Anscombe’s rejection of the concepts of “moral obligation and moral duty,” in the absence of a divine lawgiver, shows a concern about the presumption that ethical standards are normative; that is, the idea that ethical standards seem to command or make claims on us, which then seems unjustified without some legitimate commander. Moral realists – like Prichard, Moore, or Ross – attempt to argue for the existence of intrinsically normative obligations and duties without appealing to a commander, yet it inevitably relies on an appeal to some sort of intuition and fails to address Anscombe’s worry.  Simon Keller’s Partiality (2013) presents a novel strategy to justify obligations and duties we have to intimates, like our friends and family; specifically, he appeals to the “phenomenology of partiality,” or our direct experience of intimates, which commands us to perform certain actions. I argue that an appeal to the phenomenology of partiality is epistemically similar to an appeal to a divine lawgiver, and that our experiences of partiality and partial obligations (or duties) provide examples of standards with legitimate normative force. The phenomenology of partiality, just like the appeal to a divine lawgiver, can justify their claims as, what Alvin Plantinga calls, “a properly basic belief” – such beliefs are primitive, like the belief in other minds or the belief in the existence of the external world. I further argue that the strategy of appealing to the phenomenology of partiality is categorically distinct from the moral realist’s appeal to intuition in that it meets different epistemic standards. My claim is that the appeal to the phenomenology of partiality, just like the appeal to the divine lawgiver, purports a higher epistemic standard than the moral realist’s rational intuition. The upshot is a justification of the normative force of obligations and duties which parallels the divine lawgiver.