger were to ask me to hide a body, impersonal morality would demand that I turn them in. If this resulted in the stranger receiving the death penalty, I would not feel guilt but compunction – that is, some ill feeling, but not because I did something wrong. It may be more difficult to decide whether to appeal to personal or impersonal morality if a mere friend were to ask me to hide a body. If I turned the friend in and they were hanged because of it, I may again feel compunction because I did what impersonal morality demanded of me; however, I think that we are more inclined to feel guilt from personal morality. 

Principle of Arbitrariness: Literature Review #3

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In a liberal democracy, it is generally held that the legitimacy of a sovereign’s coercive action (viz. laws) is justified insofar as the sovereign meets some condition: popular examples include the harm principle, public justification, or rules nobody could reasonably reject.[1] Whatever the justificatory standards are, notions of arbitrariness are often appealed to and have regulative roles. For instance, arbitrariness can be used as a heuristic or test for what is primitively (morally) acceptable – Rawls takes this route and employs arbitrariness as a meta-theoretical test for justifying the original position and veil of ignorance (which in turn justify his requirements of justice).[2] Another more intuitive example is the role of arbitrariness in regulating reasoning – the judge, in deciding two identical cases, should not be affected by arbitrary factors like political leanings or an empty stomach. In bringing together the ideas of a sovereign’s coercive actions and notions of arbitrariness, the question becomes one about the rights of the citizen and what she is owed in virtue of her equal status.[3] If we take the view that everybody deserves, at minimum, equal concern and respect, then arbitrary laws fail to show equal concern and respect because it illegitimately coerces them.

Public Justification

A closer look at the relationship between sovereign and citizen is crucial for a legal-political conception of arbitrariness, particularly insofar as non-arbitrariness is a requirement for the exercise of political power. Such views begin with a familiar Kantian starting point: the priority of the dignity of persons. In virtue of this special status, everybody is owed equal treatment which must be expressed in the basic structures of society. Rawls[4] champions this view as “political liberalism” and sparks a vast discussion on public justification. The basic idea is that political power is always coercive power, and this coercion must be justified if we are to take seriously the idea that persons deserve equal respect.[5]

One obvious coercive political power is the imposition of laws. If a law is to be publicly justified, then the subjects of the coercive laws must have good or sufficient reason to endorse the law (this is sometimes referred to in the literature as “public reason liberalism”). Public reasons are the kinds of reasons[6] that can be shared by all citizens. For Rawls, this is achieved by an overlapping consensus, that is, reasonable citizens can endorse a political conception of justice (a part from their own comprehensive doctrines) and debate only using these shared views. For example, a Christian’s reasons to worship God are clearly not public reasons, yet the Christian’s reasons to endorse the view that public office should be open to all can be public reasons and consistent with her Christian doctrine. Both the legislature and judiciary ought to appeal to public reasons – and not their own non-public reasons – with respect to laws in order for the law’s coercive power over citizens to be justified.[7]

Democracy and Equality

It is important to emphasize that public justification does not simply mean the will of the legislative majority. In virtue of fundamental rights tied to equal standing and respect, those in the minority and lacking political power are still protected from being at the mercy of the legislative majority. Christiano[8] explores these questions of the moral underpinnings of democracy and liberal rights. Collective decisions through a democratic process have authority over us, but it is not clear how this is justified or how it relates to the “liberal rights”[9] that structure a constitution. For example, the political will of the legislature must abide by principles of democracy and the rights held by both the minority and the majority, but such normative principles, according to Christiano, are “vague and unsystematic.”[10] Thus, Christiano develops an account of democracy as “public equality” in decision-making.

The idea is intuitive: the unifying principle of a just society is that “all can see that they are being treated as equals.”[11] All coercive authority is justified on these grounds (as well as its limits), and what follows from this is that even those in the minority must be treated in a “publicly clear [way] as persons whose well-being matters and whose well-being matters equally.”[12] In other words, everybody has equal standing in collection decisions or else the authority is illegitimate.[13] Christiano’s justificatory tool is the “egalitarian standpoint of publicity,” which is supposed to make clear the facts of “diversity, disagreement, fallibility, and cognitive bias and the interests in being able to correct for others’ cognitive biases…”[14] This closely resembles Adam Smith’s impartial spectator, but it is focused on achieving equalities of interests.[15]

The Rights of Minority Views

At this point, some limits for the public reason liberals should be brought to the fore. Wolterstorff[16] has two particularly convincing arguments. The first is widely discussed: the premises of public reasons liberals are highly idealized. They assume reasons for rational agents in ideal states of affairs can adequately ground the justificatory standards for non-idealized agents. Wolterstorff argues that this is patronizing and fails to show due respect for persons.

A second, and more unique, criticism is that public reason liberals arbitrarily give more weight to secular reasons over religious reasons. Recall that a Christian’s reasons to worship God are by definition non-public reasons, so the Christian cannot invoke such reasons in public discourse. Wolterstorff remains unconvinced that the Christian must set aside their Christian reasons and instead only appeal to public reasons. This seems to privilege some conception of the good (or compressive doctrine) over another – namely, a secular conception of the good. What is striking here is that what is being purported as state neutrality is really an arbitrary favoring of a particular way of life. 

In a society containing a plurality of views, liberal neutrality[17] goes hand in hand with non-arbitrariness. Den Otter[18] investigates this by exploring the topic through a sustained analysis of polygamy (or “plural marriage”) with respect to (American) constitutional rights. Behind all this, there is a general notion of liberal neutrality which, in the face of pluralism, does not privilege one conception of the good over another (this is one of the facets of public justification).[19] From this, we can derive a right – that is publicly justified on terms others can reasonably accept – to choose our own conception of the good.[20]

In a pluralistic society, it might be easy to see how same-sex marriage can be justified as a right on constitutional grounds, and, according to Den Otter, the same justifications must also apply to polygamy.[21] American history had similar socio-political motivations for antipolygamy sentiments, particularly against Mormon groups and specious justifications of harm to families (e.g. failing to parse polygyny from polyamory, failing to account for the empirical data of alleged harms, presupposing as deviant or unacceptable, etc.).[22] All things equal, given current views on marriage, it would be arbitrary to exclude polygamous marriage.

[1] J Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[2] J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[3] Charles Taylor, “Hegel’s Ambiguous Legacy for Modern Liberalism” (1989) 10: 5-6 Cardozo L Rev 857.

[4] J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[5] Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism” (1999) 96: 12 The Journal of Philosophy 599.

[6] “Reasons” are simply consideration for favoring something. See T Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[7] R Den Otter, Judicial Review in an Age of Moral Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[8] T Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[9] Ibid at 132-190.

[10] Ibid at 1.

[11] Ibid at 2.

[12] Ibid at 5.

[13] For an account of political authority, see ibid at 232-260.

[14] Ibid at 89.

[15] B Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

[16] N Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[17] Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality” (1989) 99:4 Ethics 883.

[18] R Den Otter, In Defense of Plural Marriage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[19] Ibid at 281-284.

[20] For an analysis of fundamental rights relating to polygamy, see ibid at 176-205.

[21] For an equality-based analysis, see ibid at 244-272.

[22] For an analysis on the argument from gender inequality, see ibid at 65-122; and, for further arguments from child welfare, administrative considerations, and appeals to tradition/nature, see ibid at 123-174.